A normative critique of the concept of sovereignty by Harris, Simon Edward
Durham E-Theses
A normative critique of the concept of sovereignty
Harris, Simon Edward
How to cite:
Harris, Simon Edward (2004) A normative critique of the concept of sovereignty, Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3041/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
A normative critique of the concept of sovereignty 
(One Volume) 
Simon Edward Harris 
A copyright of this thesis rests 
with the author. No quotation 
from it should be published 
without his prior written consent 
and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
Master of Arts 
University of Durham 
Department of Politics 
2004 
A normative critique of the concept of sovereignty 
Simon Edward Harris 
Abstract 
Sovereignty m contemporary international relations is facing a number of key 
norn1ative challenges. The anarchic precepts of the Hobbesian system are too narrow 
to meet the demands of the international community. The cosmopolitan approach to 
international relations is one which is equipped to deal with these problems and an 
evolution of sovereignty may be seen to be occurring. 
The foundation of the International Criminal Court asserts the necessity for universal 
individual responsibility and, as such, pierces the shell of sovereignty. The 'climate 
change regime' questions a state's responsibilities to other states, peoples and 
individuals under the guise of 'trans-border obligations', whilst the case for according 
rights to indigenous peoples examines the sovereign state's ability to protect and 
welcome diversity within its borders whilst simultaneously remaining within a 
cosmopolitan framework. All three case studies ask questions of the sovereign state's 
ability to deliver an acceptable level of justice for each global citizen. 
These three challenges are met via recourse to the theories of Andrew Linklater and 
John Rawls, in particular. What is argued for is a consistent notion of 'thin 
cosmopolitanism' which is able to guarantee fundamental rights for every individual. 
The idea of 'spatia-temporal justice', a concept which delivers duties and rights 
according to previous activities and policies, is also explicated. Spatia-temporal 
justice is viewed as a coherent liberal approach which is nevertheless able to accord 
different rights to different individuals on the basis of historical, economic and culture 
situatedness. 
Despite the intransigence of an international system embedded in notions of power 
politics and game theoretic elements, elements of cosmopolitanism can be seen to be 
emerging with regard to all three case studies and, indeed, in the wider international 
political life. 
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Introduction 
This essay seeks to investigate the nonnative worth of sovereignty in contemporary 
international relations, centring upon the new moral and political dilemmas it faces in 
post-Cold War politics. The three challenges discussed in this essay are the ability of 
the concept to respond effectively to challenges represented by universal individual 
responsibility, the recognition of trans-border obligations and also the ability of the 
state to embrace diversity within its boundaries in a morally appealing manner. These 
three challenges are all aspects of a single cosmopolitan case for modifying 
sovereignty, although different aspects of this are highlighted in each case study. 
The first chapter articulates more precisely the concept of state sovereignty, briefly 
investigating its history and the various definitions that have been provided, in order 
to anchor the essay more successfully. The definition of the state owes much to Alan 
James' work whilst the definition of sovereignty focuses closely on Hinsley's work, 
although the concept is treated throughout the essay as a working hypothesis, since 
deeper investigation into the foundations of sovereignty are beyond the remit of this 
work. Chapter One also investigates the moral worth of 'classical' or 'Westphalian' 
sovereignty drawing on the works of Bodin, Hobbes and Locke in particular. In 
setting out the moral value of the concept as traditionally conceived, indicating both 
its raison d 'etre in international relations as well as its limitations, this section 
provides an analytical framework against which the cosmopolitan challenges are set. 
The three challenges are introduced in the first chapter in order to provide an 
overview of the theoretical literature on the subject, but are then developed in 
subsequent chapters which focus on contemporary issues and debates. Chapter Two, 
which looks at the notion of universal individual responsibility, focuses on the 
foundation of the International Criminal Court. It argues that such an institution 
exemplifies the manner in which a sovereign state can no longer, morally or 
politically, claim exclusive concern or authority over its citizens. After outlining the 
'human rights regime' following the end of the Second World War, the chapter moves 
forward to the Rome Conference on the establishment of the Court which raises a 
number of issues relating to sovereignty, such as universal jurisdiction, individual 
accountability and the role of an independent prosecutor, all of which are investigated 
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throughout the course of the chapter. The role of non-governmental organisations and 
of the existence of a nascent 'global civil society' is also included. The improvement 
argued for in Chapter Two corresponds roughly with the mode of reasoning 
developed by Andrew Linklater, and indeed, the concept of 'thin cosmopolitanism' is 
clearly visible in much of the essay. 
Trans-border obligations are also viewed as a significant theoretical challenge facing 
sovereignty. The idea that the impact of activity within sovereign states is now the 
concern of all, especially regarding how they impact upon their immediate neighbours 
and those further away, has grown in recent decades and is now clearly visible with 
regard to the international management of environmental problems. Hence, Chapter 
Three, in tying in with the section in Chapter One, seeks to investigate the way in 
which climate change has been handled. It focuses on the Kyoto Protocol, indicating 
agreements between states and also the issues, mainly financial, which reinforce 
sovereign individualism. 
One of the most taxing issues in international relations concerns indigenous peoples 
and the rights that they ought to enjoy. As groups who have enjoyed political 
autonomy, their relationship with the modern state is troublesome and so Chapter 
Four seeks to argue that a plausible solution can be reached which maintains its 
cosmopolitan credentials rather than reverting to a communitarian position. This 
issue is, arguably, the most complex of the three case studies and thus includes a good 
deal of theoretical discussion on the issue, suggesting a range of justifications for 
special rights, focusing on the types of justice that a morally-appealing variant of 
sovereignty ought to be able to produce. The empirical evidence in this chapter 
focuses mainly on the experiences of indigenous peoples in the 'new world'. 
The role of non-governmental organisations, epistemic communities and of 'global 
civil society' is investigated in each of the case studies. These bodies and groups are 
increasing in their importance in international relations, reflecting, as they do, a form 
of moral conscience for the sovereign state with regard to issues of justice, be it 
transnational or sub-national, as well as constituting organs which legitimate and 
direct the policy of sovereign states on matters such as environmental policy. The 
importance of these bodies reflects an understanding that sovereignty is, in a sense, 
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becoming contingent, and that the actions of states are subject to the checks and 
balances offered by transnational bodies who have the ability to lodge credible 
critiques and suggestions for moral improvement. The role of international networks 
such as epistemic communities also feeds into a discussion of policymaking issues on 
the part of states, and the differing attitudes adopted, especially with regard to the so-
called 'Euro-Atlantic split', is a further issue analysed throughout the essay. 
This essay also aims to demonstrate that in order to produce a normative improvement 
in sovereignty, issues of spatia-temporal justice must also be included. This category, 
which accounts for the past actions of sovereign states, both in terms of cumulative 
industrial output and also moral culpability for enforced relationships of inequality 
and subjugation, can be seen to be emerging with regard to environmental problems 
and also the rights of indigenous peoples. This justice is rationalized as forming an 
extension of John Rawls' cosmopolitanism in particular, but also fits within the 
cosmopolitan schemas offered by a range of theorists, including Linklater. 
In conclusion, this essay atms to demonstrate that sovereignty, as a morally 
contestable concept, is reacting to new challenges in international relations, and is 
able to manage these in order to evolve into a contingent and morally-appealing 
variant which is able to reconcile its Hobbesian roots with a burgeoning sense of 
cosmopolitanism, which is now a hallmark of many issues and debates. 
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Chapter One: The Normative Worth of Sovereignty in International Relations 
Theory 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces a number of key ideas and theories which underpin the case 
studies in the later chapters. It fulfils a number of important tasks, beginning firstly 
with a short section which attempts to define sovereignty, assessing what makes a 
state sovereign and what the concept entails practically. What this section does not do 
is go too deeply into definitions of sovereignty. Rather, it seeks a usable working 
definition in order to illustrate the issues contained within the rest of the essay. Nor 
does this involve a history of the concept, although there is a discussion of historical 
change which is contained within the section which assesses the concept's normative 
worth. The section discussing sovereignty's normative worth begins with a 
discussion of legitimacy in international relations, a factor which ties in with the 
previous discussion of what makes a state sovereign in the first place. Following this, 
the chapter moves chronologically from Bodin and Hobbes, examining 'classical' or 
Westphalian sovereignty, to Kant's cosmopolitanism and the effect that his moral 
theory has had on contemporary international relations analyses. Following this, three 
of the challenges to sovereignty offered by the cosmopolitan critique are investigated, 
with each centring upon theoretical issues discussed during the case studies in the 
latter chapters. The communitarian and realist responses to the cosmopolitan notions 
espoused by Linklater, Pogge and Held, for example, are considered throughout these 
discussions and the criticisms are designed to pinpoint precisely the kinds of 
objections faced by the measures and activities considered in the later chapters. 
Section One: Characterizing Sovereignty 
This essay intends to ask normative questions of the concept of sovereignty. Hence, it 
is perhaps sensible to begin with a section outlining precisely what this term refers to. 
However, this is no small task as there exists a great selection of works by theorists all 
proffering slightly different interpretations. The first question that needs to be 
addressed is quite simple; what is sovereignty? When a state community is defined as 
being sovereign what can be said to be qualitatively different between these and other 
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groups? This apparently simple question instead produces a range of answers, each 
bound in semantics and overlapping issues of autonomy and control as well as legal 
prerogatives. Indeed, this impasse is so sizeable that is has been suggested that the 
concept is indefinable and is something everyone is keen to have but that few can 
justify why or how they have it. 1 The postmodem tum in theory argues that the 
concept is indefinable and that we are limited solely to examining the definitions of 
others2 whilst Bartelson's conception draws on Kant's 'parergon', a frame which does 
the framing and which is neither inside nor outside, since it is the condition for the 
possibility of both.3 Nevertheless, it is agreed that the term is largely unproblematic 
when used in practice and, as Cynthia Weber argues, it is only ever challenged by 
'constitutional lawyers and other connoisseurs of fine lines, '4 and in an essay of this 
length it is unwise to delve too deeply for fear of losing track of the issue at hand. 
Stephen Krasner defines four key elements which all fit under the umbrella of 
sovereignty. 5 'Domestic sovereignty' refers closely to the work of Hobbes and Bodin 
in particular, whose main political concerns were with erecting a central legitimate 
authority to govern internally over a fixed territory. Hinsley notes that, initially at 
least, sovereignty was largely a matter of asserting that there existed 'a final and 
absolute authority in the political community; and everything that needs to be added 
to complete the definition is added if this statement is continued in the following 
words: 'and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere. ' 6 Secondly, there is 
'interdependence sovereignty' which emphasises control in international politics 
rather than authority, particularly in relation to globalised issues such as 
environmental degradation and the AIDS epidemic. For the purposes of this essay, 
however, this theoretical category can, to an extent, be disregarded since the main aim 
here is to discuss the way in which nations are ceding their authority rather than 
investigating their autonomy,7 although control of events and processes is an essential 
1 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London, Allen and Unwin, 
1986), p. 18 
2 As with Jens Bartelson's The Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, CUP, 1995) 
3 John Hoffman, 'Blind Alleys: Can We Define Sovereignty?', Politics, Vol. 17 (1997), pp. 53-58, p. 
56 
4 Cynthia Weber quoted in John Hoffman, 'Blind Alleys', p. 54 
5 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1999) 
6 F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge, CUP, 1986), pp. 25-6 
7 Robert Jackson's 'Sovereignty in World Politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical 
Landscape', Political Studies, Vol. 47 (1999), pp. 431-456 discusses at length the difference between 
autonomy and authority especially with regard to economic matters 
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aspect of much discussed below, particularly in Chapter Three which focuses on 
environmental problems. 'International legal sovereignty' is connected to the 
recognition of a state as a legitimate sovereign political entity along with the legal 
independence that this involves. The equality of sovereign states was first formulated 
by Vattel in Le droit de gens, based on the logic that if, as with the domestic analogy, 
all men are equal, then so, internationally, are all states. 8 The final category, often 
thought to be the most important is Westphalian sovereignty, which Krasner argues to 
mean that states 'exist in specific territories, within which domestic political 
authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behavior (sic ).'9 
To be sovereign a state must possess a fixed territory, a permanent population and a 
government. These are necessary but insufficient conditions, since many areas of the 
world possess these but are not able to act in the international community. James 
asserts that what divides the sovereign and non-sovereign, essentially, is constitutional 
independence. 10 Sovereignty is a legal institution inasmuch as what an independent 
constitution does is provide the force of law which can be enacted on a given 
population and territory and rejects the existence of such authority elsewhere, except 
with the consent of the constitutionally constituted authority. This notion is supported 
further by the fact that international law presupposes sovereignty. Even when 
considering the human rights regime today, the United Nations (UN) clearly awards 
precedence to the state both in its Charter and in its activities, as evinced by the fact 
that humanitarian intervention remains illegal. 11 Sovereignty is also absolute in that a 
state either possesses it or it does not. This is to say nothing of a state's capabilities or 
autonomy, merely its constitutional separateness. The sovereignty a state possesses is 
indivisible and no outside body may make decisions for it. However, this does not 
mean that powers cannot be delegated outside of the state and that the decision 
process cannot be external as instruments such as treaties, bilateral agreements and so 
forth can all limit a state's actions, but only if it has consented to such limitations. 
Even at this juncture, it is not guaranteed that a state with constitutional independence 
will be considered sovereign, the final step being that of recognition. This is a 
8 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 14 
9 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 20 
10 Alan James, 'The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society', Political 
Studies, Vol. 47 (1999), pp. 457-473 
11 Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945) 
[http://www.un.org/aboutun/charterl) I October 2003 
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unilateral act taken by an individual state, formally recognising the existence of 
another legitimate sovereign state. Recognition may be withheld and this tactic has 
been used for normative purposes, as with Transkei discussed below, and similarly it 
may also be hastily conferred upon new states in order to attempt to guarantee rights 
to the oppressed, as occurred in the former Yugoslavia. 
Section Two: The Normative Worth of Sovereignty 
Having discussed briefly what is meant when sovereignty in international relations is 
referred to, the following section considers what is essentially the main issue at hand 
in this essay, namely the normative desirability of sovereignty. This section moves 
roughly chronologically beginning with the writings of Jean Bodin and Thomas 
Hobbes. To view the evolution of the theory surrounding the subject is to stress the 
historico-political situatedness of each theory for, whilst many claim that sovereignty 
is immutable, this is probably a mere romanticisation of the past in order to legitimate 
the present. Contemporary views on sovereignty are then investigated utilising Molly 
Cochran's key schism, the cosmopolitan and communitarian divide. 12 Throughout the 
examination of each theory for normative improvement or otherwise, criticism is also 
noted, since this section refers not only to whether sovereignty needs to be improved, 
but also whether this is at all likely. The critique of Westphalian sovereignty also 
includes references to other types of sovereignty of growing importance, such as 
environmental and human sovereignty, as well as variants which address sub-state 
communities, such as that held by indigenous peoples. 
The critique of Westphalian or 'classical' sovereignty refers to 'normative 
improvement', which, for the purposes of this essay, includes the incorporation into 
international relations of the three cosmopolitan challenges discussed throughout. 
The issue of legitimacy and sovereignty 
Legitimacy is at the heart of all issues surrounding sovereignty. What, in essence, 
may be said is that sovereignty is an issue that is, at all junctures, normatively coupled 
12 Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1999) 
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with legitimacy and the changing perceptions of it are, intrinsically, moral 
assessments. 13 For the purposes of this essay, legitimacy may be defined as 'a 
generalized sentiment or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constmcted system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.' 14 
The legitimacy of state sovereignty 1s a subject that has come to prommence 
particularly since the end of the Cold War. The Cold War was a period of history in 
which survival was perceived to be the sole priority but nevertheless, as Paul Taylor 
argues, there existed throughout a sense of a burgeoning 'international community' 
the rules of which were acknowledged, if not exactly adhered to. 15 Taylor notes that 
the state's right to act without moral limitations, which may be viewed as the modem 
equivalent of the divine order, was mitigated throughout this period, 16 whilst 
McCorquodale notes that the state is not what is in question but rather the notion that 
it is an unquestionable moral good. McCorquodale illustrates this by demonstrating 
that human rights have blunted the state's power to act unchecked by moral criticism, 
arguing that the 'commitment to applying international human rights law to the right 
of self-determination reinforces the acknowledgement of states that their sovereignty 
is not absolute at least as far as the treatment of persons and groups on their territory 
is concerned.' 17 What this assertion rests upon is the view that state sovereignty and 
cultural relativism cannot be used as an absolute defence against more cosmopolitan 
norms and values, an important argument which has impacted massively upon the 
formation of the International Criminal Court (see Chapter Two) and, to a lesser 
extent, the treatment of indigenous peoples (see Chapter Four). 
It may be argued that the practical results of sovereignty's normative improvement 
were discernible throughout the 1990s, as evinced by the fact that the UN Security 
Council approved Resolution SC940, which called for an armed intervention in Haiti 
13 David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Hampshire, Macmillan Press, 1991) 
14 Mark Suchman quoted in Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics', 
International Organisation, Vol. 53 (1999), pp. 379-408, p. 387 
15 Paul Taylor, 'The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of 
Sovereignty', Political Studies, Vol. 47 (1999), pp. 538-565, p. 539 
16 Paul Taylor, 'Proactive Cosmopolitanism', p. 539 
17 Robert McCorquodale quoted in Taylor, 'Proactive Cosmopolitanism', p. 545 
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to restore its democratically elected government. 18 Thus, the legitimacy of Haiti's 
sovereignty was viewed as being fundamentally contingent on it possessing a 
democratically elected government, rather than merely possessing an effective 
government which had previously been a fundamental criterion in anointing a 
territory with statehood. Furthermore, it may also be possible to view this decision as 
the tempering of sovereignty by the international community. This is particularly 
important when considering global challenges facing the sovereign state today. Many 
globalisation theorists are heralding the end of the modem state 19 but the opposite 
may also clearly be seen. James and Jackson20 note this contrary conclusion, 
contending that via measures such as the Security Council's Haiti resolution there 
exists an effort to sustain the state by re-legitimising it in the face of cosmopolitan 
demands borne of the human rights culture and the globalisation of politics in general. 
Indeed, it may be seen that many actions discussed in this essay recognise this re-
legitimisation, particularly with regard to indigenous rights. 
The function of recognising states may also be increasingly subject to normative 
considerations, with the UN becoming the chief organ by which sovereignty is 
awarded, rather than the rather ad hoc methodology adopted previously, a process 
which has had disastrous results as can be seen in the Badinter Commission's 
response to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.21 The additional requirement that 
states ought to be, in keeping with the spirit of the international community, well-
founded, includes the requirement that aspiring states need to possess, according to 
Taylor, the ability to partake in international civil society and that they are both able 
and willing to provide acceptable levels of decency and internal welfare.22 
Furthermore, it is suggested that it may soon be possible to view sovereignty as 
contingent and, therefore, removable and that certain states may soon be viewed as 
unsovere1gn. The notion that aspiring states ought to meet the norms of the 
international community is an interesting development considering that the norms of 
the international community themselves are a product ofthe sovereignty ofstates.23 
18 Paul Taylor, 'Proactive Cosmopolitanism', p. 555 
19 See the discussion of Held in particular, below 
20 Robert Jackson and Alan James, States in a Changing World: a Contemporary Analysis (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1993) 
21 Robert Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 448 
22 Paul Taylor, 'Proactive Cosmopolitanism', p. 560 
23 Paul Taylor, 'Proactive Cosmopolitanism', p. 565 
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The UN's role in legitimating sovereignty, however, can be traced back to its earliest 
years. For example, when South Africa attempted to found Bantustans or independent 
republics to legitimate their apartheid policies, the international community was quick 
to denounce any state which emerged as a result of racial policies. Thus, Transkei, 
which fitted the requirements for classical sovereignty by possessing defined territory, 
a people and a constitutionally independent government, was declared invalid by all 
members of the UN.24 What this action indicates is that despite a territory meeting 
juridical and empirical criteria for statehood, nevertheless, the would-be state had to 
be viewed from a normative position. The fundamental question was posed was, 'was 
it right that this state exists?'. The international community emphatically answered 
that it was not, thereby indicating that sovereignty was contingent on meeting certain 
moral requirements. 
The UN's legitimating function corresponds with, amongst others, Reus-Smit's and 
Jackson's theses that sovereignty occasionally modifies itself in order to align with 
the historical and moral conditions of the international system?5 This is particularly 
evident since the end of the Second World War where sovereignty has taken a human 
rights-based tum which, according to Reus-Smit and unlike most theorists' opinions, 
does not reflect a conflict between sovereignty and human rights as constituting 
mutually contradictory systems but, rather, two aspects of the same discourse which 
attempts to 'justifY territorial particularism on the grounds of ethical universalism, ' 26 
an argument which queries the assertion that human rights are a result of the process 
of decolonisation. Indeed, the UN's statements legitimating decolonisation are 
resolute in their promotion of human rights, with the 1960 Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples linking 'faith in 
fundamental human rights' with statehood?7 
The post-Second World War change was catalysed by Nazi Germany's incalculable 
abuse of human rights and, in the decades following, there developed a critique of 
24 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 146-8 
25 See Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics' and Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the 
State (Princeton, NJ, Princeton, University Press, 1999) 
26 Christian Reus-S mit, 'Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 27 (200 I), pp. 519-538, p. 520 
27 As reported in Reus-S mit, 'Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty', p.536 
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Hobbesian sovereignty which had entrenched itself during the period and which 
promoted the nation-state above all other values. The UN, in particular, presided over 
the development of an extensive body of international human rights law that 
'recaptured, in a substantially purified form, the morally appealing idea of adherence 
to shared standards of justice as a condition for full membership in international 
society, ' 28 though the remit of this is currently debatable and potentially one of the 
reasons why adherents of classic Westphalian sovereignty are unwilling to part with 
the reified concept of total jurisdiction. Stanley Hoffman, for example, argues that 
although human rights have questioned the state's right to go to war and to do 
whatever it likes, nevertheless they have had little tangible impact on international 
politics, whereas Kathryn Sikkink argues that the doctrine of internationally protected 
human rights offers one of the most powerful critiques of sovereignty as currently 
constituted, and the prominence of human rights law and foreign policies which 
account for these rights demonstrate the shifting sands of sovereignty as a reflection 
ofthe state's 'moral purpose.'29 
The normative worth of Hobbesian sovereignty and its critics 
The history of sovereignty and its normative value, as noted above, may be viewed as 
being bound in situatedness, that its definition has evolved as the result of 
circumstances and tensions within particular situations. The following section 
sketches the evolution of sovereignty as developed by Thomas Hobbes and, firstly, 
Jean Bodin. Both theorists' works, but particularly Hobbes', have been utilised to 
develop complex political, systemic and moral arguments which inform and frame 
modem international relations. These theorists' works are critiqued throughout and 
this section leads into a discussion of more cosmopolitan understandings of the term. 
Jean Bodin's Six livres de Ia nipublique first crystallised modem sovereignty. 
Written during the height of the civil war between the Catholics and Huguenots, it 
presents the case for a central authority which should be able to wield unlimited 
power. Bodin defines sovereignty as the 'supreme power over citizens and subjects 
28 Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?', International Affairs, Vol. 74 
(1998), pp. I -23, p.l3 
29 Reus-Smit, 'Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty', p. 522 
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unrestrained by law,'30 which effectively results in a power which is unlimited in 
duration within a territory. Though seemingly absolute, Bodin's prince, however, 
remains subordinate to the law of God and nature, and here it may be noted how 
medieval moralistic notions creep back into what is, in essence, a thoroughly modem 
interpretation of how power must be organised within a territory. Bodin thus leaves 
an important dilemma in the balance since he does not resolve the issue of whether 
the prince's authority rest on moral, customary or coercive authority. Using W.J. 
Rees' schema, moral authority resides in people obeying laws simply because they 
feel that they are just and fair; customary authority revolves around obeying a law for 
fear of incurring the disapproval of other persons and is usually associated with the 
violation of social norms, customs or conventions, whilst coercive authority rests on 
obeying a law simply because it is backed by force. 31 
Hobbes presents a similarly pessimistic view of human affairs, proposing the notion 
that a pre-sovereign community is in the 'state of nature' whereby all are susceptible 
to attacks from all. Hence, it is entirely reasonable and nom1atively valuable to cede 
powers to an over-arching authority, a Leviathan, in order to protect oneself. Hobbes' 
work also introduces the idea of 'a social contract', a tacit or otherwise agreement 
between the sovereign and citizen, a concept which has impacted massively on all 
areas of politics throughout the centuries. Though Bodin and Hobbes' views of 
sovereignty are undoubtedly attractive when one is faced by a state of international 
anarchy, their normative value is highly vulnerable to criticism. Both wrote in times 
of great crisis when an authority who would guarantee a person's continuing existence 
would have, of course, been highly attractive, but their very context seems to damage 
the credibility of their ideas when applied to the modem world. Only the hardiest of 
realists would argue that the international system today mirrors the civil wars of 
France and England but, nevertheless, these paradigms suggest, feed, inform and 
structure the ways in which international relationships are conceived. Constructivists 
charge that the way in which international relations is studied is the prime reason why 
classical sovereignty remains. It is argued that by constant referral to Hobbesian 
30 Jean Bodin quoted in Joseph A. Camilleri, 'Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmented 
World', in R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political 
Community (London, Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 13-44, p. 16 
31 W.J. Rees in Camilleri 'Rethinking Sovereignty', p. 16 
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anarchy the notion has become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.32 That is to 
say, states are violent and protect their sovereignty belligerently because they have 
been told to do so. The violence or 'war syndrome' which sovereignty seemingly 
generates has been dubbed 'the inevitable outgrowth of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, ,33 with sovereignty being viewed as the respectable word for chauvinist 
nationalism which has 'already launched our planet on a thousand wars . .34 Certainly 
the political meshing of sovereignty and nationalism is a heady cocktail which has, 
especially in the twentieth century, produced wars of unprecedented ferocity which 
have invariably been legitimated by recourse to the principle of state sovereignty as 
an inviolate concept. Furthermore, Hedley Bull contends that sovereignty has limited 
the political imagination, especially in the West. 35 The totalising trend, however, 
seems to have been reversed, to an extent, in favour of a more morally appealing 
approach which recognises communities outside of the nation state. 
By examining the international system in such a manner and loading the analyses with 
Hobbesian intellectual values and predispositions, it is wholly unsurprising that 
sovereignty remains such a vital component of most theorists' and policymakers' 
vocabularies. It is also worth noting that the realist conception of international 
relations, driven by the conclusions of Thucydides and Waltz, remain particularly pre-
eminent in US politics as opposed to those of the European Union. Robert Keohane's 
analysis of the differences between European and American attitudes to sovereignty 
examines the political culture of each, noting how symbols of nationalism and 
military strength are used to support the case for a more absolute sovereignty. He 
refers to the Pentagon as being a lynchpin in the American psyche to which most US 
citizens turn over issues such as the ICC, whereas Europeans are more likely, in the 
absence of such strong institutions, to look to promote values and more cosmopolitan 
ends, preferring the unheroic requirements of bureaucratic compromise to the rallying 
call of the flag and the armed forces. 36 The discrepancy in sovereignty may impact 
32 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', in 
Andrew Linklater (Ed.) International Relarions: Critical Concepts Vol. II (London, Routledge, 2000), 
pp. 615-664 
33 Kurt Waldheim quoted in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 259 
34 Hannah Arendt quoted in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 261 
35 Hedley Bull noted in Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998), p. 34 
36 Robert Keohane, 'Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States", JCMS, Vol. 
40, (2002), pp. 743-65 
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upon international politics in the future. Indeed, hints of this Euro-Atlantic 
conceptual tension can already be felt especially with regard to the ICC and the Kyoto 
Protocol, from both of which the USA has distanced itself. What realist conceptions, 
as discussed above, do, above all, is reinforce the primacy of the 'fact', the 
empirically testable in world politics, rather than setting normatively-based agendas. 
John Locke extensively modified Hobbes' thought by introducing inalienable human 
rights. Here naturalistic, medieval assumptions were reintroduced, thereby arguing 
that moral laws are both intrinsic and inherently superior to positive laws. The 
primacy of the moral over the politically expedient is a powerful weapon for those 
who wish to view a normative improvement in sovereignty and, as long as the concept 
is not viewed in an ahistorical manner, as a theoretical given, then perhaps change is 
possible. Locke also hints at the concept of legitimacy when asserting that a 
sovereign who infringes inalienable human rights automatically forfeits their right and 
authority to govern. Thus, Locke demonstrates that sovereignty is a contingent notion 
and indeed, this contingency can clearly be viewed in the arrival of the International 
Criminal Court (see Chapter Two). 
The common apprehension equates the retention of sovereignty with strength but 
there is evidence to suggest that this link is not as persuasive as political rhetoric 
would indicate and that 'pooled' sovereignty offers an opportunity for states to 
succeed through cooperation. For example, states like Rwanda, with well-defined 
sovereign structures, allowed extremists to take power effectively. Equally, Robert 
Keohane maintains that sovereignty has been a disaster for 'the Cypruses, Somalias 
and Afghanistans of this world,' which have all struggled, whereas the post-Second 
World War West Germany flourished even though it was only 'semi-sovereign. ' 37 In 
this way, accepting the matrix of norms and institutions that direct international 
society may be viewed, not as a sign of weakness, but rather, as a sign of strength, 
emphasising what has been dubbed 'the new sovereignty.' The 'new sovereignty' 
emerges from the fact that the 'only way most states can realize and express their 
37 Robert Keohane, 'Ironies of Sovereignty', p. 756 
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sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the 
international system . .JS 
To treat sovereignty as an admirable quality, as a normatively desirable characteristic, 
is contested by, amongst others, Laski who maintains that it, 'would be of lasting 
benefit to political science if the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered,' on 
the grounds that, 'it is at least probable that it has dangerous moral consequences' and 
moreover, 'is of dubious correctness in fact. .39 Hence, classical sovereignty is 
morally undesirable since it possesses a false impression of itself as an immutable 
concept whereas in the 'nitty-gritty' of politics it does not act as such. The rhetoric of 
politics and the parameters of debate, which assume sovereignty to be fact, generate a 
plethora of discrepancies which create more problems than they solve. Such a 
conclusion provides a neat fit with the postmodern critique, which argues that the 
historical specificity of the term means that the schism between the juridical 
interpretation and the political fact results in sovereignty, as currently perceived, 
being undesirable. Ironically, the international lawyer chastises the juridical concept 
of sovereignty, questioning whether 'any single word has ever caused ... so much 
international lawlessness?'40 This theme leads into the need for checks and balances 
on unlimited sovereignty as provided by the ICC. An International Court of Justice 
judge echoed this sentiment when asserting that one of the essential features of 
current international law was 'curbing ... the pretensions and aberrations of the 
doctrine of sovereignty, '41 indicating that it can not be feasibly treated as a concept 
unchecked for excesses. Optimistic thinkers of a Kantian persuasion may, therefore, 
be ready to argue that the message that an improvement in state behaviour is 
necessary is finally being understood, and that the beginnings of this process, which 
began after the end of the Second World War, may be felt in a number of areas, 
including those analysed below in the three illustrative chapters. 
38 Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (London, Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 27 
39 Harold Laski, quoted in Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 216 
40 George Catlin quoted in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 259 
41 An ICJ Judge quoted in Alan James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 259 
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Sovereignty as the supplier of order 
The modem international system does not resemble Hobbes' state of nature, which 
predicted that the absence of government would inevitably lead to an inability to 
develop industry, agriculture, navigation or trade.42 What mitigates this potential 
impasse is order, which the traditional state system does offer. In international 
society, rules are ever-present but they are not a necessary definition. This order then 
translates into a society of states which Bull declares to exist when a group of states, 
conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the 
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their 
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.43 Thus, 
it may be argued that sovereignty in its present form is the grundnorm of international 
relations which aids the maintenance of international order. The rules which are 
communicated and administered, and above all, legitimised must, however, be 
capable of change in order that they remain valid and it may be ventured that a more 
flexible form of sovereignty may be necessary to retain order.44 
The post-Cold War era has witnessed an explosion in deep-seated ethnic tensions, 
which have transformed the dangers of the international society from purely statist 
affairs, whereby two or more states fear each other's political and economic powers or 
their ideology, to a more nuanced and potentially explosive world. Although, 
undoubtedly, Samuel Huntington over-emphasised the clash of civilizations, 
nevertheless there lies in his work the kernel of truth that ethnic, religious and cultural 
affairs, which are transnational, will have a much greater impact on the manner in 
which international affairs are formulated. 45 Indeed, already in the Balkans during 
NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo the potential impact of ethnic warfare 
has been judged to be grounds enough to sidestep internal sovereignty for a greater 
cosmopolitan good. 
42 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (2nd Ed.) (New York, 
Columbia UP, 1995), p. 45 
43 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 9 
44 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 54 
45 Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 ( 1993), pp. 22-49 
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Hence, Bull views sovereignty as a normative good, as a foundation upon which order 
can be realised. In this sense, order operates as a facilitator for the production of other 
values and it is important to recognise this, but there remains in international society a 
fundamental contradiction. For example, to state that expanding the range of human 
rights across the globe may lead to disorder is not to say that they are undesirable but 
rather, that they are, in this particular space and time, undesirable, since they may 
upset current order.46 Fundamentally then, Bull posits that new moral norms and 
ways of operating within the international system, perhaps by modifying sovereignty, 
are to be welcomed but that they must be judiciously introduced in a way conducive 
to upholding the raison d 'etre of the international system itself. Order should not be 
viewed as a 'commanding value' and merely demonstrating that an institution or 
policy is conducive to order does not establish a presumption that either is morally 
desirable. 47 
A focus on order between states indicates that the problems of international politics 
tend to emerge from the interaction of territorially defined and entirely separate 
blocks. In this way, traditional sovereignty and its associated rules may produce order 
but it is incapable of dealing with issues which are necessarily global, for example 
environmental problems, and it is for this reason that perhaps 'world politics' rather 
than relations between states will emerge. Moreover, these supranational alterations 
will be accompanied by a fundamental alteration in the way in which discussions take 
place with non-state actors playing a more pronounced role, an almost neo-
medievalist notion.48 Elements of this can be seen with regard to the drafting of the 
Rome Statute and Kyoto Protocol, examined in depth in Chapters Two and Three 
respectively. In terms of environmental politics, Falk asserts that 'the threats are all 
outgrowths of a mismanaged environment that is an inevitable result of a defective set 
of political institutions, ' 49 indicating that sovereignty unrestrained is an ineffective 
and normatively undesirable concept, incapable of providing a basic level of 
environmental security. Nye and Keohane's anti-statist sentiments are even more 
pronounced as they stress that the state system is incapable of providing peace, 
46 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 147 
47 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 94 
48 Richard A. Falk, This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival, (New 
York, Random House, 1971) 
49 Falk, This Endangered Planet, p. 98 
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security, including economic, social and ecological variants, or even minimum world 
order. 5° 
Further suggestions for a normative improvement come from what may traditionally 
be seen as an unlikely source, E.H. Carr. Though regarded as the first modern theorist 
to explore the international system in a scientific manner, purging the discipline of 
idealist fantasies which ignored the role of power, nevertheless, and especially in his 
later works, Carr demonstrates decidedly liberal, perhaps even utopian sentiments. 
Carr blurs the lines dividing the domestic and international, seemingly moving him 
even further from realist orthodoxy, as indicated by his advocacy of the idea that 
states ought to cede some power in order to create a 'humane political community,' 51 
a conclusion discussed in The Future of Nations which tackles the self-interestedness 
which absolute sovereignty generates. 52 
Section Three: Sovereignty and the Cosmopolitan Challenge 
Having explicated sovereignty, its inherent normativity and value, this section 
explores the cosmopolitan challenge. Cosmopolitanism offers an important critique 
of current conceptions of sovereignty and hence the section below tackles its inability 
to promote universal individual responsibility, the acceptance of trans-border 
obligations as well as laying out the way in which diversity within the sovereign 
community can be tolerated and, moreover, promoted. 
Universal Individual Responsibility 
This section argues that sovereignty can and should be able to shoulder universal 
individual responsibility and, thus, sketches Kant and Linklater's positions which both 
question the wisdom and moral usefulness of Hobbesian sovereignty, in order to 
create a modified sovereignty which is able to promote justice whilst maintaining 
order. The goal of universal individual responsibility is one which underpins many 
50 Nye and Keohane quoted in Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 272-3 
51 Andrew Linklater, 'The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr critical theory and 
international relations', Review of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1997), pp. 321-328, p. 329 
52 E.H. Carr discussed in Linklater, 'The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr critical 
theory and international relations', p. 322 
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appraisals of sovereignty, and connects with the International Criminal Court as 
discussed in Chapter Two. 
Kant's cosmopolitanism derives from the marriage of the primacy of reason and the 
will to place morality on a more stable footing than the consequentialist method, for 
example, does. Legalistic imperatives were important, Kant maintained, in order to 
avoid a situation in which figures such as Hume could potentially award moral praise 
to persons as if their actions were bestowed upon them because, by mere 'gift of 
nature, ' 53 they tended to be generous rather than selfish. To counter the relativism 
and uncertainty of such a method, Kant identified the one faculty all moral agents 
possess - reason - and from this, constructed a moral system in order that he may 
universalise and normalise moral considerations. 
The first idea in Kant's argument asserts that one ought not to act in such a way if we 
would not want others to act in the same manner. This conclusion leads to the first 
stage of the categorical imperative which states that, 'I ought never to act except in 
such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. '54 
Though familiar to those well versed in Biblical studies, this maxim was bolstered by 
man's ability to reason. As is discussed below, the notion that man acts rationally is a 
conclusion which has been contested heavily, particularly with regard to international 
relations. Nevertheless, the sheer power of the concept of man as a reasonable animal 
cannot be underestimated and, indeed, much of modem intellectual history rests upon 
it. Reason also accords man the status of an 'end' rather than a 'means' and thus Kant 
argues that one ought to act as if you were 'through your maxims a law-making 
member of the kingdom of ends. ' 55 This emphasis on the supremacy of law is noted 
in Kant's view of a priori principles of a lawful state, which would ensure the 
freedom of every member of a society as a human being, and equality between and 
independence of all these members. The extent to which this freedom is applicable 
only to one single, lawful state is arguable for, as Reiss notes, this freedom is 
meaningless whilst it resides in one state only, for 'right ... cannot possibly prevail 
53 Immanuel Kant quoted in David E. Cooper, Ethics: The Classic Readings (Oxford, Blackwell, 1998), 
p. 167 
54 Kant quoted in Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Oxford, 
Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 30 
55 Kant quoted in Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 31 
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among men within a state if their freedom is threatened by the action of other states. 
The law can prevail only if the rule of law prevails in all states and in international 
relations. ' 56 Moreover, Kant's unwavering universalism means that even if the 
implementation of the categorical imperative is not practicable, it does not mean that 
the theory is defective, merely that its implementation is difficult. 
Having sketched the fundamental aspects of moral cosmopolitanism, it is perhaps 
fitting to remain with Kant and his suggestions for a normative improvement in 
sovereignty. Though his political stock has risen only recently, mainly owing to the 
globalization of world politics, Kant's political thought is incisive as a source for 
criticism of the Westphalian state system and the international anarchy it perpetuates. 
Kant's key political text was Perpetual Peace,57 a blueprint for ridding the world of 
war, advancing important suggestions for the improvement of sovereignty. Before 
analysing precisely the proposals contained within Perpetual Peace, it is important to 
note that Kant's political ideology differs markedly from his moral theory, for 
whereas students of the latter may, rightly, conclude that Kant would prefer a 
universal moral community, students of the former will note he was able to grasp the 
manner in which politics and power operate. 
The Second Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Right of Nations shall be 
based on a Federation of Free States58 connotes the appealing normative idea that 
states ought to limit their own sovereignty in order to create a federal system with an 
over-arching global government. In this case, the concept of sovereignty is not 
contested, but merely removed from each individual state and multiplied up to a 
global level. However, this is far from what Kant envisages, for he was abundantly 
aware that as power is increased, so the potential for tyranny also grows. Thus, a 
world state, as a natural progression of the Hobbesian security dilemma, as suggested 
by David Gauthier, is avoided.59 
56 Hans Reiss quoted in Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 32 
57 Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Hans Reiss (Ed.), Kant's Political Writings 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1991), pp. 93-130 
58 Kant, 'Perpetual Peace, p I 02 
59 David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan : the Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969) 
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Even with Kant's criticisms of world government noted, the most far-reaching 
cosmopolitan suggestions come from David Held and Daniele Archibugi whose 
proposals centre upon the democratisation of world politics via 'global governance'. 
The proposed reforms focus mainly on the UN, which, it is contended, contains within 
it the genesis of a legitimate global political authority. By reforming the UN and 
altering its institutions, thereby increasing its power, it may be able to live up to its 
Charter by upholding the prohibition on the discretionary right to use force and by 
activating the collective security system it envisaged. 60 The limiting of state 
sovereignty would be accompanied by a wave of democratisation within the UN in 
order to avoid double standards, a set of reforms which includes the founding of a 
second, democratically elected chamber. Only when these reforms are enacted would 
the transfer of jurisdiction from the state be practicable. Once the democratisation 
occurs, the path is clear for an international military force in order to alleviate the 
threat of a Hobbesian war, a conclusion substantiated by the invocation of Hobbes' 
mantra that 'covenants without the sword are but words. ' 61 Thus, even before 
assessing the desirability of the transfer of power it may be seen that the reforms 
necessary to facilitate the alterations in the use of force, in the present political 
climate, have very little chance of occurring. Nevertheless, Held and Archibugi 's 
vision carries a great deal of normative force and its focus upon the expansion of 
dialogue to take into account those outside the state is a positive step. 
The status quo with regard to the maintenance of domineering, sovereign legal powers 
is not, in the cosmopolitan schema, encouraged as is evinced by the scorn Kant pours 
upon 'savages' who 'cling to their lawless freedom,' refusing to engage in legal 
constraints, preferring the 'freedom of folly to the freedom of reason.'62 Here, the 
critique of sovereignty as a normative concept is clearly visible; state sovereignty, 
although the vehicle by which state power is maximised, is viewed as an obstacle in 
securing peace and prosperity for all. This is a direct attack on what would now be 
deemed the realist school of international relations in which 'each state sees its own 
majesty (for it would be absurd to speak of the majesty of a people)' 63 in not having to 
submit to any external law. To see the acme of international politics as the state is to 
60 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 269 
61 Thomas Hobbes quoted in Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 276 
62 Kant, • Perpetual Peace', p. I 02 
63 Kant, • Perpetual Peace', p. 103 
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mistakenly treat is as an 'end' rather than a 'means' and, therefore, to protect 
sovereignty from any interference, erosion or trimming is to fail to maximise politics' 
potential. 
The cosmopolitan viewpoint is one which, in accordance with the Kantian schema, 
stresses the notion of universal individual responsibility, that each member of the 
global community is morally culpable for his or her actions and that state boundaries 
are morally incapable of suspending moral judgements made by those outside. 
Elements of the cosmopolitan schema are clearly visible in the rationales adopted by 
proponents of the International Criminal Court, and it may be argued that 
cosmopolitanism provides the dominant moral critique of sovereignty as well as hope 
for a morally-improved version of the concept. 
Though Kant's political theory offers a plausible and attractive way to alter the 
international system, nevertheless, there are key problems with cosmopolitanism as a 
moral theory. A critique of Kant's universality which views reason as the progenitor 
of universal moral concern results from the argument that, under his methodology, 
since the insane and children do not or cannot possess rationality, they immediately 
fall beyond the limits of moral worth. This line of reasoning fails to take into account 
the potential of the species and awards too much credence to physiological 
irregularity and does not dent greatly the Kantian case. Secondly, the Kantian notion 
of universality may be dubbed 'culturally imperial' since it aims to impose what are 
sometimes referred to as being essentialist Western values upon non-Western states, 
and that the conception of the individual worth of man emanating from reason is a 
result of a peculiarly Western tradition, one that differs substantially from, for 
example, Confucianism, which is dominated by the moral worth of the community, 
and which, hence, strives for an entirely different form of the good. However, 
although the theory is indeed Western in its origin, this does not necessarily prove 
anything; for example, merely because Darwin and Bohr were educated in the West, it 
does not follow that their theories are intrinsically Western. Those who offer a 
defence of culture against universalising moral trends, it may be argued, may be 
awarding legitimacy simply on the basis of tradition and custom, a justification which, 
it would seem, is weak, ignoring as it does, justice. This argument is powerful, 
however, only if the universality of justice is accepted. Kant, moreover, maintained 
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that regional differences were beneficial and that individual cultural heritages should 
be treasured, but never at the expense of moral imperatives. This 
communitarian/cosmopolitan discourse is discussed in detail below and especially 
with regard to indigenous rights, where cosmopolitanism is faced with the challenge 
of embracing diversity within its totalising moral remit. 
Andrew Linklater has developed a form of cosmopolitanism which has challenged 
directly the notion of sovereign legitimacy, constructing a system which mitigates the 
self/other divide using a surprising approach. Linklater's methodology for the 
political transformation, though cosmopolitan, is decidedly Hegelian, and, therefore, 
avoids the problematic transcendental universalism. For Linklater, the transformation 
is due to the development of 'dialogical communities' and here the influence of the 
Frankfurt School, and Jiirgen Habermas in particular, is clearly evident. Nevertheless, 
Linklater remains wedded to Kant's appealing 'kingdom of ends' and the categorical 
imperative, though as noted, he approaches the concept from a very different angle. 
Linklater asserts that the evolution of pre-existing international rights are generated 
by inter-social negotiation and that such dialogue offers an opportunity to extend the 
moral community beyond the Westphalian state as currently conceived. Indeed, The 
Transformation of Political Community anticipates, 'the transition to a condition in 
which sovereignty, territoriality, nationality, citizenship are no longer welded together 
to define the nature and purpose of political association. '64 Thus, via this process, 
there emerges the recognition of mankind's capacity to view itself as being organised 
and morally above the normal statecentric central reference group, thereby rendering 
the traditional citizen/non-citizen distinction unjustifiable. Hence, Linklater views as 
possible the replacement of sovereignty with a global legal political system which 
affords protection to all subjects as moral equals. To this end, Linklater argues that 
the transformation of sovereignty involves the fundamental recognition that there 
ought to be an increase in the protection of fundamental human rights producing a 
sense of universal individual responsibilif';. However, Linklater remains committed 
to the moral standing of the state owing to the fact that it confers citizenship rights, 
although he does argue that its full moral impact cannot be realised until states are 
64 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 44 
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unlocked from the notion of territorial and political entities. From this, it may be 
contended that for Linklater the existence of the state is not in question, but rather that 
its scope must be enlarged in order to maintain its moral capacity and not to 
compromise human freedom. This reasoning is particularly apposite with regard to 
the International Criminal Court and, indeed, it may be seen that the burgeoning field 
of international criminal law in this manner provides an excellent fit with Linklater's 
notion of the post-Westphalian state. 
Linklater's work has received much criticism, as well as praise, although it is perhaps 
noteworthy that much of the criticism results, not from a philosophically antagonistic 
position, but rather on the basis of political caution and pragmatism. 65 What may be 
drawn from this is the conclusion that cosmopolitanism a la Linklater is a worthy and 
desirable transformation. However, although the international community ought to 
adopt freely-chosen moral principles, the figure of Hobbes looms large in the 
shadows. Elshtain notes that the single greatest problem with Linklater's 
methodology is that 'it is nearly impossible to discern what this international dialogue 
is going to be about. ' 66 Moreover, discussions of higher levels of universality are all 
well and good for academic conferences and intellectual discussion but they 'are not 
the stuff of nitty-gritty power brokerage. '67 Elshtain's criticisms suggest that 
sovereignty is an immutable concept, fixed in and across time, a conclusion which 
follows from Hobbes' conception of an unchangeable locus of power and legitimacy, 
rather than an acknowledgment of shifting balances of power and politics which may 
allow dynamic changes in the public good to happen. The immediacy of the latter 
position reflects an almost Machiavellian position which prioritises the immediately 
expedient over static understandings of authority and legitimacy.68 
Notions of moral progress contained within Linklater's work are vociferously 
attacked by Schweller who argues that, ' [ w ]hether Linklater, or Kant, or Marx, or 
65 See, for example, Randall Schweller, 'Fantasy Theory', Review oflnternational Studies, Vol. 25 
(1999), pp. 147-50. 
66 Jean Bethke Elshtain, 'Really Existing Communities', Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 
(1999), p. 141-46, p. 145 
67 Elshtain, 'Really Existing Communities', p. 145 
68 R.B.J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary 
Political Practice' in R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz (Eds.), Contending Sovereignties: Redefining 
Political Community, (London, Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 159-185 
26 
Habermas, or some contemporary critical feminist, postmodern theorists believe 
something will happen, must happen, can happen, and should happen, does not make 
it so - or likely to be so - in the foreseeable future, ' 69 a point which, although 
seemingly obvious, confirms that the fixity of sovereignty is an issue which is so 
powerful that any alteration in its scope or practice is viewed as essentially fanciful. 
More classical interpretations of Westphalian sovereignty tend to treat the concept as 
a given, but this is not the case.70 Sovereignty is a normative postulate or a working 
hypothesis which is periodically renovated to reflect the changing historical 
circumstances, changing from being dynastic and imperial to popular, and then, anti-
imperial.71 Clearly, absolutist sovereignty and its international relations' corollary, 
neo-realism, are strong, indicating that a fundamental change is unlikely to occur, 
other than in a piecemeal manner. However, it must be argued that what Linklater 
offers is not a grand blueprint for a better future but rather 'a normative vision,' 72 and, 
as his work has provoked a great deal of reaction, becoming an important weapon for 
proponents of cosmopolitanism, his work must, as Elshtain implies, contain a certain 
level of cultural resonance. 
Trans-border obligations (Environmental problems) 
Another key component of contemporary cosmopolitanism revolves around trans-
border or transnational obligations, or, that individuals in one state ought to show 
some level of moral concern for those outside the community, and that this concern 
should be reflected in political actions such as the tackling of environmental 
dilemmas, explored in depth in Chapter Three. The construction of transnational 
obligations for the global good is discussed by Thomas Pogge who argues that the 
international system, which rests on 'the crystallization of the momentary balance of 
power,' 73 is fundamentally unable to offer much hope of a normative improvement. 
Politicians are left without a moral reason for supporting institutions which contribute 
to a moral order since these are susceptible to the vagaries of power and influence. 
Thus, Pogge suggests the creation of 'epistemic communities', the cross-border 
69 Schweller, 'Fantasy Theory', p. 14 7 
70 A notion discussed in Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics' 
71 Jackson, 'Sovereignty in World Politics', p. 434 
72 Andrew Linklater, 'Transforming political community: a response to the critics', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25 (1999), p. 165-75, p. 166 
73 Thomas Pogge's schema explained in Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, p. 42 
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sharing of values, knowledge and ideas which eventually, it is claimed, will be able to 
curb the excesses of absolute sovereignty, and direct it towards a more cosmopolitan 
endpoint. An order based on values rather than prudent decision-making also requires 
that, firstly, the parties involved are convinced that there ought to be a fairer scheme 
for the distribution of the benefits of the scheme, that the parties can identify and 
perhaps extend common values, and lastly, that each party is willing to modify their 
values to some extent. The appreciation of the need for collective action to improve 
the social and economic problems facing the world's community and the necessity to 
strengthen the very notion of world community to face the effects of technical and 
industrial rationality are also noted by Linklater, whose 'thin cosmopolitanism' offers 
hope that global problems are manageable without resort to world government. 74 
The notion of an epistemic community ts one which pervades much of the 
contemporary literature surrounding sovereignty and its role is prominent within this 
essay, especially when referring to the climate change regime discussed at length in 
Chapter Three, where the impact of a cohesive scientific community would be 
incalculable. Pogge's moral system can also be viewed in Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink's work, which discusses the way in which moral communities 
develop as a result of a 'norm entrepreneur' instigating a new standard which is 
eventually adopted by the international community, a phenomenon which is referred 
to as a 'norm cascade. '75 
Diversity within cosmopolitanism 
Whereas the previous two cosmopolitan demands surround obligations and justice 
relating to those outside the state, the final challenge centres upon delivering greater 
levels of justice for internal groups. This section begins with the communitarian 
approach, Kantian cosmopolitanism's antithesis, followed by an examination of the 
way in which Linklater's 'thin cosmopolitanism' can distribute greater levels of 
justice, possibly to those groups within society, such as indigenous peoples, who have 
been marginalized and suppressed 
74 A theme discussed throughout Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community 
75 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's thought as reported in Nicholas Wheeler, 'Humanitarian 
vigilantes or legal entrepreneurs: enforcing human rights in international society', in Simon Caney and 
Peter Jones (Eds.), Human Rights and Global Diversity (London, Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 139-162 
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The communitarian counter to universalism is based on the assertion that universalists 
suppose that individual rights predate the community, a conclusion that Hegelians 
deem untenable. 76 The cosmopolitan answer to this is that although rights are not 
respected in a world without community, they nevertheless exist, just as citizens of 
states who do not enjoy civil liberties possess them regardless. Thus, in terms of 
global politics, it is important to construct and maintain a community in order that 
rights are respected. 
Communitarianism is a 'moral standpoint which is tied to a local discourse, a 
particular community or historical tradition, with justice being constituted by respect 
for the values that the communities hold. ' 77 The debate between cosmopolitans and 
communitarians rests on the fact that both sides assert ontological and epistemological 
points about how moral significance is developed. One of the chief proponents of 
communitarianism is Michael Walzer, who morally privileges the state as the ultimate 
form of political community and base of considerations for domestic and international 
justice, asserting that no community of humanity actually exists, arguing that 'I am 
not a citizen of the world ... I am not even aware that there is such a world such that 
one could be a citizen of it. No-one has offered me citizenship. ' 78 For Walzer, the 
state is a moral requirement and the appropriate moral refuge for people in times of 
crisis. The communitarian approach to international justice treats it not as a matter of 
distribution but of ensuring order and non-intervention. Walzer and the 
communitarians, by attempting to reconcile the universal and the particular, have 
created an artificial separation of domestic and international realms. 79 
Communitarianism is problematic smce it assumes that moral communities are 
synonymous with political institutions, that is, that the state represents a nation as one. 
This, clearly, is not true, hence the demands for indigenous rights which bend 
sovereignty from being absolute to one which reflects groups which, in some cases, 
are transnational. As an extension of the above, the concept of toleration is also 
76 Hegel's view at noted in J.B. Scneewind, 'Modem moral philosophy' in Peter Singer (Ed.), A 
Companion to Ethics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), pp. 147-157, 
77 Janna Thompson quoted in Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, p. 8 
78 Michael Walzer quoted in Derek Heater, 'Does Cosmopolitan Thinking Have a Future?', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 179-197, p. 180 
79 Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations, p. 70 
29 
questionable smce a communitarian may have to admit that it exists solely as a 
cultural norm rather than a universal. Hence, were this the case, then an intolerant 
society would be entirely justified as being as such, since in the communitarian 
schema, cultural legitimacy is the most powerful element. Identifying the moral 
community is also challenging since within every state there exists countless sub-
communities each with their own moral code. Thus, to construct a norn1atively 
superior communitarian sovereignty it may be necessary to develop an elaborate 
network of specific caveats, thereby weakening the state, possibly endangering it. 
Linklater, remams committed to a culturally-sensitive thin cosmopolitanism rather 
than thick, meaning a smaller and more basic level of commitments rather than 
extensive, and acknowledges that, '[p ]articular social bonds remain but they are 
reconstituted in light of a normative commitment to engage the systematically 
excluded in dialogue. '8° Furthermore, Linklater thinks that international political 
theory must be able to defend the existence of obligations to humanity which link 
insiders and outsiders in order to suggest the possibility of overcoming estrangement. 
Post-Westphalian changes encourage 'the emergence of new forms of political 
community in which the potential for higher levels of universality and difference is 
realised,' 81 and so it may be contended that Linklater is merely encouraging a deeper 
awareness of the circles of moral concern as identified by Charles Beitz82 without, 
unlike Beitz, denying the fundamental importance of the more immediate circles. 
Conclusion 
Sovereignty is a tricky concept to tame. The interpretations and definitions that it 
generates make discussion surrounding its normative value and possible improvement 
challenging, but by terming it a working hypothesis, viewing it as a practical concept 
and focusing on the manner in which it operates in contemporary international society 
facilitates an analysis which highlights areas and issues in which a moral 
improvement is not only desirable but perhaps, essential. This chapter has examined 
the intellectual discourse which surrounds sovereignty today. The first major theme 
80 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. I 07 
81 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 45 
82 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University 
Press, 1979) 
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to emerge from this is to say that even if a consensus cannot be reached as to how to 
modify each state's scope, nevertheless the fact that a wide range of theorists desire 
an alteration indicates that change is not entirely unlikely. Indeed, the following three 
chapters all indicate that there is hope for a normative improvement but that this may 
not be attempted in a Linklater-esque manner with a global moral dialogue but rather 
in an issue-specific context which may gradually alter perceptions. The dominance of 
realism, particularly in the world's only superpower, also may ensure that progress 
remains slow, although the growth of the European Union along with its core values, 
as discussed by Jackson and Keohane, may allow a fundamental alteration to 
happen.83 
This chapter has also demonstrated that sovereignty is a concept which alters and 
reorganises itself in light of contemporary issues, debates and challenges. What this 
indicates is that the belief held by many that the only way to succeed is to cling 
desperately to absolute power may ultimately prove damaging. Furthermore, and 
illustrated in the following three chapters, it may also be shown that an alteration in 
sovereignty may actually lead to the emergence of a more stable international order, 
more able to deal with the complex realities of post-Cold War politics. Nevertheless, 
the spectres of Hobbes and Bodin loom large. 
83 Jackson and James, States in a Changing World 
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Chapter Two: Sovereignty, Human Rights and the International Criminal Court 
Introduction 
The founding of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is, arguably, the most exciting 
event in international law since the Nuremberg trials which followed the end of the 
Second World War. Its remit, to try individuals who have committed egregious 
violations of human and humanitarian rights, is an important cosmopolitan normative 
challenge to Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty which has been sceptical or, 
indeed, hostile, to the rhetoric of individual moral responsibility. This chapter firstly, 
briefly sketches the role and history of human rights, particularly in the twentieth 
century, alongside a discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of the human 
rights regime. These foundations and their rationales are especially useful when 
trying to understand the strains and types of ideology which face contemporary 
political decision-makers as well as theorists. 
The second section focuses on the planning and negotiating processes for the ICC 
which demonstrates both differing interpretations of how sovereignty ought to operate 
and, secondly, how political situations inform and fundamentally drive negotiation 
processes. This examination then concentrates on the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court ('the Rome Statute') in order to highlight the legal, 
moral and political advances it proposes. Issues within this section include the 
consolidation of human as opposed to humanitarian rights; new categories of law 
which centre upon groups, such as women and children; and the changing role of the 
individual in international law. 
The third section deals in greater depth with some of the most important aspects of the 
Rome Statute such as universal jurisdiction, and the changing nature of state and 
individual accountability in order to emphasize the impact the ICC may have upon the 
way in which international affairs are carried out. Included in this section is a 
discussion of the manner in which cosmopolitan notions have informed and shaped 
the debate about sovereignty in order to provide a more morally advanced variant. 
Alongside the Statute's im10vations are discussions surrounding the legality and also 
desirability of the matters at hand, questions which have been generated largely, 
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though not entirely, by US scholars and politicians. These concerns feed into the 
fourth section of the chapter which judges the states' reactions to the Statute, though 
as with the previous section, much of the discussion focuses on the US if only for the 
fact that, as a hegemon, it occupies a crucial role within international life. The final 
section attempts to link the advances in international law more explicitly with 
theorists' views on international relations, focusing, in the main, on the 
cosmopolitans, solidarists and constructivists for whom the ICC offers the prospect of 
a morally-sensitive sovereignty. 
Section One: Human Rights 
Human rights undeniably play a vital role in international politics, whether it be a 
justificatory role or an actual, integral aspect of foreign and domestic policies. Their 
position was cemented in the latter half of the twentieth century although the debates 
surrounding their validity continue to this day. Their evolution can be viewed as 
having undergone three clear stages; firstly, that of 'normative construction', which 
occurred during the period between the UN Charter and the drafting of the 1966 
International Covenants on Human Rights; secondly a period characterised by 
'institution building' from the mid-1960s until the end of the Cold War; and thirdly, 
and the most important for the purposes of this essay, post-Cold War debates over 
human rights, personified by the negotiation of the International Criminal Court. 1 
Post-Second World War Human Rights 
Human rights have become an integral aspect of international relations following the 
end of the Second World War, which witnessed abuses on an unprecedented scale. 
The emergence of the 'human rights regime' was catalysed by the Nuremberg trials, 
and, to a lesser extent, the Tokyo trials which tried war criminals on a range of 
charges. These trials fixed in the minds of the international community the notion 
that respect for fundamental rights of humanity was a matter which affected the 
entirety of the human community regardless of the artificial borders created by state 
sovereignty. To what extent these trials are now steeped in a kind of political folklore 
1 This schema is suggested by Thomas Buergenthal in 'The Normative and Institutional Evolution of 
International Human Rights', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1997), pp. 703-723 
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is discussed below, but the facts of the trials are perhaps secondary; what it is more 
important is that a normative agenda emerged from them, which helped to frame a 
debate on the morality of sovereignty. 
Jeremy Rabkins' analysis of the way in which the origin of the human rights regime 
has been misremembered begins with a quotation from the New York Times; 'The war 
crimes tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda, the newborn international criminal court and 
a Spanish judge's indictment of Gen. Augusto Pinochet of Chile are extensions of the 
idea that how a nation treats its own citizens is everybody's business. That principle 
was established 50 years ago at the Nuremberg trials. ' 2 Rabkin counters by discussing 
the proceedings, arguing they were far from universal, as is evinced by the fact that 
the cases were brought by USA, France, United Kingdom and USSR. The extent to 
which this derails the momentum accrued by the regime, however, is questionable and 
perhaps the spirit of Nuremberg now embedded in the political psyche is all that truly 
matters. 
Essentially, the ICC represents an international criminal tribunal which is endowed 
with the ability to try the most serious international crimes including genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in order to prevent the ad hoc nature of 
international criminal tribunals from continuing into the twenty-first century. It has 
been described by Kofi Annan as, 'a gift of hope for future generations, ' 3 lauding it 
for promoting international accountability and demonstrating that sovereignty is as 
much to do with responsibilities as it is rights. The history of tribunals, which began 
with Nuremberg and Tokyo, has come into sharper focus more recently with the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. To place 
such activities on a more permanent footing represents two important factors; firstly, 
that the international community is, as a general rule, unwilling to tolerate outrageous 
violations of human rights and secondly, and regrettably, that there is a need to curb 
the levels of violence in the contemporary world. In relation to the latter point, the jus 
in bello of humanitarian law has been expanded by the Rome Statute to include 
2 Tina Rosenberg, 'The Lives They Lived', New York Times, 3/1/99 section 6, p.26 quoted in Jeremy 
Rabkin, 'Nuremberg Misremembered', SA IS Review Vol. 19(2) (1999), pp. 81-96 
3 Kofi Annan quoted in Gerhard Hafner, The Status of Third States before the International Criminal 
Court' in Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (Eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A Challenge to Impunity (Burlington, US, Ashgate, 2001 ), pp. 239-253, p. 239 
34 
'crimes against humanity' which is now an aspect of international criminal law. The 
Court's existence is perhaps as much to do with prevention of human rights and 
humanitarian atrocities as it is to do with punishing the guilty. In addition, the 
Pinochet case remains one of the most controversial decisions in recent international 
law and marks a fundamental shift in attitude towards immunity. Chile's government 
signed up to the Convention Against Torture, and after vociferous legal debates on the 
subject, the House of Lords in a landmark case decided that Pinochet could be 
indicted for crimes under this measure even though many viewed his sovereign 
immunity, as a former head of state, to be sacrosanct. The Pinochet case indicates an 
extension of individual culpability, again penetrating the shield which sovereignty 
offered. The repercussions of this are yet to be felt in international courts to any great 
degree but, certainly, the momentum may allow a more cosmopolitan view of 
international law to develop. 
Thomas Franck has articulated the idea of fundamental rules such as those underlying 
international criminal law as forming conditions on membership of the international 
community that, contrary to the ordinary practice of international law, are not 
themselves subject to the specific consent of states, except in the very act of accepting 
membership of the community itself. 4 Thus, the collection of equally valid, 
independent competing entities becomes a society built upon key rules and 
foundations, thereby conveying a sovereignty which is contingent and subject to a 
global normative agenda. The impetus of Nuremberg and Pinochet, emerging as a 
logical consequence of this, underpins the relationship between sovereignty and the 
international system in the post-war era, a collective movement which has as its acme 
the ICC. As Nigel Radley puts it, the 
principles of Nuremberg were not only the victory of justice over the 
intolerable fiction of the unassailable state, as well as an affirmation of the 
supremacy of a higher positive law; they were also the base upon which a 
positive international law of human rights could be built, namely, the 
4 This theme is discussed in Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1995) 
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identification of duties for those sharing in the exercise of power to respect, at 
least to a minimal extent, the dignity of those subject to that power.5 
This touches on the key notion within this essay, that sovereignty's prerogative does, 
and ought to, give way to the emerging global civil society and its standards, 
indicating the growth of a movement which transcends the state and its apparatus in 
an unprecedented manner. Though norms of the human rights culture became more 
entrenched during the fifty years following Nuremberg the enforcement regime did 
not alter massively. The ICC, however, marks a giant leap forward with regard to this 
and the fact it does not act solely at the behest of the great powers makes it 
controversial, as is discussed below in the section covering its trigger mechanisms. 
Section Two: The Rome Statute 
The Making of the Rome Statute 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court or 'DipCon' was opened by Kofi Annan on 18 
June 1998 with the discussions being presided over by Giovanni Conso with 
negotiations being looked after by the Chair of the Committee of the Whole, Philippe 
Kirsch. As texts were prepared they were handed to the Drafting Committee headed 
by Cherif Bassiouni and thus, via the maze and networks of negotiations, ample 
opportunity was given for coalitions to be constructed and perhaps more importantly, 
for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to have a very real impact on the framing 
of the debates about the nature of sovereignty. 
The one hundred and sixty states present quickly divided into significant groupings 
which both shaped the negotiations and also reflected different attitudes to the role 
and function of sovereignty in contemporary politics. 6 The Arab block and the Non-
Aligned Movement each provided a strong and relatively coherent position on many 
of the major issues discussed, including the role of the Security Council, the ICC's 
5 Nigel S. Rodley quoted in Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: 
Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (Oxford, OUP, 2003), p. 42 
6 The names for the groups used within this chapter are borrowed from Bruce Broomhall, International 
Justice and the International Criminal Court 
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jurisdiction in internal conflicts as well as the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor. 
The Non-Aligned Movement joined India, Pakistan and China, amongst others, and 
embodied the statist view which maximised state prerogative, objected to Security 
Council powers and also to the controversial Prosecutor. It has been suggested that 
objections raised by those in the South may be as result of the fear that the ICC 
would, in the end, tackle a small number of cases, mainly from third world states. 
Thus, the ICC and Security Council must be careful not to exacerbate the perception 
that the international system is driven entirely by a North which is quick to impose its 
own standards on a reluctant South.7 
Although there was some agreement with other members of the Permanent Five of the 
Security Council, the US, effectively, fitted into a category on its own. Indeed, the 
US delegation headed by David Scheffer, remained closely attached to its own narrow 
conception of the ICC and reminded other delegates of its power to 'make or break' 
the Court depending on its provisions for peacekeeping missions, 8 an issue examined 
in greater detail in the section on non-party jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, the US 
favoured a stronger role for the Security Council, viewing it as the sole, legitimate 
body able to maintain peace, security and balance in international affairs. The US 
also held the view that the ICC ought to be a court of last resort, thereby maintaining 
an internationalist stance rather than the more cosmopolitan position as exemplified 
by the Like-Minded Group. 
The Like-Minded Group consisted of around sixty states including Germany, the 
Netherlands, Canada and South Africa, all campaigning for the early establishment of 
the ICC and championing some of the most progressive proposals, an example being 
the German representatives who initially favoured universal jurisdiction. Importantly, 
perhaps, the Chair of the Committee of the Whole and of other working groups were 
delegates of the Like-Minded Group. Tellingly, the EU countries also issued their 
statements through the Austrian delegates since, at the time, Austria held the 
Presidency of the EU. The Like-Minded Group campaigned for a just, fair and 
7 Hugo Young, 'We can't allow US tantrums to scupper global justice', The Guardian (2 July 2002) 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604, 787646,00.html] 4 January 2004 
8 See David Scheffer, 'The United States and the ICC' in Dinah Shelton (Ed.), International Crimes, 
Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International Criminal Court (New York, Transnational 
Publishers Inc., 2000), pp. 203-206 
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effective ICC which would be able to wield genume powers and also, vta 
complementarity, would be able to compel domestic courts to conduct their affairs in 
a manner which befitted internationally acceptable codes of behaviour, and it may 
therefore be seen that this group exemplified what may be deemed the cosmopolitan 
position. 
The role ofNGOs cannot be overestimated. Alongside the state delegates, there were 
also representatives from over two hundred and fifty NGOs which amassed strength 
by forming a coalition, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC). 
CICC organised itself, by way of a Steering Committee, into thirteen bodies which 
each focused on a specific issue, actually preparing and presenting to delegates daily 
papers to be taken into negotiations. Such interaction between state officials and 
NGOs helped to make the Rome Statute almost universal since it exercised 'the 
function of an international constitutional convention. '9 NGOs, often treated as an 
aspect of global civil society, are increasingly coming to prominence as bodies which 
can set agendas, build networks, develop and implement solutions across boundaries, 
a network of norm-builders whose normative reach extends to sovereignty, helping to 
construct a post-Westphalian state. 10 Dialogue between groups, states and 
governments are facilitated by NGOs and perhaps reflects the dialogic approach 
which Linklater identifies in his work The Transformation of Political Community, 
discussed in the previous chapter. The environment of legitimation the NGOs 
provided suggests that the delegates sensed an overlap of duties between the state they 
represented and humanity in general. As The Times of India rightly notes, 'not since 
the establishment of the UN itself have so many countries voluntarily yielded ground 
on such a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty.' 11 
9 Marc Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution: UN Security Council action on the International 
Criminal Court, International Affairs, Vol. 78 (2002), pp. 693-712, p. 700 
10 Richard Price, 'Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics', World Politics Vol. 55 
(2003), pp. 579-606 
11 The Times of India quoted in Andrew Marr, 'As a century of war draws to a close, it's time for an 
age of international justice', The Observer (28 March 1999) 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,209651 ,OO.html] 15 March 2004 
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The Rome Statute in Brief 
The ICC has jurisdiction over core crimes which are deemed to be those which are so 
grave as to 'threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,' 12 a definition 
which appears to be reasonably uncontroversial. Indeed, the language used here 
seems to mirror the language of the UN Charter itself, although the addition of 'well-
being' would seem to imply a concern which extends beyond the balance of peace and 
war. The echoing of the UN Charter is underlined further by the fact that the Statute 
is addressed to 'States' and 'Peoples' and nowhere are individuals explicitly 
mentioned as constituting a core audience. Hence, it may be seen that acceptance of 
the ICC represents what may be deemed a decidedly cosmopolitan improvement in 
sovereignty's normative status whilst simultaneously re-emphasising the primacy of 
the state itself. 
As discussed above, Nuremberg expressly tied cnmes against humanity to events 
which took place within the theatre of war. This, it has been suggested, was due in no 
small measure to the notion that the US government was fearful that the new crime 
could have been expanded to cover the mistreatment of its own black population, and 
thus, the definition was tightened. 13 However, the Rome Statute far exceeds this 
limitation, defining crimes against humanity as any acts committed in a widespread or 
systematic way as part of an organised policy against any civilian population, thereby 
constituting the ICC as an organisation which overlaps both humanitarian and human 
rights in an unprecedented way. The list of crimes against humanity set out in the 
Rome text is both extensive and important with regard to the specific groups it 
addresses such as the crimes defined in Article 7 which expressly relate to crimes 
committed against women, the inclusion of these marking an important step in the 
evolution of rights relating to women in international relations. 14 The list includes a 
wide range of crimes including murder, extermination, the forcible transfer of a 
12 Preamble to United Nations Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ('Rome Statute') (17 
July 1998) [http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm] 1 November 2003 
13 View of a judge at the Tokyo Tribunal as noted in Andrew Clapham, 'Issues of complexity, 
complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg trials to the dawn of the International Criminal 
Court', in Philippe Sands (Ed), From Nuremberg to The Hague (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), pp.30-67, p. 
43 
14 This theme is discussed by Cherie Booth, 'US lets down world justice' The Guardian (13 June 2002) 
[http:l/guardian.co.uk!comment/story/0,3604, 736397,00.html] 4 January 2004 
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population, torture, persecution, enforced disappearance, Apartheid and 'other 
inhumane acts of a similar nature. ' 15 The list of crimes against women includes rape, 
sexual slavery and enforced pregnancy. 
The ICC claims jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular where 'committed 
as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. ' 16 
What is of particular importance with regard to this definition is that no strict 
threshold is defined and thus the independent Prosecutor, for example, may be able to 
launch an investigation where the numbers involved are relatively small. It may 
therefore be noted that the ICC is able to act in order to provide justice but that its key 
role may be as that of a deterrent, an important international tool helping to normalise 
behaviour. Also included in war crimes are serious violations of the laws and 
customs of armed conflict. 17 Article 8 also catalogues the provisions of Article 3 
common to the four Geneva Conventions, and, importantly, a range of crimes 
committed in non-international armed conflicts such as attacks upon civilians who are 
not participating in hostilities, 18 indicating strongly that how a government treats its 
own people, via the ICC, becomes the business of the international legal community. 
Also codified are attacks on humanitarian workers, 19 further offences of sexual 
violence20 and the prohibition of the use of child soldiers under the age of fifteen.21 
One of the most controversial of the war crimes discussed was the 'transfer, directly 
or indirectly by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of 
the occupied territory within or outside this territory. ' 22 This was a measure which 
Israel felt to be a politically-motivated attack on its actions, and a forerunner of how 
the ICC would become a political tool designed to attack its interests in the Middle 
East.23 The definition of genocide used in the Rome Statute is taken directly from the 
Genocide Convention of 1948, which the US, along with over one hundred and thirty 
15 Article 7 of the Rome Statute. 
16 Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute 
17 Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute 
18 Article 8(2)(i) of the Rome Statute 
19 Article 8(2)(ii) ofthe Rome Statute 
20 Article 8(2)(vi) of the Rome Statute 
21 Article 8(2)(vii) ofthe Rome Statute 
22 Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute 
23 This is discussed in Gerhard Hafner, Kristen Boon, Anne Rilbesome and Jonathan Huston, 'A 
Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood', European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 10 (1999), pp. 108-123, p. 120 
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other countries, have pledged obedience to, as well as the promise to prosecute 
offenders. Like crimes against humanity, genocide does not have to occur during 
times of war and nor does there have to be a state plan, just the aim of destroying a 
national, ethnic, or religious group. 
Part Four of the Rome Statute describes the composition and administration of the 
ICC, defining its organs which include the Presidency, the Appeals, Trials, and Pre-
Trial Division, the Registry and an Office of the Prosecutor.24 Arguably the most 
important of these bodies, and one examined in depth below, is the Office of the 
Prosecutor, whose head is elected by an absolute majority of the Assembly of State 
Parties and who will also have the ability to act as an independent organ of the ICC.25 
The importance of this independence is vital in understanding both the objections 
raised against the ICC and also the positive contribution the Court may make in 
international life. Article 52 stipulates that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence will 
only enter force with a two-thirds majority from the Assembly of State Parties and, 
hence, a possible objection to the ICC, that of the democratic deficit, seems largely 
unfounded. 
Part 5 of the Statute focuses on processes for investigation and prosecution and 
includes provisions for making arrangements with states, persons and international 
non-governmental organisations, 26 which may indicate the growth of an international 
civil society which is both able, and arguably duty-bound, to investigate atrocities 
executed by a government anywhere in the world. Global responsibility for the 
welfare of the cosmopolis therefore connotes that a normatively desirable sovereignty 
may emerge, if only by dint of the fear of prosecution. This is a particularly solidarist 
notion, but perhaps practice will be the only true test of whether a sophisticated form 
of post-Westphalian sovereignty will appear. The penalties the ICC may impose are 
noted in Part Seven, the maximum being thirty years imprisonment unless the gravity 
of the crime demands a tougher sentence. A trust fund for the victims of crimes is 
also documented. As may be expected, the Rome Statute also has extensive 
provisions for revising judgements of the Trial Chamber through the Appeals 
24 Article 35 of the Rome Statute 
25 Article 43 of the Rome Statute 
26 Article 54(3) of the Rome Statute 
41 
Chamber27 as well as measures for compensating the wrongly convicted?8 The need 
for cooperation between all parties is also noted in Part Nine's Article 86. 
Section Three: Issues raised by the Rome Statute 
Accountability 
Accountability, be it the extension or lack of, is a key issue with regard to the ICC. 
Particularly with regard to the ICC's ability to deflect immunities and amnesties, the 
body will have a profound impact on the way in which individuals within the 
international system are viewed. Indeed, what the institution does, as a body with 
enforcement capabilities, is make concrete the notion that individuals have defined 
duties under international rather than national law. For example the Hague 
Convention of 1907 intended to put an end to certain ways of waging war but, it 
'nowhere designates such practices as criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor 
any mention made of a court to try and punish offenders. ' 29 The nascent ICC has 
focused ever more clearly the notion, first expounded in depth at Nuremberg, that 
crimes are not committed by abstract entities but, rather, by people and that the 
enforcement of laws and treaties, such as the Genocide Conventions, means that 
individual accountability is coming to the fore. Individual accountability recognises 
the rights, and as a corollary, the duty of man, reflecting the Kantian bypassing of the 
machinery of the state in order that individual justice may be served. 
Rome constitutes progress towards a greater level of accountability but to reinforce 
steps taken there is a need to develop a culture of accountability which would lead to 
a convergence of perceived interests and behaviour on the part of the states. 
Essentially, there is a need for an epistemic community of appropriate behaviour, the 
moral equivalent of the scientific community essential for the improvement in 
environmental sovereignty. As Broomhall notes, the term 'collective conscience' has, 
in recent years, gained a greater level of sophistication and whereas previously it 
referred to issues surrounding peace and security only, the term now possesses a 
27 Article 83 of the Rome Statute 
28 AI1icle 84 ofthe Rome Statute 
29 The Nuremberg Judgment and Sentence quoted in Andrew Clapham, 'Issues of complexity, 
complicity and complementarity', p.32 
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wider theoretical autonomy.30 At present, what exists is a complicated system of 
which law is only one aspect, a system which also includes diplomatic and economic 
factors to enforce behaviour. Though this system is unlikely to fundamentally alter, 
nevertheless the inspiration behind the ICC, the international rule of law, comptises 
an important aspect of future civil society which may develop in the following few 
decades. 
Immunities and amnesties hold an unusual position m international law and their 
legality is contentious. Amnesties are neither prohibited nor allowed in international 
law except in extraordinary cases such as Article 6(5) of the Additional Protocol 11 to 
the 1949 Genocide Convention where amnesties are allowed, although the 
International Committee of the Red Cross maintain that this does not apply to those 
who have broken internationallaw.31 Ruth Wedgwood argues that the Rome Statute 
largely ignores the issues surrounding amnesties but the Statute can clearly be viewed 
as a direct attack upon the use of immunities in international law. 32 Before the Rome 
Statute, the international community's attitude to amnesties and immunities was 
reflected in the notion that amnesties create room for manoeuvre under the guise of 
principled flexibility which recognises the dignity of the victims rather than the 
necessity to prosecute. Immunities for heads of state and state immunity per se have 
largely remained a matter of custom, albeit rather thin. However, the Rome Statute 
makes immunities illegal and as such represents a further attack on the system of 
states and their diplomatic rules in favour of victims of human rights abuses. It may 
therefore be argued coherently that the steps towards a greater level of state 
accountability are both, from a cosmopolitan standpoint, positive and, secondly, 
important with regard to the way in which states and their officials must assess their 
actions for, '[i]f the international rule of law is to become firmly rooted in practice, it 
will have to do so against the background of the modified or post-Westphalian system 
of the post-War international order. ' 33 Cassesse echoes this point arguing that, 
30 Broom hall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, p. 46 
31 Hafner et al, 'A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood', p. Ill 
32 Ruth Wedgwood, 'The International Criminal Court: An American View', European Journal of 
International Law, Vol. I 0 ( 1999), pp. 93-107 
33 Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, p.S 
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[ s ]o long as states retain some essential aspects of sovereignty and fail to set 
up an effective mechanism to enforce arrest warrants and to execute 
judgments, international criminal tribunals may have little more than 
normative impact. Thus, we are once again reminded of the limits posed by 
international politics on internationallaw.34 
Complementarity 
Complementarity's importance is in relation to its compatibility with present 
statecentric architecture. Complementarity also seems to connote matters of 
complicity with regard to the way in which the international system operates, an issue 
examined towards the end of this section. Complementarity, effectively, 
demonstrates the primacy of domestic legal systems, as demonstrated by Article 18's 
deferral to national proceedings. The reasons for this are partly political and partly 
matters of efficacy. As an institution, the ICC appears to be more legitimate if it 
suspends action in deference to the state but equally, proceedings are more likely to 
be effective if kept to the national level since the acquiring of evidence, the 
transportation of witnesses and other practical matters is simply easier. The issue of 
legitimacy again appears to be crucial in establishing what may effectively become 
the constitutional architecture of a more developed world society. Legally, there 
appears to be little problem with complementarity since, '[I]t is within the sovereign 
power of a state to allow an international body to exercise jurisdiction in the same 
way in which a state exercises jurisdiction. There is no rule in international law 
prohibiting a state from conferring its adjudicatory authority on an international 
court. ' 35 
Occasions on which the ICC can defer to national courts occur where; no state entitled 
to jurisdiction under the Korean compromise36 has initiated domestic proceeding; 
where an entitled state voluntarily transfers the case to the Court; where proceedings 
are interrupted because of a bar under national law, such as a statute of limitations, 
immunity or a grant of amnesty; or where action that has been taken is more limited 
34 Cassese quoted in Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, p. 56 
35 Hafner et al, 'A Response to the American View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood', p. 117 
36 Explained in the section on universal jurisdiction, below 
44 
than the ICC may hope for. The voluntary transfer criteria 1s important when 
assessing the sovereignty of states in the developing world since it implicitly accepts 
that those states which have limited autonomy but, nevertheless, sovereignty have the 
ability to press ahead with justice, the importance of which with regard to ethnic 
warfare will perhaps only be demonstrated by the Court's future activities. The 
critetia by which the ICC gains control over cases also reveals that states, in the 
future, must adhere to international standards of behaviour and the Statute may 
therefore develop into a near-universal code of conduct for sovereign states, a near 
contract that must be abided by. The ramifications of this and opportunities for 
viewing sovereignty as a contingent concept are, therefore, massive. Since joining the 
ICC results in awarding the body jurisdiction the vast majority of members, it is 
conjectured, will be democracies, 'not the abusive governments that self-protectively 
flock to UN human rights bodies, where membership bears no cost. d? It may 
therefore be argued that the ICC, in some way, represents and extends the Kantian 
notion of the federation as in The Second Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The 
Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States,38 a rolling alliance of 
states who agree to a certain standard of civilization. This shared stance views 
sovereignty as a contingent property which relies on governments treating their, and 
other states', peoples in a proper manner, consistent with international standards. 
Eventually, were one an optimistic Kantian, then the ICC may evolve into the foedus 
pacificum by which war will become banished from the world. Indeed, aggression 
has been deemed to be illegal and open to judicial treatment by all those who have 
signed the Rome Statute, the problem being, merely, that no definition has yet been 
decided upon. 
Complementarity, it may be seen, is a double-edged sword. Whilst giving judicial 
primacy to domestic arrangements it nevertheless promises to act if a minimum 
standard of justice fails to be reached. It may be argued, for example, that there exists 
in international society a developing and shared norm of complicity39 and conscience 
as part of a wider moral net\vork which operates at a sub-state level. For example, for 
a state not to act in spite of the persecution of one of its minorities, indicates 
37 Kenneth Roth, 'The Case for Universal Jurisdiction', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80 (200 I), pp. 150-154, 
p. 151 
38 lmmanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', p. I 02 
39 An idea developed by Andrew Clapham in 'Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity' 
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complicity by inaction, which may be remedied by the ICC, particularly by its 
independent Prosecutor. 
Non-State Parties 
Linked to universal jurisdiction is the issue of non-state or third party jurisdiction, 
which is particularly controversial in US politics. The Korean Compromise, 
discussed in the section on universal jurisdiction below, effectively allows for 
individuals from non-party states to be tried by party states which, as discussed 
below, caused American consternation especially with regard to UN peacekeeping 
Issues. Traditionally, however, the US government has had few qualms over non-
party jurisdiction and has itself used it to its own advantage, a prime example being 
the removal of General Manuel Noriega from Panama, an action legally vindicated by 
international drugs laws.40 
US fears surrounding the ICC centre closely on the non-party issue and although there 
are cogent points surrounding disagreements, nevertheless these seem to pale in 
comparison to the massive boon in the improvement of state behaviour which the ICC 
offers. The ICC exposes US citizens to an international judicial mechanism not 
approved by the US government or to laws not formulated in Congress, and, hence, it 
is perceived to threaten sovereign decision-making, US rights to self defence and also 
its participation in international humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. However, 
as Kofi Annan argues, no UN peacekeeper of any nationality has been accused of a 
crime 'anywhere near the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. '41 Here, 
the balance between the internationalist and cosmopolitan stance is particularly 
evident, with the appearance of loss of power from the hands of the American 
legislators being viewed as a potential threat. Indeed, in Congressional hearings the 
ICC has been described as a 'monster that we [the US] need to slay,'42 prompting 
suggestions of over-exaggeration in defence of sovereignty in which, 'Senators and 
Congressmen have lined up to assert a case for national sovereignty by elevating this 
40 This example is drawn from Kenneth Roth, 'The case for universal jurisdiction', p. 152 
41 Kofi Annan quoted in Steve Crawshaw, 'Why the US needs this court' The Observer ( 15 June 2003) 
[http://obscrver.guardian.co.uk/commcnt/story/0,6903,977743,00.html] 15 March 2004 
42 Senator Rod Grams quoted in David Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal 
Justice', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2202), pp. 974-991, p. 988 
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largely phantom enemy into an irresistible global force of anti-Americanism sufficient 
to justify the institutional paranoia that has most of Bushite Washington in its grip. '43 
However, the US has recently dropped many of its objections with regard to its 
participation in peacekeeping operations,44 but, nevertheless, there remains a great 
deal of tension. 
Problems surrounding non-party action came to the fore when the UN Security 
Council debated an extension to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The US 
ambassador refused to commit troops unless guarantees were given that no troops 
would face the ICC for incidents that occur during their operations. Eventually, an 
agreement was reached under which US troops would be protected for twelve months, 
although the US representatives indicated that this measure would be enacted and re-
enacted for the foreseeable future,45 an action which violates the spirit of the ICC as 
established in Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Marc Weller noted that this 
contretemps was 'the most pronounced struggle about the nature of international law 
in the unipolar world yet, '46 and this sentiment of US exceptionalism is an issue in 
detail below. Further to this, during 2000 the American Servicemembers' Protection 
Act was introduced into Congress, prohibiting any US court and all levels of 
government from dealing with the ICC, including the extradition of suspected war 
criminals. The Act, passed in 2002, also prevents US forces from participating in UN 
activities unless the Security Council granted immunity as well as preventing military 
aid to those who adhered to the ICC, apart from NATO countries, major non-NATO 
allies and those who promised not to send US personnel to the ICC.47 The US has 
also signed agreements with over seventy countries, or over forty per cent of the 
world's population, exempting American citizens and, often, their own from ICC 
prosecution,48 even though this actually violates Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties which obliges nations 'to refrain from acts which defeat the 
43 Hugo Young, 'We can't allow US tantrums to scupper global justice' 
44 Rupert Cornwell, 'Prisoner abuse: US backs down over immunity for soldiers', The Independent (26 
June 2004) [http:/ /news. independent. co. uk/world/americas/story.j sp?story=5 34639] 26 June 2004 
45 Security Council Resolution 1422 reported in Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution', p. 707 
46 Marc Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution', p. 707 
47 As reported in Sean D. Murphy, 'US Signing ofthe Statute ofthe International Criminal Court', 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95 (200 I), pp. 397-400 
48 John Bolton, 'For us or against us?', The Economist (22 November 2003) [ www.economist.com] 4 
January 2004. 
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object and purpose' of a treaty. 49 Moreover, the Act promised to 'use all means 
necessary and appropriate to bring about the release from captivity' 50 of those held by 
the ICC, be they from the US, NATO countries or, indeed non-NATO countries. 
Ironically then, the US seems wiling to use physical force, possibly upsetting world 
peace, in order to undermine a body which aims to improve the lot of the world's 
citizens. 
Even opponents of the ICC, such as Ruth Wedgwood, are quick to admit that non-
party action may provide a normative good, consistent with accepted rules of 
customary law. One argument in favour of trying non-party individuals is that states 
already try non-nationals on the basis of territoriality, or on issues that directly affect 
their citizens - the principle of passive personality - or via protective jurisdiction 
which rules on matters which affect state interests. 51 However, the ICC, it is argued, 
it different from these examples since it involves a codified international body rather 
than the states themselves. Hence, it would appear that it is the institution which 
appears to promote cosmopolitan justice and damage sovereignty, albeit only 
marginally, that is in question and the reasons for this with regard to US objections 
are examined further below. 
Triggers 
This section examines those bodies charged with the ability to refer situations to the 
ICC. 'Situation' is used in preference to 'cases' since 'case' seems to imply that 
questions do need to be answered. The bodies able to refer situations to the ICC are 
the Security Council, individual states and, most controversially, the Prosecutor. 52 
The role that the Security Council would occupy was heavily debated during 
negotiations. For example, India objected to the Security Council possessing enough 
power to dominate the Court's proceeding and perhaps, from a cosmopolitan outlook, 
49 Human Rights Watch, 'United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court: Legal 
Analysis of Impunity Agreements' [http:lwww/hrw.orglcampaigns/icc/docs/art98analysis.htm}4 
January 2004 
50 American Servicemembers' Protection Act as quoted in Murphy, 'US Signing of the Statute of the 
ICC', p. 398 
51 Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View', p. 99 
52 Article 13 of the Rome Statute 
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greater representation of all nations would have benefited global justice. The US, 
however, argued that the Security Council should not be restrained by only being able 
to refer cases under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which accounts for matters which 
affect international peace. Although the US left negotiations dissatisfied with the role 
the Security Council occupied it nevertheless possessed the ability to halt proceedings 
for up to one year as well as refer them, which, nevertheless, is a considerable amount 
of power to be able to wield. 53 The Security Council's ability to suspend cases was 
negotiated under the guise of the 'Singapore compromise' and its effects can already 
be felt (see the section above on non-state parties). What the 'Singapore compromise' 
connotes is a tension between the internationalist and cosmopolitan stance since it 
infers that the greatest value in the international system is that of stability rather than 
justice, and that any movement towards a greater sense of global justice must be 
moderated in order that it does not upset fragile balances across the globe. The more 
sceptical may well be inclined, however, to argue that the 'Singapore compromise' 
reflected nothing more than the wish of a global hegemon to keep an even tighter grip 
on its own position. 54 The retention of power and control over proceedings certainly 
seems to have been an important factor during the discussion of the Rome Statute and 
it is notable that India wanted the state alone to be able to refer cases and that it, along 
with states such as China and Russia, declined to sign the Statute. 
The greatest move away from state justice to a more cosmopolitan understanding is 
contained within measures establishing a Prosecutor. The Office of the Prosecutor is 
an independent organ and, as such, may have a very important role in prosecuting 
state officials for the most heinous of crimes. In this way, the Prosecutor may be seen 
as moving beyond the state system since it is able to impose its authority regardless of 
state sanction, which, obviously, is a contentious issue. To what extent, therefore, an 
independent Prosecutor signals the departure of the world system from Westphalian to 
a modified or post-Westphalian one is an matter of some import but nevertheless it is 
important to note that the Prosecutor's actions are subject to a good deal of state 
scrutiny. For example, the approval of a pre-trial chamber is necessary55 and the 
Prosecutor has to justifY decisions to the states concerned in order to provide an 
53 See Hafner et al, for example, p. 113 
54 This is a view endorsed in Scott Turner 'The Dilemma of Double Standards in US Human Rights 
Policy', Peace and Change, Vol. 28 (2003), pp. 524-554, which is discussed in greater detail below 
55 Article 15(3) ofthe Rome Statute 
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opportunity to defer to domestic justice, for states have one month to respond to the 
Prosecutor. A renegade Prosecutor, turning accepted procedure on its head, is 
therefore, highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor's independence may result in 
the disenfranchised in international society gaining a voice and it is for this reason 
that there is hope of a more representative system of international justice, a matter 
examined in greater depth in the section on the future of international law. Moreover, 
since individuals can refer cases to the Prosecutor,56 he or she acquires the status of 
actio popularis which implicitly brings the individual close to the status of locus 
standi injudicio,57 which may have ramifications with regard to how a sovereign state 
views its people. In this way, the trigger mechanism may to be able to bring those 
previously excluded into the international arena in a manner espoused by, for 
example, Linklater.58 
Universal Jurisdiction 
One of the key issues which surrounds the ICC is universal jurisdiction, a concept 
which tallies with notions of cosmopolitan justice and respect for human rights to a 
greater extent than within the traditional Westphalian system of states. This section 
assesses claims that the Rome Statute embodies elements of universal jurisdiction 
including counter-arguments to this and a discussion of the way in which it may affect 
the normative worth of sovereignty. The importance of universal jurisdiction lies in 
the fact that it may privilege justice over order and, thus, must be introduced in such a 
way as to improve the lot of the world's citizens without upsetting the delicate 
international balance. 
Judge Bassiouni contends that there currently exists in international law mandatory 
jurisdiction for all core crimes under the banner of jus cogens.59 However, it may be 
seen that, at best, all that customary law allows is a permissive exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and some war crimes, although 
56 Article 15(12) of the Rome Statute 
57 Lamia Mekhamar, 'The Status of the Individual in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 
Mauro Politi and Giuseppe Nesi (Eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Challenge to Impunity (Burlington, Ashgate, 200 I), pp. 123-130, p. 125 
58 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. I 07 
59 Bassiouni's view as reported in Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal 
Court, p. Ill 
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there is some hope that momentum towards an increasing number of mandatory 
crimes is increasing.60 Indeed, a jus cogens rationale would lend a great deal of 
coherence to the ongoing evolution of international law with human rights, above and 
beyond humanitarian rights, becoming integral. For those who look towards a kind of 
legal federation, therefore, the ICC offers hope of a civitas maxima, or, at the very 
least, a clearly recognisable international legal community which goes some distance 
to recognising individuals. Moreover, the ICC has been described as constituting the 
culmination of twentieth century law making. 61 The International Criminal Court, 
Weller argues, consolidates universality by, firstly, refining the list of international 
crimes which can be held to be genuinely universal; secondly, by affirming the duty 
of states to use their own jurisdictions and; thirdly, establishing a constitutional organ 
capable of a greater level of enforcement.62 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to award the ICC the badge of universality. Indeed, the 
concept of universality, a German proposition, was explicitly rejected during the 
negotiating processes, being replaced instead by the 'Korean compromise'. Under the 
compromise, the Court is able to exercise its jurisdiction where any member nation is 
one of the following; the state where the offence actually took place; the state which 
is home to the victim; the state which is home to the accused or, lastly, the state of 
custody for the accused. 63 In this respect the Court remains territorial inasmuch as the 
ICC only exercises its jurisdiction if par malheur, the territories are either unwilling 
or unable to prosecute. Universal jurisdiction, therefore, did not remain on the agenda 
during negotiations for very long but Article 12 clearly offers a stepping stone 
towards the goal, which was largely a European aspiration, by entitling the ICC to try 
non-party citizens as stipulated by the Korean compromise. A key US objection to 
the Rome Statute, as discussed by Ruth Wedgwood,64 is that despite the step down 
from universality proper, the compromise nevertheless breaks customary international 
law. The custom in question is pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt, a maxim 
enshrined in the Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties. This 
measure holds that a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third state 
60 As noted in Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, p. 112 
61 Marc Weller 'Undoing the global constitution', p. 693 
62 Marc Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution', p. 694 
63 Marc Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution' p. 702 
64 Ruth Wedgwood, 'The International Criminal Court: An American View' 
51 
without its consent and that any body which acts as such is acting illegally. This 
argument and its rebuttal are presented, above, in the discussion surrounding third 
party jurisdiction. 
Section Four: Sovereign Reaction Following the Close of Negotiations 
Of all the states' reactions to the ICC, perhaps the most interesting geopolitically is 
that of the US, whose u-turns on the issues have been bolstered by legalistic 
argumentation, though the extent to which they hold water is debatable. Below is an 
examination and recap of the arguments for opposing the ICC as proffered by the US, 
followed by an examination of possible political reasons as to why US may not wish 
to be part of the Court. As a preliminary note, the US's relationship with international 
law has always strange for although it 'seldom loses an opportunity to profess its 
loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract ... the expression of this sentiment 
has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the 
actual policy of the United States. '65 
The US fears that the ICC will suffer from a democratic deficit, a continuing concern 
amongst a people who revere their constitution so vociferously. The ICC, unlike the 
US Supreme Court for example, is not embedded in a wider system of democratic 
institutions. The ICC can make judgements, but is not answerable for them. Here, 
the Euro-American split66 can be clearly felt, with the European model having 
embraced outside jurisdiction in the form of the European Court of Human Rights in 
particular. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights imposes far more 
stringent curbs upon participating states. 
The US views itself as a beacon on a hill with its superior Bill of Rights and therefore, 
refuses to be trumped by international law in a way other states would find perfectly 
acceptable.67 Indeed, written into the Hungarian constitution is the notion that 
international law is able, at any point, to trump the domestic. 68 The constitutional 
65 Manley Hudson quoted in David Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal Justice', p. 
980 
66 This theme is central to the recent work of Robert Kagan 
67 Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal Justice', p. 975 
68 Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal Justice', p. 975 
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exceptionalism that US political culture professes is connoted by Representative 
Bereuter (Rep. Neb) who, after having chaired the hearings on the ICC in the House 
of Representatives argued that although the officials of the EU are 'willing to give up 
elements of their sovereignty ... we are not and should not be'.69 Unilateralists 
currently occupy prominent positions in both the White House and Congress, and 
favour self-reliance over multilateral ism, treating treaties as unwelcome limitations on 
their behaviour. In this way, current US policymakers favour 'hard' power, which 
tallies with military and economic muscle, over the 'soft' power which emerges from 
a regime built upon treaties, norms and negotiations. 70 The status of the United States 
in contemporary international relations has been analysed by Charles Krauthammer 
who maintains that the US is 'no mere international citizen', that it is more powerful 
than any state has been since the Roman Empire and that it retains the ability to 
reshape norms and create new realities by 'unapologetic and implacable 
demonstrations of wi11.' 71 However, the UN is opposed to the concept of hegemony, 
as is evinced by its assertion of sovereign equality in 'Inadmissibility of the Policy of 
Hegemonism in International Relations,' 72 and it may be seen that the US's efforts to 
distance itself from the ICC only compounds the view that the US is, to many intents 
and purposes, going it alone. 
A second reason as to why the ICC meets American intransigence is simply that an 
international body may have an effect on the way in which policy may be constructed 
and implemented. As William Pfaff puts it, 'the motivation of the new decision 
makers in Washington is quite simple. They want the United States to have its way. 
They do not want to rule the world .... They believe that the United States is the best 
of all countries, with the right ideas; that it deserves to prevail in international 
disputes because it is right.' 73 The ICC represents a body which has not been 
designed to fit American needs and thus challenges the United States use of human 
rights rhetoric to pursue unilateral objectives by forging a more neutral means of 
69 Representative Bereuter quoted in Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal Justice', 
p.982 
70 lvo H. Daalder, 'Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?', International Affairs Vol. 
77 (200 I), pp. 553-567 
71 Charles Krauthammer as noted in Detlev F. Vagts, 'Hegemonic International Law', American 
Journal of International Law 95 (200 I), pp. 843-848, p. 843 
72 
'Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations,' UN General Assembly 
Resolution 34/103, noted in Vagts, 'Hegemonic International Law', p. 845 
73 William Pfaff quoted in Forsythe, 'The United States and International Criminal Justice', p. 978 
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prosecuting international justice. 74 Hence, it may be argued that, despite the legal 
arguments which tread around niceties, treating them as core issues, what is truly at 
stake is American vulnerability. This issue has received scant official comment but to 
many critics it appears that the chief reason as to why US support for the ICC was 
withdrawn is that a conscientious Prosecutor may be able to find some degree of fault 
with its policies in armed conflict. 
Apart from the US, reaction to the Rome Statute has generally been favourable with 
many countries altering their constitutions, their sovereign remit effectively, in order 
to accommodate their new responsibilities. The UK, Canada and South Africa are 
examples of states taking such a stance. However, even in liberal democratic states 
there has been some disquiet. For example, the Canadian international lawyer, 
Edward Greenspan has refused to act in accordance with the body, stating that it is a 
court which will put politics ahead of justice and, moreover, that having liberal 
d . . d . . 75 emocratlc states answenng to un emocratlc states IS wrong. Furthermore, 
Greenspan argues that member states are, 'granting massive power to a supranational, 
unaccountable, rootless group of lawyers,' 76 and hence it may be seen that the notion 
of territoriality as a grounding for jurisdiction over persons remains an important 
issue, even in the most forward-looking of states. Of those still refusing to join the 
ICC, other than the US, perhaps the most important are China, Israel and India, whose 
absence, owing to their geopolitical role and also their numbers in terms of 
population, represents an important omission. 
74 Scott Turner, 'The Dilemma of Double Standards in US Human Rights Policy', pp. 524-554, p. 524 
75 Peter Stock, 'Get ready for Globocourt', The Report (3 April 2002), Vol. 29(5) 
[http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=6266986&db=buh] 4 January 2004, p. 23 
76 Peter Stock, 'Get ready for Globocourt', p. 23 
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Section Five: The ICC, Sovereignty and the Status of International Law 
from a Normative Perspective 
The advent of the ICC has, arguably, ushered in a new era in international law 
enforcement founded upon respect for human rights and for increased recognition of 
the individual within the system of states. This section examines the developments 
and attempts to map current thought in international relations theory onto the 
advances, taking into account the innovations and arguments as noted in the 
discussion above. 
Falk notes that, 
Westphalia as a construction of international reality retains a vast domain of 
unexplored normative potential, which will remain ... potential ... unless 
morally sensitive and forward looking . . . political forces gain far greater 
access to policymaking and succeed in promoting a new image of reality that 
challenges economistic and geopolitical world pictures. To sum up, the realist 
construction of world order should not be confused with the range of world 
order constructions that are possible within a Westphalian framework. 77 
This is a sentiment which certainly seems to resonate with regard to the ICC. Falk 
appears to be hoping for an epistemological revision to the manner in which issues of 
justice are viewed and certainly such a sentiment echoes Wendt's constructivist 
understanding of how international relations operates. It may be argued that a 
legitimate organ of justice emanating from a concern above and beyond political 
exigencies, given momentum by the epistemic impetus of the non-governmental 
organisations and so forth, may, in the future, help to guide decision-making 
processes in order to create a type of sovereignty which recognises its moral duties 
and limitations of action more readily. 
The scope of the ICC suggests a convergence of humanitarian laws and human rights 
law in an unprecedented manner with the connection between core crimes and war 
77 Richard Falk's 'Horizons' as quoted in Henry E. Caney, 'The Grotian Eclectic and Human Rights: 
Four Recent Works by Richard A. Falk', Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 24 (2002), pp. 799-829, p. 813 
55 
being uncoupled, thereby blurring the distinction between war cnmes and cnmes 
against humanity. Again, this connotes the entrenchment of human rights into the 
way in which sovereignty operates and, as Megret contends, the ICC, 'seems deeply 
embedded in a cosmopolitan outlook rather than [being] geared to minimizing the side 
effects of sovereign co-existence.' 78 A cosmopolitan comprehension views 
sovereignty as being a normative good when it yields the maximum possible 
individual autonomy under the coercion presupposed by the social contract.79 This 
creates tension with regard to the ICC since, 'carried to its logical extreme the 
doctrine of human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole 
principle that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign states,'80 
although Reus-Smit contends that this is not the case, and it may be for this reason 
that major powers such as the US, Russia and China, aside from domestic conflicts, 
are unwilling to move into a post-Westphalian epoch. The 'Europeanization', if such 
a term is applicable, of developments within international law demonstrates, however, 
that a significant number of powerful states are willing to leave aside thoughts of 
sovereignty in order to create an international system which resembles more closely 
the world envisaged by Kant than the one by Hobbes. Indeed, the institutional 
architecture of the EU, including the European Court of Human Rights, whose remit 
extends behind the Rome Statute's compass, reveals a comprehension of a more 
integrated and morally sophisticated version of sovereignty, echoing the post-Second 
World War proposal devised by the international lawyer, Hans Kelsen. 81 Indeed, 
cosmopolitan citizenship, Linklater argues, requires that individuals support global 
institutions that are capable of enforcing justice for individuals when rights are 
violated,82 and thus hopes for a cosmopolitan variant of sovereignty may lie in the 
emergence of a robust ICC. However, perhaps such optimistic judgements must be 
restrained in order that the practical impact of the ICC may be better understood. The 
modified sovereignty emerging in contemporary Europe is somewhat of a historical 
78 Frederic Megret, 'Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal Court's Third Party 
Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International Law', European Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 12 (2001), pp. 247-268, p. 259 
79 Fernando R. Teson, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law', Columbia Law Review, Vol. I 
( 1992), pp.55-l 02, p. 66 
80 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 152 
81 As noted in Anthony Carty, 'Sovereignty in International Law: A Concept of Eternal Return', in 
Laura Brace and John Hoffman (Eds.), Reclaiming Sovereignty (London, Pinter, 1997), pp. I 01-116 
82 Andrew Linklater, 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European States', in 
Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler (Eds.), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies 
in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998), pp. 113-137 
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Irony smce it reflects more closely the Philadelphian conception of sovereignty 
developed by the nascent US as a counterpoint to the domineering and morally 
stifling Westphalian system. 83 The extent to which power usurps morality, is 
therefore open to question and leads back to the initial discussion of the way in which 
the system operates. 
Conclusion 
Fernando Teson defines a Kantian federation as consisting of an 'alliance of separate 
free nations, united by their moral commitment to individual freedom, by their 
allegiance to the international rule of law, and by their mutual advantages derived 
from peaceful intercourse,' 84 and it may be seen that, in intention at least, the ICC 
represents an attempt to construct such a system in the face of Westphalian 
sovereignty. The ICC builds upon moralistic judgements about the manner in which a 
state ought to treat its people, attempting, as it does, to instil a thin code of behaviour 
for individuals at all levels, which may, ultimately, provide a shell of rights for each 
individual. 
The growth of the human rights regime following the end of the Second World War 
may, in due course, be come to be viewed as a watershed in international relations, as 
the Peace of Westphalia is viewed now. However, at present, the tensions that exist 
between the Hobbesian, the internationalist and the cosmopolitan are readily apparent 
in all theatres of discussion and war. Indeed, the reaction and objections raised 
against the ICC on matters such as non-party jurisdiction and the trigger mechanisms 
indicate that traditional, territorial conceptions of sovereignty as relating solely to the 
state, still flourish, with the legal mechanisms and arguments countering their 
assertions remaining slightly vulnerable. Perhaps the evolution of customary law on 
the issues at hand will allow for greater clarity. 
Returning to state reaction to the ICC, we may also argue that a fundamental schism 
may be developing in international relations, a topic discussed by Kagan, Vagts and 
Keohane. The 'European' way of dealing with the concept of sovereignty includes 
83 See Robert Keohane, 'Ironies of Sovereignty' 
84 Teson, 'The Kantian Theory of International Law', p. 86 
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what may almost be termed the de-territorialisation of sovereignty along with a more 
advanced conception of both the worth of the individual and of the necessity and 
worth of cross-border cooperation, whilst the US in both political culture and action 
seems rooted to Westphalian notions of sovereignty, a possible outgrowth of its 
position as the global hegemon and its suspicion of others, which remams, even 
following the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it may be argued that, 
The excesses and exigencies of 'sovereignty' are due in part [to] the 
provenance of the term and its entry into the international and political 
vocabulary ... The law of inter-prince relations, with its roots in religious law, 
natural law, Roman law and morality was later strengthened and assimilated 
into the modem law of nations, but it did not shed its origin and its princely 
h 1. 85 parap ema Ia. 
This suggests that any fundamental change in the normative status of sovereignty 
under the auspices of international bodies such as the ICC must be accompanied by an 
epistemic and definitional change with regard to what sovereignty connotes and 
denotes with legitimate and, indeed, legitimating arms, such as NGOs, helping to 
catalyse this change in order to provide a more morally-sensitive sovereignty. 
85 Louis Henkin quoted in Robert McCorquodale and Raul Pangalangan, 'Pushing Back the Limitations 
of Territorial Boundaries', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12 (200 1), pp. 867-888, p. 877 
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Chapter Three: The Environmental Challenge and Sovereignty 
Introduction 
The environment m international relations has traditionally occupied a relatively 
minor role, acting only as a backdrop against which the political takes place. 
However, and especially in recent decades, environmental dilemmas have come to the 
fore and demonstrated the necessity of global action to combat problems with the 
potential to unleash incalculable devastation. These quandaries must be tackled in a 
way which, to an extent, ignores the cartographer's arbitrary state boundaries and it is 
for this reason that the examination of environmental problems is essential when 
discussing the normative worth of sovereignty in contemporary international relations. 
This chapter, therefore, aims to analyse a number of key themes with regard to the 
challenges and opportunities facing sovereign communities. Following a brief 
introduction to the 'climate change regime', Section One aims to explore the ethical 
status of the environment both in policymaking circles and also in philosophy, 
investigating positions such as strong and weak anthropocentrism to demonstrate what 
cooperation is likely if such an ethical position is held. This discussion leads into the 
notion of sustainability relating to negotiations at Rio and the climate change regime 
in particular, exploring the manner in which the search for sustainability has been 
informed by attitudes and economic bargaining. The sovereign states's relationship 
with the environment is also noted in this section, focusing on the way in which the 
ecological world cannot be meaningfully divided into the political units that we 
expenence. 
Section Two focuses on the notion of justice, and here links between this chapter and 
the previous one may be noted. A cosmopolitan schema, incorporating John Rawls' 
thought is used to argue that an inhabitable environment is an essential human right 
and that sovereign states are duty-bound to secure such a right for the entire human 
community. This justice is also discussed in relation to spatio-temorality and it is 
suggested that, unlike the justice examined in the previous chapter, such a version 
ought to, and is able to, recognise and adjust itself as a result of what occurred in 
previous generations. This notion feeds into an analysis of the role of developing 
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states, with regard to the climate change in particular, noting the problems 
encountered if universal duty is imposed upon all states in a blanket manner. 
Section Three is grounded in realpolitik and exammes potential causes for state 
intransigence with regard to environmental problems. Here the role of the 'epistemic 
community' is fully examined, indicating the circumstances under which it is able to 
drive and direct state action. This section focuses more closely on economic issues 
and also public opinion, substantiating the claim that the sovereign state is unwilling 
and, perhaps unable, to deal with environmental problems. Again, this analysis is 
coupled with an examination of negotiations over the climate change regime and 
especially over measures within the Kyoto Protocol. This section elucidates more 
fully the Euro-Atlantic divide outlined in the previous chapter, but also suggests that 
much of the rhetoric on the issue is, in terms of environmental action, misplaced. 
This chapter draws upon two case studies which are intertwined with the conceptual 
and philosophical bases of environmental sovereignty. 'Climate change' otherwise 
known as 'the greenhouse effect' or 'global warming' is arguably the greatest single 
environmental challenge facing the planet today. Climate change is caused, in the 
main, by the release of greenhouse gases, especially carbon dioxide, into the 
atmosphere. These gases form a layer in the upper atmosphere trapping the Sun's 
rays as these bounces back off the surface of the Earth. In time, this leads to the Earth 
effectively becoming a greenhouse, unable to let some of the heat from the 
atmosphere escape. The potential effects of climate change are devastating and range 
from the melting of the polar ice caps which may raise the sea level, submerging a 
number of states to an increase in the number of freak weather conditions the planet 
experiences, meaning that hurricanes and typhoons, for example, may become 
commonplace. This case study has been chosen because tackling it requires universal 
cooperation with differentiated levels of sovereign responsibility, thereby evoking one 
of the key normative challenges to sovereignty. Via the processes and machinations 
of international summits, meetings and conferences, it also demonstrates the role that 
non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations have upon the exercise of 
sovereignty within contemporary international relations. As will be seen throughout 
the chapter, the success of NGOs, in relation to the victories their human rights 
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cousins secured in the fight for the International Criminal Court, is interesting and 
hints at the dichotomy, for example, between liberal justice and economic matters. 
It is important to note that at the time of writing, July 2004, the Kyoto Protocol has 
yet to come into binding force since state ratification has not provided for the 
mandatory 55% reduction in emissions necessary to activate the treaty. Nevertheless, 
differing attitudes to the document, and climate change in general, offer scope for the 
analysis of the normative status of sovereignty with regard to environmental and, as a 
subsidiary, economic factors, which are discussed throughout. 
The second case study involves the 'ozone regime' which centres upon the use of 
CFCs in industrial practices. CFCs have the ability to deplete the levels of ozone in 
the atmosphere, meaning that dangerous radiation is able to pass into the atmosphere, 
the result of which includes an increased susceptibility to skin cancer in both people 
and animals. Acute crop damage may also occur. This second case study 
demonstrates the possibility for international sovereign cooperation, and the 
conditions necessary for this to occur. 
A brief history of the climate change regime 
This chapter, in seeking to demonstrate the ways in which sovereignty is facing a 
number of important normative challenges with regard to environmental matters, 
draws upon a key issue within contemporary international politics, namely climate 
change. In this introduction, the cogent points surrounding the 'climate change 
regime' including its origins and positions held by various states are discussed in 
order to provide a backdrop for the more analytical ideas explored in Sections One, 
Two and Three which, as mentioned above, focus upon theoretical points whilst using 
climate change to elucidate arguments. Also noted are the main points contained 
within the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (from hereon in 'Kyoto' or the 'Kyoto Protocol'). 
Although it has only been on the political radar for a relatively short time, climate 
change, originally deemed the 'hothouse effect', was identified in 1827 by Fourier 
with investigations on the issue continuing throughout the nineteenth century in works 
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such as Tyndall's On Radiation Through the Earth 's Atmosphere ( 1863) and also 
through Arrhenius' research. Following a lull in activity, interest re-emerged upon 
the founding of a carbon dioxide monitoring station in Mauna Loa in 1957 and the 
establishment of the Global Atmosphere Research Programme eleven years later. The 
1979 World Climate Change Conference stated with some confidence that carbon 
dioxide was the most problematic amongst the greenhouse gases and appealed for 
nations to 'foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might 
be adverse to the well-being of humanity.' 1 Also in 1979, the eighth World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) Conference established the World Climate 
Programme (WCP) whose influence upon sovereign states, along with the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has fulfilled a vital role in 
supplying information and scientific legitimacy as part of an epistemic community 
(see Section Three). The IPCC, established in 1988 by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and WMO is composed of three distinct divisions, 
Working Groups I (Science), II (Impacts) and III (Responses). Owing to its genesis, 
the IPCC is almost universally represented and it may be viewed as the most 
legitimate scientific body to exist on the subject. Legitimacy in environmental 
matters is, in relation to non-governmental and intergovernmental bodies, absolutely 
crucial just as the meetings and briefings at the Rome Conference described in 
Chapter Two helped to legitimate the International Criminal Court. 
The 1985 Villach Conference, organised by the WCP, witnessed the emergence of 
something of a consensus and this, when coupled with the floods, hurricanes and 
droughts of the late 1980s, led individual governments to believe that the effects of 
climate change were both hugely damaging and, moreover, real. Following Villach, 
conferences in Toronto, Malta and Hamburg each called for reductions in the amount 
of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere.2 
These conferences and vanous scientific conventions led to the Rio Conference 
('Rio') (1992) which proposed bold aims of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, but 
whose discussions were marked by the dominance and intransigence of the state as 
prime actor in international relations as well as throwing the North/South divide into 
1 Mathew Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 28 
2 Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 35 
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stark relief. In Rio, the UNFCCC was negotiated and the impact of this can be seen in 
all climate change discussions, as noted throughout the three sections of this chapter. 
Sustainable development was also considered in Rio. The concept of sustainable 
development, examined below, emerged from the Brundtland Report (1987), written 
by the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, which called into question 
sovereign states' ability to tackle environmental problems, querying sovereignty's 
limitations and worth.3 
After a number of conferences, Parties to the UNFCCC met in Kyoto in 1997 to 
finalise greenhouse emission reductions, along with a number of other measures. 
During the negotiations, various factions emerged each representing either individual 
or shared interests or intellectual positions relating to justice, order and the nature of 
the international system. These issues are investigated in the following three sections 
but it is important to present a brief sketch of states' original negotiating positions in 
order to elucidate more fully the challenges and pitfalls affecting those who would 
wish to construct a dynamic and powerful environmental regime beyond the remit of 
the sovereign state. For example, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), 
established at Rio, played an important role. AOSIS members have the most to lose 
from global sea rises considering that one of its members, the Maldives, consisting of 
over one thousand islands, is at no point more than two metres above sea level. The 
EU formed a second bloc, advocating the most stringent emission reductions owing 
to, arguably, a more developed cosmopolitan ethic,4 or possibly because of the fact 
that their emissions had, relative to 1990 levels, dropped. The 'umbrella group' or 
'JUSCANNZ', consisting of Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand plus Switzerland formed a further group who, although concerned like the 
EU, were unwilling to cut emissions so radically, instead emphasising carbon sinks, 
tree-filled areas which soak up carbon dioxide. It may be seen that the key debate in 
policies and measures covered at Kyoto revolved around a clash of political and 
governmental cultures between the United States and Europe, since the EU, 
accustomed to harmonization, cross-border interaction and cooperation opted for 
3 As reported in Owen Greene, 'Environmental Issues' in John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.), The 
Globalization of World Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 387-414, p. 393 
4 Note the 'European' stance to major issues with regard to the ICC (see previous chapter). Also note 
the European approach to the politics of collaboration as discussed in Keohane's 'Ironies of 
Sovereignty' 
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tougher measures, some of which were to be mandatory. It may be argued that 
European states, including the United Kingdom, were advocating a circle of concern 
beyond their immediate neighbours and that they were sensing more acutely the need 
for collective action, possibly because of the institutional architecture of the EU itself. 
What was eventually agreed were legally binding targets for industrialised countries 
to be achieved during the so-called Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012),5 with the 
US agreeing on the final day to cut emissions to seven percent below 1990 levels.6 
Article 2, on greenhouse gas emission, may be viewed as a victory for the laissez-faire 
attitude over the EU since no mechanisms are mentioned. Indeed, the United States' 
delegation lobbied successfully for the list of measures to be prefixed by 'such as' 
rather than 'in particular', favoured by the Europeans.7 As no prescription was given 
to the states as to what to do, it may be argued that the sovereign state remains 
entirely pre-eminent, reflecting the deeply entrenched internationalist view 
championed by the Americans, rather than the European cosmopolitan method which 
centres more closely on the notion of global governance. Mechanisms for reduction 
are documented in Articles 3(1 0) and (11) but it has been argued that the devil lies in 
the detail, or rather, the lack of it. 8 The activation procedure for the Protocol rested 
on ratification by fifty percent of the signatories who, in addition, had also to account 
for fifty-five percent of the stipulated emission reduction. 
Kyoto's measures were deliberated further at Conferences of the Parties held in Bonn, 
Marrakech and New Delhi. During the Bonn negotiations, European delegates 
rejoiced at having saved the Protocol by offering concessions to the umbrella group 
including extending the definition of carbon sinks, for example. US delegates were 
present but were not involved in negotiations, a stance explained by Paula 
Dobriansky, the US Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, who asserted that 
although 
5 Christoph Bohringer, The Kyoto Protocol: A Review and Perspectives', O.iford Review of Economic 
Policy, Vol. 19 (2003), pp. 451-466, p. 45 i 
6 Michael R. Molitor, 'The United Nations Climate Change Agreements', in Norman J. Vig and Regina 
S. Axelrod (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (London, Earthscan, 1999), 
pp. 210-235,p.288 
7 Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (II 
December 1997) [http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html] I November 2003 
8 See Michael Grubb, Christiaan Vrolijk, and Duncan Brack, The Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and 
Assessment (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999) 
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[ w ]e do not believe the Kyoto Protocol is sound public policy for the United 
States, we do not intend to prevent others from gong ahead with the treaty, so 
long as they do not harm legitimate U.S. interests ... and we will welcome 
international views as we develop a science-based, market-friendly basis to 
deal with climate change.9 
The American stance, therefore, rests upon the ability of the climate change regime to 
provide, via epistemic community activity, a precise calculation of what needs to be 
done and secondly, that these measures be enacted in such a way as not to damage the 
economy. Thus, it may be seen that narrow conceptions of interests are evident here, 
a factor discussed in Section One which explores sovereignty's relationship with the 
environment and also in Section Three which argues that the state's willingness to 
regulate itself is significantly diminished where financial prosperity is concerned. 
Section One: Sovereignty and the Ethical Status of the Environment 
Sovereignty, narrowly defined and relating to the wielding of legitimate authority and 
power within separate geographic units, is being challenged by environmental 
problems which affect the global whole. This initial section explores the ethical 
standing of the environment in contemporary international relations, as informed by 
philosophical traditions as well as relationships of power, autonomy and control under 
the Westphalian system. The two disparate strands of thought which dominate are the 
views that the environment, which includes our habitats and all the living organisms 
therein, has inherent value, value just by being. The second, and more prevalent, 
view argues that it retains value only inasmuch as it facilitates the existence of 
humanity. 
9 Paula Dobriansky quoted in Greg Kahn, 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush 
Administration', Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 21 (2003), pp. 548-571, p. 553 
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Anthropocentrism and the Environment as an Economic Issue 
The dominant view of the environment, especially in the industrialised world, is that it 
has no inherent value, in the way in which a human in the cosmopolitan's schema, for 
example, does. Two versions of this position have prevailed, namely 'strong 
anthropocentrism' and 'weak' or 'enlightened anthropocentrism.' The stronger 
variant robustly privileges humanity over the environment and, therefore, places the 
political organisation of man into sovereign communities as being more important 
than any other factor and is demonstrated in the view that man 'will be the Lord of 
Nature,' espoused by Leibniz. 10 This view developed during the period of scientific 
discoveries but has been tempered by the Enlightenment and theology into the weaker 
version which has emphasised man's role as steward of the planet. This mode of 
thinking, favoured by the majority of the empiricists, most notably John Locke, has 
been the most important since the Industrial Revolution, in particular. However, it is 
not only the liberal rights theorists and capitalists who have referred to the 
environment solely in terms of resource and habitat, as possessing instrumental value 
only. Marx, for example, stated that 'the purely natural material in which no human 
labour is objectivised has no value.' 11 Thus, financial considerations have been of 
paramount importance when considering the environment, reflecting the sovereign 
state's fixation on narrow conceptions of the good which are based on military and 
economic power especially. 
Purely financial considerations about environmental action can clearly be viewed in 
the progress of the ozone regime which initially divided the industrialised world into 
two blocs. The first of these, the Precautionary Group, including the United States, 
Canada, Sweden and Norway, all banned non-essential CFC usage and lobbied for a 
global ban, although it must be noted that during the Reagan Administration the US 
did rejoin the sceptic's camp. 12 The second, more conservative group consisted ofthe 
EC and Japan with France and the United Kingdom, in particular, demanding more 
10 Leibniz quoted in Alexander Gillespie, flllernational Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 13 
11 Karl Marx quoted in Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics, p. II 
12 Owen Greene, 'Environmental Issues', p. 402 
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. .fi f 13 sc1ent1 1c proo . Importantly, once the decision to curb CFC usage was 
implemented, those states adhering to the newly set limitations actually did better 
economically. For example, in 1983 alone in the United States the reduction in CFC 
usage and the tum towards hydrocarbons saved over $165million, a trend which 
continued throughout the ozone regime, easing the passage of the Montreal Protocol. 
What this indicates is that sovereign states are willing to embark on environmental 
change only if the cost benefit analysis demonstrates that it is cost effective. Thus, it 
appears that claims that environmentally-speaking, the Westphalian world is reaching 
a new level of environmental morality which respects the globe merely because of its 
being rather than its economic value are misguided, especially when considering that 
the Montreal Protocol had written into it an escape clause for states where costs were 
deemed to be too high. Furthermore, Greenpeace's stance on the issue reveals a 
leaning towards acknowledgment of the North/South divide rather than a focus upon 
the planet when it posed the question, 'Why should they [the developing countries] 
forego these useful chemicals when the industrialised world has used them for 40 
years and was totally responsible for the problem - for making 96% of the main 
CFCs?' 14 Not only is the economic value of the environment raised but so too are 
questions of justice and development, explored in greater detail in Section Two. The 
justice here is temporal, since it is declared that to deny a person the right to utilise 
something which has been beneficial in the part even though it is now shown to be 
damaging is argued to be an injustice. This position also echoes the strong 
anthropocentrism defined above. 
The view that the environment is a matter of economics is reinforced further by 
negotiations in Rio in 1992. For example, those countries who were dependent on 
either exporting or importing oil were, understandably, unwilling to sacrifice their 
prosperity for the well being of mankind and nature, morally desirable as it may be. 
The global South's view of the conference was expressed by one delegate who bluntly 
stated that, '[w]e from the south do not view this as an environment conference. We 
13 The impetus for definitive scientific proof before any action which may incur costs is discussed in 
Section Three 
14 Greenpeace ( 1987) quoted in Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations 
(London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992) 
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view it as an economic conference,' 15 which indicates the discrepancy in North/South 
relations. It may therefore be seen that, even at this early stage in the climate change 
regime, sovereign states were fundamentally unwilling to adopt measures that would 
impact negatively upon or impede economic development, even though short-term 
cutbacks may, in the long term, actually be beneficial. 
Game theoretic notions play an important role in environmental issues. Issues of 
justice in relation to the International Criminal Court are likely to produce a win-win 
situation since nobody, save despots and dictators, are likely to lose out. It is a 
tangible global good and it is for this reason that the majority of states were willing to 
sign in Rome. This is not so with environmental politics, and the climate change 
regime especially, where there is perceived to be no win-win situation. The scientific 
method of determining levels of pollution and resources was also viewed as an 
extension of moral imperialism on the part of the North as is demonstrated by 
Agarwal and Narain's accusation that the World Resources Institute's report of 1991 
was based 
'less on science than on politically motivated and mathematical jugglery. Its 
main intention seems to be to blame developing countries for global wam1ing 
and perpetuate the current global inequality in the use of the earth's 
environment and its resources.' 16 
Fears of 'ecocolonialism' are rife, in which 'technology cooperation', the term 
favoured by the United States over 'transfer', would be utilised by transnational 
corporations in order to gain an even greater foothold in the South, thereby 
perpetuating the core-periphery relationship as identified by dependency theorists. 
The utilitarian's mantra of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' has had an 
immense impact upon attitudes towards perceived interests and this practical 
reasoning has informed much of the policymaking over the last two hundred years. 
This mode of thinking contrasts with the rights-based approach which underpins 
much cosmopolitan discourse, including the successful discussions over the 
15 As noted in Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 83 
16 Agarwal and Narain quoted in Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 89 
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International Criminal Court. It is for this reason that this chapter attempts to draw 
rights into the discussion of environmental matters. 
There also exists a view that nature retains moral value merely as a result of its being, 
as evinced by the notion of 'respect for life' proposed by Albert Schweitzer. 17 This is 
problematic since it does not, and arguably cannot, draw a definite line of where 
moral worth is to be awarded and where it is not. The sliding scale for the 
environment is therefore contentious and it has remained only on the margins of 
political life, rarely impacting on discussions over the worth of sovereignty. 
Sustainability 
Utilitarianism, strong and weak anthropocentrism when considered temporally as well 
as spatially all rely on sustainability since they aim to perpetuate the species. 
Unhindered economic activity has produced a myriad of problems as well as positives 
and only in recent decades has the notion that industrial activity cannot continue 
indefinitely come to the public fore. The Club of Rome's report, The Limits to 
Growth (1972), for example, asserted that, at then current levels, many important 
resources would be used up within the following one hundred years, meaning that 
governments would be forced to regulate their own citizens in order to maintain a 
level of approximate homeostasis. By framing problems is such a way as to appeal to 
realist notions, environmental problems have become pressing issues amongst the 
world's statespeople. 'Environmental security', a contentious term, has thus emerged 
as an important category amongst the policymakers. Equally, any problem the 
outcome of which is not deemed necessary for security reasons is likely to remain 
unresolved, as may be seen with the climate change regime. Despite an abundance of 
evidence to the contrary, there still remains lingering doubt over the potential damage 
that can occur even if carbon dioxide levels, in particular, were to rise. 18 
The idea of sustainable development (Agenda 21) was discussed in Rio, at which it 
was asserted that economic activity ought to be regulated in order to service the needs 
17 Schweitzer's position noted in James Connelly and Graham Smith, Politics and the Environment: 
From Theory to Practice (2nd Ed.) (London, Routledge, 2003) 
18 See Section Three of this chapter 
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of both generations to come as well as the present one. The Commission for 
Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) were 
established to complement the efforts of the previously existing branches of the UN. 
The CSD, made up of fifty-three states on rotation kept a balance of members 
favourable to the developing world from 1994 and has the power to review national 
policy of individual states and offer advice, if necessary. The CSD as a body which 
promotes dialogue between states and NGOs could, in future years, be at the heart of 
a reporting system which is able to impose environmental standards and advocate 
sweeping economic changes, although it is notable that there is some fear surrounding 
a supranational body with any power to formally limit economic activity. 19 The Rio 
conference also spawned a series of follow-up conferences such as Cairo on 
population (1994) and Copenhagen on social development (1995), indicating that 
environmental problems, conceivable as security issues, are multiplying beyond 
traditional military concerns but, as yet, a normative shift in this field has yet to occur. 
Geographical, Sovereign States and the Environment 
The second part of this section endeavours to explicate the environment's relationship 
with other entities within the international arena, and especially sovereignty as 
understood, in Hinsley's definition, as the ultimate authority within a state.20 Hence, 
this section aims to explore the challenge facing sovereignty in maintaining the 
environment, providing a sustainable future for humanity and the planet. 
The sovereign state is necessarily defined geographically, since cartographers can 
demonstrate where one state ends and another begins. The notion that spheres of 
legitimate authority and action drive the manner in which the world operates is key 
and it is for this reason that the Westphalian system and, more precisely, Euro-
American geopolitics has been dubbed 'mastery of the physical world. ' 21 However, it 
has been argued that the sovereign state as the protector of its citizens' environmental 
19 Marvin S. Soroos, 'Global Institutions and the Environment: An Evolutionary Perspective', in 
Norman J. Vig and Regina S. Axelrod, The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (London, 
Earthscan, 1999), pp. 27-57 
2
° F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, p. 25-6 
21 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 'The Nature of Sovereignty and the Sovereignty of Nature: Problematizing the 
Boundaries between Self, Society, State and System', in Karen T. Litfin (Ed.), The Greening of 
Sovereignty in World Politics (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998), pp.1 09- I 38, p. 115 
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well-being in the Hobbesian mould, is entirely mythic, smce globalisation has 
identified the way in which the state's individual moral importance is contestable, 
with each unit merely constituting a small section of the global ecosystem which 
cannot be isolated in any meaningful way.22 Hence, states have to demonstrate that 
sovereignty, through cooperation, is able to confront problems which are, by their 
very nature, transnational, rather than international. Conventional politics' inability to 
grapple with the politico-ecological dichotomy was neatly summed up in the 
Brundtland Commission which commented that 'the Earth is one but the world is not,' 
and that 'a world in which human activities and their effects were neatly 
compartmentalised' within states was quickly disappearing?3 Moreover, this failure 
to cope with the path-crossing nature of these problems has, it is claimed, led to a 
crisis of confidence amongst the planet's populations, a trend which also partially 
explains why NGOs and the media have such trans boundary power. 24 
The groundbreaking UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm 
in 1971 produced Principle 21 reiterated in Principle 2 of the Rio Summit's 
Declaration, now considered a constituent of international soft law25 . Principle 21 
declares that 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction of control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or other areas beyond the limits of 
jurisdiction. 26 
22 Daniel Deudney, 'Global Village Sovereignty: lntergenerational Sovereign Publics, Federal-
Republican Earth Constitutions and Planetary Identities', in Karen T. Litfin (Ed.), The Greening of 
Sovereignty in World Politics (Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 299-325 
23 The Brundtland Commission's report quoted in Lipschutz, 'The Nature of Sovereignty and the 
Sovereignty of Nature', p. 130 
24 Gwen Prins and Elizabeth Sellwood, 'Global Security Problems and the Challenge to Democratic 
Process', in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, Re-imagining Political Community: 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998), p. 252-72, p. 254 
25 Phillipe Sands, 'Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century: Sustainable Development and 
International Law', in Norman J. Vig and Regina S. Axelrod (Eds.), The Global Environment: 
Institutions, Law and Policy (London, Earthscan, 1999), pp.116-137, p. 127 
26 Principle 21 of the Declaration ofthe United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
('Stockholm Declaration') (16 June 1972) 
[http://www. unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Documentl 0=97 &Article( D= 1503] 
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Although this declaration enforces sovereign responsibility for industrial activity in 
order to produce a global good,27 it nevertheless reinforces the sovereign entity's 
place within international relations as being, in some ways, prior to the environment. 
Indeed, in the above extract, the state can be viewed as possessing its very own 
environment. Although not particularly troubling with regard to issues such as lakes 
used for fishing and forests, for example, the attempt to package the sky above a state 
seems rather puzzling. Hence, whilst the framing of the environmental debate focuses 
on the environment as a package of resources with precise limits, the ability of a 
global political system predicated on Westphalian sovereignty to resolve issues such 
as the greenhouse problem remains limited. 
It has been argued that the momentum of the agreements reached at Stockholm, Rio 
and Montreal signal a fundamental alteration in international relations evincing a 
world of unprecedented global interdependence.28 In terms of sovereignty's 
normative worth, it may be contended that there is an emerging understanding of the 
limitation of sovereignty's capability to deal with problems which are, by their very 
essence, global. This, in tum, may lead to a more inclusive form of sovereignty 
sensitive to cosmopolitanism29 or perhaps 'terrapolitanism', a view which accounts 
for the well-being of the planet as a moral actor.30 Negotiated efforts at Rio and 
Kyoto reflect this nascent understanding whilst simultaneously highlighting reasons 
for environmental inactivity and also those parts of the globe which cling to the 
traditional Westphalian system. The uneasy balance between the recognition of 
problems and states asserting their sovereign rights remains unresolved. 
The problem, therefore, facing those who aim to tackle global ecological problems is 
developing a coherent vision of 'green sovereignty' which is able to manage the 
pitfalls and schisms of traditional international relations, acknowledging the limits of 
transnational action and also the primacy of the state, which is unlikely to be eroded 
or circumvented in any meaningful fashion. The 'green' approach, thus far, has been 
I November 2003 
27 This notion, summarised by the maxim 'one must not use his own so as not to injure others' is 
explored in greater detail below in the section on environmental justice 
28 Molitor, 'The United Nations Climate Change Agreements', p. 210 
29 In line with the Rawlsian method for obtaining justice outlined in Section Two 
30 Daniel Deudney, 'Global Village Sovereignty', p. 314 
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largely unsuccessful, tending to be deconstructive rather than constructive, offering a 
compelling criticism of state activity without proposing a reasonable alternative. 
Deudney argues that this occurs because of the tendency to view sovereignty 
alongside autonomy and supremacy rather than 'the more protean concept more 
useful for capturing the generative logic of legitimate authority, autonomy and 
identity in political order more generally. di What may, therefore, be seen is the value 
of a more sensitive variant of sovereignty which is able to broach the Schmittian 
self/other divide, acknowledging the welfare of other states' citizens as being morally 
important, a theme embellished in the second section on environmental justice. The 
reconfiguration of political space is, it is argued, necessary in order to be able to cope 
with the most pressing ecological questions, moving away from Westphalian and 
indeed, cosmopolitan notions, to terrapolitanism. However, the scope of this chapter 
does not permit a detailed investigation of any dramatic alteration of the international 
system, focusing instead on potentially dramatic normative alterations of sovereignty 
rather than its abandonment. 
Section Two: Justice and the Environment 
Environmental justice and the right to a clean and hospitable environment has become 
a key issue in recent years. As discussed below, emerging from the human rights 
culture following the Second World War,32 there grew the sentiment that access to 
certain material benefits, as well as negative liberties or 'freedoms from' were 
essential and that the international system ought to act in such a way as to guarantee 
these. Thus, this section aims to clarify what can be understood in terms of 
environmental justice beginning with an examination of conventional Enlightenment 
views of progress and the questioning thereof, followed by an examination of John 
Rawls' notion of cosmopolitan justice as it may be applied to the individual with 
regard to the environment. This then leads into the notion of 'spatia-temporal 
justice,' an important notion and one which appears to exist in the realm of 
environmental politics rather than human rights, for example. This section aims to 
demonstrate that the contemporary world does and ought to provide moral 
consideration on the basis of previous actions as well as protecting those who will 
31 Daniel Deudney, 'Global Village Sovereignty', p. 302-3 
32 See Buergenthal's schema as examined in the previous chapter 
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exist as part of future generations. This discussion is bound up in the issue of 
developing states' responsibilities and duties under the climate change regime, 
indicating that there exists a division between traditional Kantian cosmopolitanism 
and a more subtle variant which rests very much on the historical stituatedness of the 
individual. The connection between cosmopolitanism and the developing state occurs 
by dint of the fact that developing states are the political communities through which 
individuals can enjoy greater levels of justice. 
The Cosmopolitan Right to a Hospitable Environment 
Conventional Enlightenment views of the progress of mankind have slowed, and, in 
some cases, reversed, especially in recent years. It can no longer be assumed that all 
our activities, economic or otherwise, are advancing the species or our communities. 
This sentiment can be viewed in the work of the Frankfurt School who adopted the 
view that elements of Kantian progress have been co-opted in such a way that the 
'how' has triumphed with the 'why' becoming almost redundant,33 but it appears that 
this trend is, to an extent, inverted as sovereign states learn to realise that they possess 
responsibilities as well as rights and capabilities. Indeed, the onus has shifted in order 
that industrial actors are forced to demonstrate that their projects are not endangering 
the environment, just as they are forced to view more carefully the human cost of 
progress, as in the case of Quebec's indigenous peoples, discussed in Chapter Four. 
Beyond the narrow confines of each sovereign state however, there is a burgeoning 
sense that industrial actors must prove that industrial activities do not unfairly 
disadvantage those not necessarily geographically adjacent. 
The human rights regtme has had a masstve impact upon the way in which the 
environment is viewed. The human rights measures of the second wave of UN action, 
as exemplified by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
example, argued that the 'liberal' rights to speech, assembly and so forth were, in fact, 
moot points were people unable to cat and drink owing to the material conditions of 
their existence. Thus, there grew a sense of a new right to a habitable environment 
based upon the argument that, '[i]n order to live and secure the survival of his species, 
33 See for example, Thedor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London, 
Verso, 1997) 
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man needs to use and consume material things. This requirement of his nature, this 
claim of a right to live, precedes and survives any form of State organisation . .34 
Material rights rather than liberties are less embedded in the industrialised nations 
which constitute the Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and so it is, perhaps, 
unsurprising that meaningful action with regard to climate change has been limited. 
Furthermore, it is even less startling that the state which guards its Bill of Rights so 
jealously, the United States, has been so vehemently unwilling, at least in 
international agreement, to limit its economic activities. 
The right of each individual to be able to live and flourish in an unpolluted world can 
be reached by applying John Rawls' test. 35 Rawls suggests a thought experiment in 
which we, removed from our cultural and intellectual context and preferences, are 
asked to consider the rights we would wish to choose. Rawls contends that we would, 
invariably, adopt a position which involves equal rights to basic liberties, with 
economic and social inequalities being so arranged as to benefit the poorest members 
of society, thereby introducing both inalienable political and socio-economic rights. 
The imposition of the 'veil of ignorance' 'nullifies the contingencies and biases of 
historical fate, ' 36 which certainly includes geographical considerations. Under this 
cosmopolitan schema the fears and interests of those living in, for example, low-lying 
states such as Bangladesh and AOSIS states with regard to the threat of global 
warming and sea level rises, must be considered. Environmental justice and the right 
to a hospitable habitat were key issues discussed at Rio and Kyoto. 
Spatio-temporal Justice 
There exists within environmental politics a burgeoning sense of spatio-temporal 
justice. The ICC, for example, affirmed that no cases would be considered where the 
incident occurred before its establishment in order to avoid an infinite regress of 
claims which may damage international order and peace. This is not so with 
environmental justice, where the net results and degradation are cumulative, as a 
result of centuries of industrial activity. For example, were Rawls' thought applied 
34 B.A. Wortley quoted in W. Paul Gormley, Human Rights and Environment: The Need for 
International Co-operation, (Leyden, Netherlands, A.W. Sijthoff, 1976), p. 38 
35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, OUP, 1999) 
36 John Rawls quoted in Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 134 
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temporally, questions of intergenerational justice would have to be considered. 
Although Rawls does not expressly focus upon environmental matters it can be 
inferred from his original premise that an inhabitable world is crucial, something 
which can only be secured by previous generations 'stewarding' the planet in a 
sustainable manner. Furthermore, it may also be possible to extend Charles Beitz's 
'circle of concern' in such a way that it encompasses future generations.37 It may 
therefore be argued that one of the key normative challenges facing sovereignty is its 
ability to secure a spatia-temporal environmental justice that bridges the self/other 
dichotomy. This has been dismantled, to an extent, by the human rights activities 
surrounding the ICC, for example, and must now be applied in such a way as to 
include the future. The sovereign responsibility for the future of the planet can clearly 
be viewed in the response of one of the delegates at the Bonn negotiations, who, 
following a breakthrough exclaimed, '[w]e have rescued the Kyoto Protocol. We can 
go home, look our children in the eye and feel proud of what we have done. ' 38 
The state, replete with sovereign legitimacy, remains a powerful obstacle in forging 
solutions to environmental dilemmas. Legal sovereignty, a key component of 
external sovereignty, confers on states the right to make decisions which affect a 
geographical portion of the globe, its population, flora and fauna, and is reinforced by 
international law, including, ironically, environmental agreements and treaties, even 
those which recognise the states' inability to generate solutions by themselves. In 
legal terms, every agreement simply reinforces and reproduces the constitutive 
principles ofsovereignty.39 Indeed, Article 2 ofthe 1974 Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States asserts the right of states to exercise permanent sovereignty over 
its natural resources and economic activities.40 Arrangements such as these, it may be 
argued, make cross-border control of activities, or global governance, exceedingly 
difficult, rendering effective global environmental justice using the Rawlsian method 
outlined above, verging on the impossible. Hence, states like Brazil assert, quite 
legitimately, their right to deforestation for economic gain in spite of criticism, albeit 
mainly from the North. Furthermore, this points to a further tension in the political 
37 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 
38 Margot Wall strom quoted in Mark Lynas, 'To make matters worse ... ' The Guardian (2 August 
2001) [http://www.guardian.co.uk/GWeekly/Story/0,530722,00.html] 4 May 2004 
39 Karen Litfin, 'Introduction' in Karen Litfin (Ed.), The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics 
(Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998), pp. 1-27, p. 6 
4
° Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations, p. 12 
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system quite unlike any other issue since it may be seen that the industrialised states 
of the North wish to curb the industrial development of the global South, even though 
they themselves are responsible for the majority of the problems encountered today.41 
Although environmental problems have only meaningfully entered public 
consciousness in recent decades, legal responsibilities became contentious in the 
nineteenth century. The acceptance of responsibility for damage was not initially 
forthcoming though, as with the Harmon Doctrine (1895), which dismissed Mexican 
claims that US use of the Rio Grande was having negative consequences on Mexican 
stretches. This dismissal of transnational culpability for ecological damage was 
altered irrevocably by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas, or that 'one must 
use his own so as not to injure others. '42 Such decisions led to the emergence of 
regulatory regimes which, fundamentally, are international agreements that set the 
terms of specific types of state action, practice and also goals. Prime examples 
include the Montreal Protocol and regimes regulating the usage of rivers in Europe, 
which benefited all by limiting state action. 
Environmental Justice and Developing States 
Different elements of justice are therefore clearly visible and these problematic 
interconnections were revealed in stark detail during the framing of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The final text of the Protocol designates that only Annex I countries, the 
developed states, have to reduce emissions and it remains unlikely that states such as 
China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria will be given definite targets to meet at 
any point in the next few decades even though China, for example, could easily 
reduce its dependence upon coal. It has also been suggested that, over the course of 
the next fifty years, emissions produced by the developing world will actually exceed 
the industrialised.43 Questions of fairness may therefore be raised over the actual path 
of development taken by the industrialising states regarding their culpability for any 
environmental degradation from hereon in. As a counterbalance, it may be argued 
41 Note Greenpeace's attitude with respect to CFC emissions. 
42 Paul Wapner, 'Reorienting State Sovereignty: Rights and Responsibilities in the Environmental Age 
in Karen Litfin (Ed.), The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998), 
pp. 275-297,p.278 
43 See, for example, Kahn 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration' 
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that these states retain the right to the same development which the North has been 
fortunate enough to experience. Although the developing states' exemptions tally 
with the 'common but differentiated' approach espoused by the Rio Declaration 
which was ratified by the US Senate, this issue, in particular, remains unpopular.44 
US ratification of Rio may, in part, be due to the fact that the UNFCCC is a 
convention which means that its force in international law is a long way short of a 
treaty and secondly, that no precise targets or mechanisms were settled. 
President George W. Bush's Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol as 
unreasonable owing to the lack of developing state commitments, and also because of 
their preference for market-based voluntarism over internationally set targets which 
would have necessitated a thirty percent reduction in emissions. Bush's 'Letter to 
Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change' explains that 
Kyoto is unfair because it 
exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers (sic) such 
as India and China, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the 
U.S. economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is clear consensus 
that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global 
climate change concems.45 
In a strange irony, Bush's rejection draws upon notions of universal duty amongst all 
the states even though states such as India and China are not responsible for the 
problems of climate change. It is wrong to believe that the US rejection is based 
entirely on its executive's narrow understanding of power, since rejection at the hands 
of the Senate was all but certain. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which was passed 95-
0, asserted that the Senate would not ratify any treaty that, 
(A) Mandate(s) new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or any other agreement also 
mandates new specific schedules commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance 
44 As noted in The Economist, 'Oh No, Kyoto' (5 April2001) [www.economist.com]lO May 2004 
45 Bush's letter quoted in Kahn, 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration', p. 551 
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period, or (B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United 
States.46 
This indicates that the notion of spatia-temporal justice, examined above, may be 
coherent as an intellectual concept but that in policymaking circles where 
understandings of power are more restrictive, it is currently untenable as a tool, 
especially where short-termism and re-election are of paramount importance. 
However, environmental issues occupy an exceptional position in international 
relations in that they are able to privilege developing states over the developed world. 
Whereas military, political and economic power remain the preserve of the developed 
world, the developing world's future can impact massively on the developed's. In 
this way, it may be argued that the developing world possesses leverage in terms of 
environmental bargaining, and, indeed, that it is able to claim victories off the first 
world. 47 
Section Three: Sovereignty, Non-Governmental Organisations 
and Relationships of Power and Control 
The sovereign state's ability to address environmental problems is questionable. 
Issues of practicality and inclination plague attempts to construct meaningful regimes. 
NGOs have come to the fore with regard to environmental politics and this section 
analyses the growth of these bodies and the conditions necessary to provide a genuine 
breakthrough in the alleviation and prevention of environmental disasters. The 
example of the Montreal Protocol, which dealt with the diminution of the ozone layer, 
which prevents harmful rays from reaching the ground, is cited throughout this 
section. The success of Montreal and 'the ozone regime' is in stark contrast to the 
Kyoto Protocol and the climate change regime and throughout this section the 
differences and similarities between the two are noted. 
46 US Senate's Byrd-Hagel Resolution, quoted in Kahn, 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol Under the 
Bush Administration', p. 550 
47 Marian A. L. Miller, 'Sovereignty Reconfigured: Environmental Regimes and Third World States' in 
Karen Litfin (Ed.), The Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998), 
pp. 173-192, p. 188 
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Non-Governmental Organisations, Intergovernmental Organisations 
and Epistemic Communities 
In judging the nonnative challenge and improvement in sovereignty with regard to 
environmental problems, it is vital to note the role of non-governmental organisations 
and Pogge's 'epistemic communities.' Both occupy a crucial role not only in bringing 
issues to the attention of policymakers and populations alike, but also in legitimating 
state action within the international arena. The roles occupied by environmental 
NGOs is somewhat different from the role that CICC played in discussions, for 
example, over the International Criminal Court. Those attending the Rome 
Conference were able to prick the moral conscience of the state delegates and also 
provide legal arguments as to why action was both necessary and morally good. 
Under the environmental regime, NGOs provide information about likely costs and 
effects of environmental degradations, stressing moral imperatives as a secondary 
factor. In addition, many NGOs also fulfil verification functions, such as the position 
held by the World Wildlife Fund who are charged by the International Union for the 
Conservation ofNature with the task of monitoring animal trafficking.48 
Transationally-organised networks of knowledge-based communities, hereon in 
referred to as epistemic communities, developed throughout the twentieth century, 
blossoming in the 1960s. The epistemic community involves shared consummatory 
values and principled values, shared causal beliefs or professional judgement, 
common notions of validity based on intersubjective criteria for validating knowledge 
and, lastly, a common policy project. UNEP and the Environment Liaison Centre 
(ELC) have helped to emphasise the political effects of scientific discoveries and 
research and have produced a scientifically legitimated debate over the morality of 
unrestrained state sovereignty. Caroline Thomas argues that, 
NGOs have shown themselves to be willing and able to act as guardians of the 
international environment. In that context the time has come to expand the 
48 Wapner, 'Reorienting State Sovereignty', p. 286 
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role ofNGOs under general international law by giving their guardianship role 
formal legal expression.49 
Although heavily overstated with regard to environmental dilemmas, nevertheless the 
recognition of the necessity for NGOs is tantamount to admitting that sovereign 
states, if left to their own devices, are unable to act for the good of humanity and the 
planet. By virtue of the fact that these communities and the problems they address are 
transnational, the debate surrounding environmental policy has widened the circle of 
moral concern both spatially and temporally, in that the rights of both neighbours and 
future generations are involved. The role of the NGO in environmental regimes was 
formalised in the Montreal Protocol Article 11 ( 5) which stated that 
Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-
governmental, qualified in fields relating to the protection of the ozone layer 
... may be admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The 
admission and participation of the observers shall be subject to the rules of 
procedure adopted by the Parties. 50 
The UN's 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change contains similar wording 
and it may therefore be asserted that the view that NGOs have an oppositional stance 
to states is mistaken and that, rather than undermining them, the new innovations 
allow 'the expansion, not the retreat of the states in addressing global environmental 
problems. ' 51 In addition to helping frame treaty or 'hard law', non-governmental 
organisations can also provide 'soft law' which guides and alters state activity, an 
example being the 1989 UNEP London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information 
on Chemicals in International Trade.52 
The epistemic community needs to agree on causes, measures and outcomes before a 
state is willing to erode or curb its sovereignty for a global good. Despite an 
49 Phillipe Sands quoted in Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations, p. 29 
50 Montreal Protocol Article 11(5) cited in Kal Raustiala, 'States, NGOs, and International 
Environmental Institutions', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41 (1997), pp. 719-40, p. 723 
51 Raustiala, 'States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions', p. 721 
52 Edith Brown Weiss, 'The Emerging Structure of International Environmental Law', in Norman J. 
Vig and Regina S. Axelrod S. (Eds.), The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (London, 
Earthscan, 1999), pp.98-115, p. I 05 
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abundance of evidence to the contrary, there remains lingering doubt over the extent 
of and the potential damage that can occur as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. 
As no such agreement has yet been reached, many states are unwilling to act in order 
to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Current scientific evidence suggests that the 
highest ceiling for carbon dioxide beyond which damage is unacceptable is between 
600 and 1200 parts per million, the current level being around 370.53 Moreover, the 
IPCC54 has not yet proposed that which constitutes an unsupportable level of 
greenhouse gases, and nor has 'any other representative body yet dared to hazard an 
estimate. ' 55 Furthermore, a 1997 article in Science asserted that 'most modelers (sic) 
now agree that the climate models will not be able to link greenhouse warming 
unambiguously to human actions for a decade or more, '56 and, thus, it would appear 
that, at least on the part of a United States hostile to precautionary action, no 
internationally binding agreements will be enacted. The US legalese is pervasive as 
demonstrated by the fact that, owing to terms contained within the US' Clean Air Act, 
George W. Bush does not consider carbon dioxide a pollutant and, therefore, will not 
impose mandatory restrictions upon power plants in general,57 once again asserting 
the pre-eminence of domestic legal arrangements over the international. Thus, it may 
be argued that action to remedy climate change is unlikely since the scale of the 
problem has yet to reach the level of a security threat, indicating that realist 
sentiments remain strong. 
International Environmental Regimes 
Much is made of the international system being characterised by unmitigated anarchy, 
a realist assumption which informs policymaking as well as intellectual debates. In 
recent decades the dominant thesis on anarchy is that of Kenneth Waltz, whose 
structuralist approach renders environmental action unlikely. Essentially, Waltz 
contends that because a self-help rationale operates within the international system, 
the only cooperation that can occur is likely to remain short-term and at the behest of 
53 Thomas Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense: Time to Rethink the Kyoto Protocol', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 81 (2002), p. 2-9, p. 3 
54 See Section Three for greater detail on the IPCC's role within the climate change regime 
55 Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense: Time to Rethink the Kyoto Protocol', p. 4 
56 Quoted in Jim Sheehan, 'The Case Against Kyoto', SAIS Review, Vol. 18.2 (1998) 121-133, p. 122 
57 Bush letter quoted in Kahn, 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration', p. 551 
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dominant states.58 Cooperation, according to the neorealist, is possible in two 
circumstances; where hegemonic stability theory operates or where game-theoretic 
analyses incontestably demonstrate the production of collective goods. A dominant 
state is needed to front a campaign on a certain issue and then maintain its momentum 
in spite of power-maximising individual actors who may regard their short-term needs 
and demands ofbeing of paramount importance. 
The liberal institutionalist counterpoint to the largely pessimistic understandings of 
whether cooperation is possible argues that, in fact, it is more possible when the 
hegemon is in decline59 and that, moreover, 'existing regimes or institutional 
arrangements often prove highly resistant even to assaults spearheaded by one or 
more of the great powers. '60 This indicates that state power in its rawest form is 
unable to dominate in a community of strongly shared mutual interests. To mitigate 
anarchy, states construct regimes or 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in a 
given area of international relations. '61 
It is perhaps possible to view the emergence of nascent international regimes m 
environmental matters through the work of bodies such as the WMO, UNEP, and, the 
IPCC, although the failure of the climate change regime bears witness to the 
remaining power of the sovereign state with its interests. The following section 
analyses the successes that the climate change regime has achieved and also its 
limitations, especially with regard to economic matters and institutional arrangements 
which are able to bind states, forcing them to act. Rio's package of commitments was 
contained within Article 4 of the UNFCCC and its pledges provide limited evidence 
of a slight normative shift. For example, Parties to the convention promised to 
'develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the 
Parties, national inventories of greenhouse gas emission sources and sinks' and 
'formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, 
regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change . . . and 
58 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979) 
59 Keohane, noted in Mathew Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 98 
60 Oran Young quoted in Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 117 
61 Krasner quoted in Paterson, Global Warming and Global Politics, p. 117 
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measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change, ' 62 thereby indicating a 
level of accountability on the part of nations to the global whole. Moreover, states 
pledged to 'promote and cooperate in the development, applications and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes, ' 63 and it is this economic 
element that is perhaps both the most surprising and also potentially the most 
revolutionary. 
A fundamental challenge facing sovereignty is its willingness to relinquish control 
within a given territory even though a world of global interdependence is generally 
accepted. Thus, the prospect of constructing an effectual climate change regime was 
hampered by the fact that it was not until 2001 in New Delhi that a mechanism in any 
way capable of acting against those in non-compliance was devised. 64 It was decided 
that inventories must be produced under the guise of the 'National Inventory Review', 
which would bear the hallmarks of transparency, consistency, comparability, 
completeness and accuracy, but it appears that this remedy arrived too late to prop up 
a failing regime. 65 
The unwillingness of states to bind themselves under international law in order to 
tackle a normative challenge can clearly be viewed in the promotion of voluntarism. 
Whereas a cosmopolitan is likely to promote a regime of global governance, fears 
remain that new layers of global bureaucracy will have ramifications for every 
sovereign state in terms of its ability to determine its own future or to restrain 
bureaucrats who operate supra-nationally.66 What may be discernible here is the 
notion of political and, therefore, moral communities emerging from the concord 
between ruler and ruled, which logically results in the conclusion that decisions taken 
outside this community, whether morally worthy or not, being invalid. This potential 
criticism of the climate change regime echoes the fears of those who feared that the 
ICC contained a democratic deficit (see previous chapter). The anxiety that 'UN-
inspired international laws, such as the climate treaty, are undermining national 
62 Article 4 of the UNFCCC 
63 Article 4 of the UNFCCC 
64 Joyeeta Gupta, Xander Olsthoorn, and Edan Rotenberg, 'The role of scientific uncertainty in 
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention', Environmental Science and 
Policy, Vol. 6 (2003), pp. 475-486, p. 476 
65 Gupta, Olsthoorn, Rotenberg, 'The role of scientific uncertainty ... ', p. 4 77 
66 Sheehan, The Case Against Kyoto', p. 128-9 
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sovereignty by handing power to interest groups and international bureaucrats, '67 
demarcates the internationalist from the cosmopolitan and the tension between a view 
such as this and the celebration of the UN in works of theorists such as Paul Taylor is 
tangible. 68 
However, this is not to say that voluntarism is entirely ineffective or, from a 
cosmopolitan perspective, morally regrettable. Action taken at lower levels, from 
within smaller communities, has generally been more effective than at the national 
level. Indeed, European attempts to maintain momentum for Kyoto have been scoffed 
at, considering that it is unlikely to meet the targets that it argued for itself.69 
Furthermore, for all the furore over Kyoto, the United States remains one of the most 
powerful advocates of environmental reform both nationally and globally. The 
United States is not environmentally the 'Great Satan against which the rest of the 
world should unite,' 70 home as it is to, amongst others, the Sierra Club, Earth First, 
and the Environmental Defence Fund. Such groups have persuaded twenty-nine state 
legislatures to introduce Kyoto Protocol-conforming measures on carbon dioxide. It 
has been suggested that what has been perceived as intransigence on the part of the 
United States was in fact a calculated attempt on the part of EU states to take the 
moral high ground/ 1 exacerbating the transatlantic rift, dressing power politics in the 
language of morality.72 Interestingly, despite the outrage in the United Kingdom, as 
evinced by condemnation of Bush's environmental policy by 83% of those 
questioned, in a recent poll 57% of Britons believe that Kyoto should not be enacted if 
it damages the UK economically.73 
67 Roger Bate, 'Greens versus sovereignty' Economic Affairs 19(1) [http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/links/doi/l 0.111111468-0270.00 146/abs/] 12 May 2004, p. 53 
68 
see Taylor, 'The United Nations in the 1990s' 
69 The Economist, 'Oh No Kyoto' 
70 Will Hutton, 'The greening of America', The Observer (7 December, 2003) 
[http:/lobserver.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903, 110 1564,00.html] 10 May 2004 
71 As argued in Kahn, 'The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration', p. 555 
72 Daadler's work on the potential 'divorce' of the United States and Europe seems to echo this notion, 
as does the work of Robert Kagan, who fervently favours an American unilateral approach to 
international relations 
73 Kendra Okonski of the International Policy Network, The Guardian letters page, The Guardian (24 
February 2004) [http://www .guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,3604, 1152846,00.html] I 0 May 2004 
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International Environmental Regimes and Economic Policy 
The following part assesses the impact that economics has upon sovereignty's 
normative worth, especially with regard to the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that where 
economic hardship is likely collective action is improbable, even where it is for a 
cosmopolitan good. Economic policy remains firmly entrenched in competitive 
practices, as noted in Section One which indicated how the environment is regarded, 
and so it is encouraging, from a normative perspective that Kyoto-ratifying states are, 
in word at least, prepared to commit themselves to act in a manner which seemingly 
ignores the boundaries of political community. What the new wave of economic 
cooperation indicates is that states recognise the limitations of their ability to deal 
with environmental issues, and are willing to act in such a way as to benefit humanity 
in general. Thus, it maybe be argued that sovereign states, embedded in Hobbesian 
anarchical behaviour economically, are prepared to wield their power in such a way 
that it creates a moral good outside of state boundaries. 
Cooperation amongst states was an essential feature of the final text of the UNFCCC 
with signing nations promising to collaborate in order to mitigate the possible effects 
of climate change, aiding those states in particular, who lacked the resources and 
technology to tackle the problems themselves. Financial arrangements, contained 
mainly in Article 11 of the UNFCCC, centred upon GEF housed at the World Bank, 
which is overseen jointly by UN's Environment Programme and its Development 
Programme. GEF's role is to facilitate the 'mechanism of the provision for financial 
resources on a grant or concessional basis, including the transfer of technology,' 74 and 
it is notable that the term 'transfer' is included. Although originally accepted only as 
an interim measure, it appears that GEF will remain indefinitely,75 which has caused 
some disquiet amongst the South who view any organisation connected with the 
World Bank, ultimately, to be partisan. Furthermore, the intervening period between 
the Rio and Kyoto negotiations suggest that where economic sacrifices were openly 
accepted as being likely, many states acquiesced and relapsed into a statecentric 
approach rather than the near-Kantian environmental federation proposed in Rio. 
During this period, the necessity for climate change action was conceded by all 
74 Article II of the UNFCCC 
75 Grubb, Yrolijk, and Brack, The Kyoto Protocol, p. 42 
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negotiating parties but at the second Conference of the Parties held in Geneva in July 
1996 Senator Tim Wirth, the US Secretary for Global Affairs under the Clinton 
Administration, asserted the need for a binding target which, nevertheless, remained 
flexible. This schism typified negotiations at Geneva and Berlin and became the 
defining issue at Kyoto. 
The importance of the environment, when framing internationally binding 
agreements, seems to be relegated below economics, as is nicely evinced by the 
OPEC countries' refusal to accept that petroleum is environmentally harmful or the 
US opposition to all references to lifestyles changes at the Rio Summit combined with 
its efforts to minimise references linking consumption and environmental 
destruction.76 US intransigence may also originate from its domestic arrangements 
such as the well-defined separation of powers, which leads to a focus on the local and 
an inability to innovate normatively, with politicians remaining reactive rather than 
proactive. Moreover, lobbyists wield enormous power with the Free Enterprise 
Institute, for example, indicating that the proponents of emission reduction would take 
all of us- and particularly the less fortunate among us- back in time to 'a world of 
darkness and cold', forgetting as they have, 'the importance of energy to the 
American way of life.' 77 
Traditional Westphalian sovereignty, using the Hobbesian moral justification, argues 
that the boundaries of the moral community lie at the borders of a state, where the 
sovereign's legitimate power to protect and control ends. Hence, the views of those 
within this territory must be respected. With regard to environmental policy this is 
problematic since various, often conflicting, opinions arise, often leaving 
governments in a difficult position. For example, in a Gallup survey taken in 2003 
respondents in the United States ranked climate change ninth out of ten on a list of 
environmental problems, well below domestic issues such as river and lake 
pollution. 78 Other polls have demonstrated that public knowledge about climate 
change is limited globally, as is evinced by the statistic that in the best-performing 
76 Wapner, 'Reorienting State Sovereignty', p. 279-80 
77 Sheehan, 'The case against Kyoto', p. 127 
78 Quoted in Steven R. Brechin, 'Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climate 
Change and the Kyoto Protocol: The U.S. versus the World?', International Journal of Sociology and 
Social Policy, Vol. 23 (2003) pp. 106-134, p. 113 
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state polled, Finland, only seventeen percent could identity fossil fuels out of a list of 
five options, as the single greatest cause of the greenhouse effect. 79 Again, the belief 
that the United States is entirely to blame for the failure of the climate change regime 
is out of place, since this poll also demonstrated that the least informed state amongst 
the industrialised world was, in fact, France. 80 
Economic considerations were also raised with regard to Russia and the Ukraine's 
participation in the climate change regime. Russian sentiments, as expressed by 
Andrei Illarionov, verify the impression that normative improvements must not 
impinge upon economic development and success. Illarionov, shortly before the 
formal rejection of Kyoto, likened the climate change regime to an economic 
'international gulag or Auschwitz' 81 even though Russia is responsible for 17.4% of 
the world's total emissions. The Russian rejection is linked to the US rejection since, 
under the economically simple 'emissions trading' measures, Russia would have been 
able to sell its surplus emissions quota to the United States and the rest of the 
JUSCANNZ group. 82 
Conclusion 
It is clear that sovereignty in contemporary international relations is facing a number 
of challenges as a result of environmental dilemmas, not least over climate change. 
Westphalian notions which package the world into discrete compartments has proven 
to be illogical in terms of problems which are, by their very essence, global. 
Sovereignty has also stressed a state's rights over its duties and, hence, cooperation 
has been at best, fragmented and, at worst, almost impossible. Recognition of 
interdependence as embodied, for example, in the Brundtland Report, has led to the 
acknowledgement of environmental predicaments but, as yet, there has not, as Molitor 
suggests, been a seismic shift in sovereignty's normative status83 . 
79 Brechin, 'Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climate', p. 113 
80 Brechin, 'Comparative Public Opinion and Knowledge on Global Climate', p. 120-1 
81 Nick Paton Walsh, 'Putin adviser calls Kyoto protocol a 'death treaty" The Guardian (15 April 2004) 
[www.guardian.co.uklclimatcchangc] 10 May 2004 
82 The potential for 'bubbling' is examined in Grubb, Vrolijk, Brack, The Kyoto Protocol, p. 92 
83 Molitor, 'The United Nations Climate Change Agreement', p. 210 
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Various philosophical and political stances have informed environmental VIews as 
held by policymakers and publics alike. The dominant of these, weak 
anthropocentrism, although sensitive to the environment has, nevertheless, privileged 
the human, especially where economic costs have to be taken into account. The 
favouring of the human, understandably, is a hallmark of all mainstream political 
ideologies from liberalism to communism and so it is unlikely that any burgeoning 
green sentiment will be able to dislodge the financial understanding of the 
environment. As examined throughout this chapter, economic inflexibility has been 
the key characteristic of the climate change regime and indeed, perhaps the success of 
the Montreal Protocol was down to the fact that hydrocarbons were more viable an 
option than CFCs. For all the espousals of justice viewed in the previous chapter, 
nevertheless, at the core of international relations remains a bedrock of power politics 
embedded in a narrow conception of interests. Waltz's and Hobbes' self-help 
analyses are, therefore, enduring in their importance and it would seem unlikely that 
any departure from these viewpoints in environmental matters is likely, although 
global sustainability has tempered, to a degree, unmitigated competition. How this 
concept develops in the next decade or so will best indicate the progress of the 
normative evolution of environmental cooperation. 
The role of non-governmental organisations and epistemic communities has also been 
discussed as length throughout the chapter. Whereas NGOs attending the Rome 
negotiations provided legitimacy for nations engaging in the protection of 
fundamental human rights, it may be argued that NGOs have been unable to secure 
such a lofty position, unable to provide definitive scientific evidence to prove the case 
for the Kyoto Protocol or the necessity of financially-limiting actions. This is due not 
only to the states but also their publics, who have indicated their unwillingness to lose 
their competitive edge for a case which has not been proven beyond all doubt. The 
scientific epistemic community serves as legitimator of state action and, sometimes, 
inaction, whereas with regard to human rights activities, they prick the world's moral 
conscience, and as such, the scientific community is able only to score very limited 
victories off sovereign states. However, the climate change regime, as a normative 
project, is not entirely defunct, as can be seen in the recent proposal referred to as 
'contraction and convergence' which depends upon a safe level of greenhouse gases 
being agreed upon. This amount will then be divided per capita amongst the Earth's 
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populations with big producers, such as the United States, being able to buy up the 
share attributed to underconsumers such as Bangladesh. 84 This suggestion, therefore, 
dismisses, national emissions limitations and instead argues for a set maximum for 
each global citizen. 
1l1is chapter has also explicated the view that the right to a habitable environment is a 
fundamental human right, which places the imperative of duty upon sovereign states. 
The cosmopolitan schema, developing out of the thought of Rawls, demonstrates the 
state's obligation to extend the moral community beyond its own boundaries just as 
borders were, to an extent, ignored during the Rome negotiations outlined in the 
previous chapter. The notion of spatia-temporal justice, in contrast to the justice 
explored in Chapter Two, sets a further challenge to the international community. 
Limiting the state's capabilities as a reaction and almost as amends for the actions of 
previous generations places an enormous strain upon governments worldwide as is 
exemplified by their unwillingness to act according to the concept of common but 
differentiated responsibility. 
In conclusion, although it may be seen that current environmental negotiations, 
especially surrounding climate change, are mired in economics and cost benefit 
analyses, there nevertheless remains hope that sovereignty will be able to meet the 
environmental challenges set for it, particularly if the tasks are imbued with the 
language of human rights which has, since the end of the Second World War, worn a 
badge of legitimacy as can be viewed by the widespread agreement over the ICC. 
84 Mark Lynas, 'Hot Topic' The Guardian (3 December 2003) 
[http://society.guardian.co.uklsocietyguardian/story/O, 7843, I 097998,00.html] I 0 May 2004 
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Chapter Four: Indigenous Rights and Sovereignty 
Introduction 
Indigenous rights provide an intriguing and difficult set of dilemmas for the sovereign 
state and the international system. Whereas the discussions of justice in the previous 
two chapters are essentially transnational, moving beyond the state, indigenous rights 
are firmly rooted within state boundaries. Indigenous peoples are those who have 
been subject to conquests and who have, as a result, suffered. Consequently, the 
challenges that the sovereign state must face in this arena are not necessarily of the 
cosmopolitan variety, as with environmental politics or the International Criminal 
Court, but are embedded in notions of specific community justice, which appears 
initially to bring indigenous rights into conflict with the conventional discourse of 
sovereign legitimacy. 
Section One provides a brief overview of indigenous rights, offering a plausible 
definition of 'indigenous peoples' and the 'indigenous person', followed by a brief 
history of the connected concepts of indigenous and minority rights, noting the role of 
NGOs, and both soft and hard international law. It introduces the UN's Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which illustrates many of the 
challenges facing sovereignty in the twenty-first century. It is important to note that, 
at the time of writing, July 2004, the UN has not yet ratified the declaration but, 
nevertheless, its contents are the most exigent calls made internationally and are, 
therefore, important. 
Section Two provides an analysis of the communitarian viewpoint as relating to 
indigenous rights, highlighting the way in which cosmopolitanism is perceived by 
communitarians to be fundamentally unable to manage cultural diversity, instead 
imposing austere and potentially unwelcome demands upon the global community. 
As part of a dialectic, the liberal response to communitarianism is then discussed, 
leading to the synthetic position of 'justice for communities' which is able to 
reconcile the two positions in order to construct a credible alternative, which is aware 
of illiberal community practices, and thus imposing a minimum code of acceptable 
behaviour. Also included in this section is an examination of Westphalian 
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sovereignty, as enunciated by Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau and its perceived 
inability to cope with the sub-national community. 
Section Three provides a second rationale for indigenous rights, based upon the idea 
that liberal rights are, if applied in a manner which recognises their instrumental 
value, able to provide a modified form of sovereignty which can maximise equality 
and justice based upon a cautious reading of historical circumstances. The legal 
approach is also examined, enunciating the common law approach as in Canada and 
Australia which recognises the normative force of historical agreements rather than 
their legal veracity. In this way, the acceptance by sovereign states of spatia-temporal 
justice, as with the previous chapter, is cited as an example of a normative 
improvement in sovereignty but this notion is, to a degree, tempered by an 
appreciation of the way in which rights, such as access to lands and resources, are 
disregarded by states who aim to maximise their economic capabilities. 
Self-determination, an explosive and crucial demand issued by indigenous peoples, is 
considered in Section Four. This passage investigates the relationship between 
nationalism and self-determination in the Westphalian discourse, including the 
limitation on its ability to resolve the issues presented by the indigenous rights 
movement. Part of the international system's inability to understand indigenous self-
determination emanates from the fact that indigenous peoples operate outside the 
conventional political system, and thus, incorporating their wishes and desires into the 
conventional body of rights, remains an important and difficult task which sovereign 
states are undertaking in order to retain their moral legitimacy. 
Section One: Indigenous Peoples and their Place in International Relations 
Definitions 
It would seem eminently sensible to begin a discussion of the indigenous person with 
a definition that narrows the term in order that the conceptual discussions within the 
chapter are anchored effectively. This task has taxed both analysts and indigenous 
peoples themselves. Indeed, in the framing of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (from hereon in the 'Draft Declaration') the indigenous 
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delegates refused to accept any definition as being valid. Nevertheless, the UN's 
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) asked for a working definition which 
was provided by the Special Rapporteur, Coho Martinez, who argued that, 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors 
of the societies now prevailing in those territories ... They form at present 
non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance 
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 1 
Martinez defines an indigenous person as a person who belongs to such a group 
through self-identification and is recognised and acceptance by these populations.2 It 
is for these reasons that WGIP emphasises, priority in time, voluntary perpetuation of 
the culture, self-identification, an experience of subjugation, marginalization and 
dispossession in their research.3 These factors are discussed in greater detail below, 
but it is clear even at this initial stage that such criteria may offer a powerful critique 
of the way in which the international system currently operates. 
The geographical placement of indigenous peoples is, quite naturally, worldwide, but 
in political circles, the geopolitical classification of these groups has been more 
limited. Populations move around and have been absorbed to such a degree that many 
scholars, including several African and Asian scholars, believe that indigenous rights 
should be reserved only for the Americas and Australasia.4 Particularly in the 
industrialised world, the pivotal issue has been the displacement of peoples by alien 
and dominant powers, rather than the marginalization of groups by those who also 
1 Martinez Cobo quoted in Sarah Pritchard, 'Working Group on Indigenous Populations: mandate, 
standard-setting activities and future perspectives', in Sarah Pritchard (Ed.) Indigenous Peoples, the 
United Nations and Human Rights (London, Zed Books, 1998), pp. 40-64, p. 43 
2 Cobo reported in Pritchard, 'Working Group on Indigenous Populations', p. 43 
3 The conclusion of Rodolfo Stavenhagen, of WGIP reported in Justin Kenrick and Jerome Lewis, 
"Indigenous peoples' rights and the politics of the term 'indigenous", Anthropology Today, Vol. 20(2) 
(2004) pp. 4-9, p. 5 
4 John R. Bowen, 'Should we have a universal concept of' indigenous peoples' rights?', Anthropology 
Today, Vol. 16( 4) (2000), pp. 12-16, p. 13 
93 
claim ties to the land. With regard to the Asian and African experience, no large time 
difference exists between the emergence of the initial peoples and subsequent 
conquests. Thus, the so-called 'saltwater thesis' which implies that invaders had to 
arrive from overseas remains dominant, but, nevertheless, a tide of Asian and African 
NGOs such as the Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact and Tin Hinan for Nomadic Women 
. . . . 5 
are ventunng to Impact upon current negotiatiOns. 
These permutations also lead into the distinction between minority and indigenous 
peoples. Although indigenous peoples have used the rationales of and rights accorded 
to minorities, they claim to be more than minorities, based largely on the fact that they 
constitute previously existing nations, though not states as per James' definition found 
in Chapter One and, as such, have a far stronger case with regard to self-determination 
(see Section Four). Coupled with this temporal element is the fact their histories have 
been ones of domination and subjugation, rendering redress a moral imperative.6 
An Overview of the History of Minority and Indigenous Rights 
Internationally legitimated minority rights, apart from seventeenth century religious 
and twentieth century rights, have been commonly imposed or coerced, rather than 
being freely adopted.7 The first striking example of minority ethnic rights occurred 
following the end of the Napoleonic Wars with Viscount Castlereagh, at the Congress 
of Vienna, arguing that the rights of Poles ought to be guaranteed by the three states 
who had carved up their territory, asserting that efforts to make the Poles 'forget their 
existence and even language as a people has been sufficiently tried and failed. '8 
Although these pleas were ignored under the weight of assimilationist tendencies, this 
attitude indicates the power of culture and language which underpin indigenous 
claims in contemporary international relations. 
The Treaty of Versailles had written into it the protection of religious and ethnic 
minorities, and another of its undertakings, the League of Nations, witnessed the birth 
5 Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity (London, 
University of California Press, 2003), p. 74 
6 Michael Walzer, On Toleration, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997), p. 217 
7 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 73 
8 Viscount Castlereagh quoted in Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, p. 83 
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of the indigenous movement when Levi General Deskaheh, Chief of the Younger 
Bear Clan of the Cayuga Nation, spokesman for the Six Nations of the Grand River 
Land in Ontario, travelled to Geneva to put the case for secession based upon self-
determination. The United Kingdom immediately disallowed Deskaheh from 
speaking, claiming that the issue was for the British Empire alone, but nonetheless, it 
may be argued that with this, the indigenous challenge had arrived on a global level. 
The Second World War and the struggle against fascism demonstrated that states 
could not be relied upon to protect their own citizens and with this sentiment came a 
greater receptiveness to measures which protected minorities. Moreover, the 
dismantled empires and their post-colonial successors could also not be trusted, a 
notion which corresponds with the Machiavellian concept that new and fragile states 
protect themselves at all costs.9 The immediate era following the end of the war was 
marked by the emergence of the human rights regime, as documented in Chapter 
Two, but elements of a communitarian or, at the very least, community-based 
sentiment, may be viewed in the UDHR. For example, Article 29 asserts that, 
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development ... [of] personality is possible. 2. In the exercise ... of rights and 
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined 
by the law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. 10 
The inclusion of 'alone' in the above is of vital importance, indicating communitarian 
values, securing the place for communities as the normative heartland of human 
rights. 11 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ( 1966) caused 
controversy amongst states when it declared boldly in Article 27 that minorities 
9 Machiavelli's philosophy discussed in Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the 
Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice', p. 172 
10 Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html] 
10 July 2004 
11 Tore Lindholm paraphrased in Patrick Thornberry, 'Minority and indigenous rights at 'the end of 
history", Ethnicities, Vol. 2(4) (2002) pp. 515-37, p. 523 
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within previously existing states shall not be 'denied the right ... to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language,' 12 
rights which were argued against by the Australian delegates who maintained that 
their Aborigines were too primitive to enjoy them. 13 More recently, the Australian 
government has revealed its hostility to the indigenous rights regime as can be seen 
when criticisms were lodged with the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. The Australian government rejected these outright, deeming them 
'insulting', 'unbalanced' and interference in sovereign affairs. 14 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) responded more directly to the 
indigenous problem, penning the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal 
Populations, 107 (1957) and the ILO Convention on Indigenous Peoples in 
Indigenous Countries, 169 (1989). The switch between 'populations' and 'peoples' is 
important and contentious, since the latter is viewed as carrying connotations of self-
determination, thereby presenting a greater challenge to existing sovereign states as 
well as presenting notions of permanence, and historical and cultural indelibility. 15 
Although these conventions do not tangibly impact upon the framing of discourses of 
sovereignty to any great extent, they do inform decision-making processes in NGOs, 
such as the Inter-American Development Banlc If these moral codes are adopted by 
enough bodies, triggering the 'norm cascade,' 16 then, ultimately, they may be seen to 
alter the international system from the bottom up. 
Throughout the last twenty years of the twentieth century and particularly following 
the end of the Cold War, the indigenous issue has gained a stronger hold in 
discussions of minority and human rights. This can be seen in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe's Copenhagen Convention (1990) which 
recognised the rights of national minorities, including the free use of their mother 
tongue in public and private and the incorporation of their histories into national 
school curricula. Furthermore, in 1992 the UN General Assembly passed the 
12 ICCPR quoted in Thornberry, 'Minority and indigenous rights at 'the end of history", p. 523 
13 Pritchard, 'Working Group on Indigenous Populations', p. 40 
14 Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation, 'Indigenous Rights in Australia' 
~http://antar.org.au/obligations.html] I July 2004 
5 The connotations of the two terms are discussed in, for example, Niezcn, The Origins of!ndigenism 
16 This term is borrowed from the work of Finnemore and Sikkink as discussed in Wheeler, 
'Humanitarian vigilantes or legal entrepreneurs: enforcing human rights in international society' 
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Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities, which clearly enunciated community rights. From 1985 to 
1993, a working group developed the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the articles of which are discussed throughout the course of this chapter. The 
claims and calls of the Draft Declaration are far-reaching and represents an 
'emblematic synthesis of indigenous claims of rights, cultural statements and world 
views, suggesting the outline of a relationship between indigenous people, states and 
the culture of human rights,' 17 and although it must be noted that many aspects of the 
Declaration are hotly contested by many governments, it is hoped that the Draft 
Declaration will be adopted by the end of 2004, marking the end of the International 
Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples. 18 The challenges sovereignty faces in 
modem international relations are clearly visible, therefore, within the dialogue that 
exists between the overlapping strands of legitimacy and association, challenging its 
ability to cope with diversity within units which are traditionally viewed as being 
mono-ideological and mono-cultural, at least in terms of political culture. 
As with the other case studies considered within this essay, there exists within the 
indigenous rights movement a body of NGOs to question the morally-legitimated and 
organising principle of state sovereignty. The current proliferation of associations, 
federations and networks, such as the International Indian Treaty Council and the 
World Council of Indigenous Peoples are extremely active, and, in a slight irony, 
defend local attachments and simple technologies via electronic media, technologies 
of communication and transportation which, additionally, serves to establish and 
maintain connections. The lobbying power of these organisations can be viewed in 
the action of groups, such as the Crees in Northern Quebec, who, in collaboration, 
with other bodies as part of a transnational system, have the potential to act as a new 
form of civil society, with the ability to check the propensity of the state to 
homogenise language, culture and legal processes. Indeed, the 'politics of 
embarrassment,' 19 through lobbying and the media, exemplified by the James Bay 
Crees, has been effectively applied to curb the excesses of the state and to highlight 
17 Thornberry, 'Minority and indigenous rights at 'the end of history", p. 521 
18 United Nations, Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' ('Draft Declaration') 
[http://www I . umn. edu/h umanrts/i nstrce/decl ra. htm] I July 2004 
19 Ronald Niezen, 'Recognizing Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of 
Indigenous Peoples, Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History, 2000, pp. 119-48 
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the plight of indigenous peoples on the basis of reasoning explored more fully in 
Section Two of this chapter. 
Section Two: Indigenous Rights, Sovereignty 
and Justice within and for Communities 
Much of the discussion over the normative worth of sovereignty and of moral 
imperatives in international relations emanate from the communitarian/cosmopolitan 
divide, discussed in the latter half of the first chapter. The issues surrounding 
indigenous rights allow for a concrete example of these two conflicting views and, 
hence, this section investigates the notion that justice for individuals, the achievement 
of which is a prime goal for sovereignty in the contemporary context, can only be 
accomplished within a community as well as this position's antithesis which is 
embodied in the liberal human rights regime as explored in Chapter Two. This 
section proceeds as a dialectic, firstly stating the communitarian position, objections 
to it, then the liberal position and, finally, a synthesis of the two which remains within 
the liberal tradition. At this juncture it is important to note that a subtle but vital 
distinction exists between justice within the community and the communitarian 
position, since the latter stresses the group above and beyond the individual, and so 
sees no harm in limiting individual rights in order to promote shared shares, whereas 
the former privileges the will, aspirations and choices of the individual. Where 
appropriate this distinction is made. 
Human beings are born and live within a particular political and, therefore, moral 
community, and are bound to it and their neighbours by special ties. Thus, they have 
a special interest in maintaining the territorial integrity and stability of their own 
community, and also in shouldering the collective burden of upholding that 
community. Growing up in a particular community profoundly shapes the individual 
and, indeed, defines him or her and hence, it may be seen that global justice should be 
concerned with maintaining the community. As Dworkin comments, 'We inherited a 
cultural structure and we have some duty, out of simple justice, to leave that structure 
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at least as rich as we found it. ' 20 The cultural context not only provides options but 
also provides the spectacles through which we identity our experiences as being of 
value, and thus care must be taken in handling a sub-state community in order for 
sovereignty to remain morally viable as a concept. The schism that exists between the 
individual and the community, especially with regard to justice within the community, 
is noted by Patrick Dodson who, in commenting on the Australian indigenous 
experience, argued that 
[t]he Government wishes to drive a wedge between the concepts of rights and 
welfare, and between those who advocate a rights agenda and those seeking 
relief from the appalling poverty. This is an attempt at a new spin on a very 
old wicket of divide and rule. If it were a matter of rice bowl politics it might 
not be so bad but it is far more sinister than that. It is about removing the 
centrality of community as the life centre; it models on the individual as the 
essential unit of society. This is not our way. With all our social problems, the 
answer is not to attack the foundations of our community by putting the 
individual before the community.21 
Negotiations surrounding the International Criminal Court privilege the individual 
above the community and anchor sovereignty's normative worth around this, but it 
may be argued that without the community, the liberal self can only ever be a figment 
of theorists' imagination. Christian Bay contends that liberals have 'persistently 
tended to cut the citizen off from the person; and they have placed on their humanistic 
pedestal a cripple of a man, a man without a moral or political nature; a man with 
plenty of contractual rights and obligations, perhaps, but a man without moorings in 
any real community; a drifter. ' 22 Sociologically-speaking, it may be contended that 
Western philosophy, and as a result, the Western-dominated international system, has 
long struggled to reconcile the notions that reality derives from an individual's 
perception but, concurrently, is assembled collectively by societies. In this way, 
20 Ronald Dworkin quoted in Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 83 
21 Patrick Dodson's 2000 Wentworth Address quoted in Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation 
'Why "practical reconciliation" is bad policy [www.antar.og.au/prac_rec.html] I July 2004 
22 Christian Bay quoted in Darlene M. Johnston 'Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of 
Group Self-Preservation' in Will Kymlicka (Ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (New York, OUP, 
1995), pp. 179-20 I, p. 180 
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Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum' wrestles with Durkheim's theory of the collective 
consciousY Bhikhu Parekh in calling for the emergence of a globally-oriented 
citizen notes that the cosmopolitan is unable to generate global justice, since such a 
position 
Ignores special ties and attachments to one's community, is too abstract to 
generate the emotional and moral energy needed to live up to its austere 
imperatives, and can also easily become an excuse for ignoring the well-being 
of the community one knows and can directly influence in the name of an 
unrealistic pursuit of the abstract ideal of universal well-being.Z4 
A liberal slant on the communitarian right is persuasive and a strong reason for 
arguing that sovereignty, moderated to accept human rights as fundamental, be further 
aligned in order to be tolerant of diversity, even to the extent of welcoming, protecting 
and embracing it. To this end, Kymlicka argues that indigenous rights are not about 
placing the community over the individual but, rather, they are based on the idea that 
justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded 
different rights, 25 a notion which reconciles the liberal and the communitarian in order 
to produce a morally and culturally sensitive international justice. Moreover, the 
deontological enterprise, which underpins the liberal discourse especially with regard 
to contemporary conceptions of sovereignty, installs the individual as sovereign, the 
author of the only moral meanings there are. As inhabitants of a world without telos, 
we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by such an order, or by 
custom or tradition or inherited status. So long as they are not unjust, our conceptions 
of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen 
them.Z6 However, 'to imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments ... is not 
to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without 
character, without moral depth, '27 and, therefore, the liberal understanding is feasible 
23 Marcus Colchester, 'Indigenous rights and the collective conscious' Anthropology Today, Vol. 18(1) 
(2002), pp. 1-3, p. 1 
24 Bhikhu Parekh, 'Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship', Review of International Studies, Vol. 29 
(2003), pp. 3-17' p. 12 
25 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 47 
26 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, CUP, 1982), p. 177 
27 Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 179 
100 
and morally valuable since it resolves some of the crucial conflicts that exist between 
the two positions. 
The universalism of human rights is often cited as an attack on rights which favour a 
community. Moreover, it may be argued that universalism is impossible. For 
example, proclamations of slogans such as 'truth' and 'justice' contain a dualism, 
based upon different interpretations. Although the terms are universally recognisable, 
they are then packed with each culture's particularism, making effective universal 
justice nigh on impossible, 28 especially given the communitarian assertion that the 
cosmos is not yet a polis.29 Furthermore, although the communities in which we 
create rights and duties are constructed, they remain the only communities there are, 
and so they cannot be considered more or less authentic than some other kind. Thus, 
according rights to groups, such as indigenous peoples, does not necessarily go 
against the tide of the liberal metanarrative which seems to be directing sovereignty 
and history in general.30 Linklater also advises caution for the grand sweeping ideals 
of the cosmopolitan endeavour when noting that, 'all claims to truth and 
enlightenment, and all emancipatory projects, contain the potential for dominating, 
marginalizing and excluding others. '31 Hence, from this viewpoint, indigenous rights 
should perhaps be admitted to the fold in order to secure rights which would 
otherwise be ignored by the well-intentioned human rights project. Modifying 
sovereignty to recognise rights should be possible if a framework of moral principles 
is constructed which accommodates multiple ethical traditions, allowing legitimate 
diversity. Again, legitimacy is at the hub of the issue and considered towards the end 
of this section are examples of cultural practices which are illegitimate and which 
should not be acceptable. Acceptable ethical distinctions include the recognition of 
the bond that many indigenous peoples feel towards their territory, since many view 
themselves as being trustees of the land for future generations and, as such, cannot 
conceive of being removed from it. This ethical tradition has been noted and worked 
into sovereignty-modifying legislation as with Canada's Indian Act (1867) which 
declared that, 'Except where this Act otherwise provides, lands in a reserve shall not 
28 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, Notre Dame 
University Press, 1994), p. 4 
29 Parekh, 'Cosmopolitanism and global citizenship', p. 12 
30 See Francis Fukuyama The End of History (London, Penguin, 1992) for an explication of the victory 
of liberalism 
31 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 68 
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be sold, alienated, leased or otherwise disposed of until they have been surrendered to 
Her Majesty by the band [indigenous people] for whose use and benefit in common 
the reserve was set apart. ' 32 Although this could appear to be a victory for indigenous 
financial justice over the capitalist system and Locke's sovereignty, which protects 
the liberal rights of commerce and ownership, it must also be noted that the Act does 
retain some discretion for the Governor in Council to alienate inalienable land,33 an 
issue which is noted below in the discussion of the Innu people. 
Indigenous cultural guarantees can be found in many international covenants and 
declarations but the most progressive claims can be found in the Draft Declaration. 
Article 6 affirms the collective right of indigenous peoples to live in freedom, peace 
and security as distinct peoples,34 whilst Articles 7 and 8 provide against genocide, 
ethnocide and also assert indigenous peoples' rights to maintain and develop their 
distinct characteristics.35 Part III of the Draft Declaration is the most important 
culturally, with Articles 12 to 14 defending the practice and championing the 
revitalisation of cultural traditions and customs, including the restitution of cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property incorporating rights to religious and 
cultural sites, including the repatriation of human remains.36 Cultural traditions also 
incorporate the collective histories of peoples and so self-determination in the field of 
education37 is also espoused, including officially sanctioned teaching in a language of 
choice. 
The idea of justice within the indigenous community is susceptible to a myriad of 
criticisms based not only on liberal interpretations but also on more empirical 
grounds. Firstly, it may be contended that it is improbable, given change and the 
migration of peoples throughout history, that any current culture anywhere is 
continuous from the original inhabitants of an area38 and thus, the possibility of an 
absurd infinite regress has to be considered. Culture is fluid and not static and so 
32 The Indian Act quoted in Johnston, 'Native Rights as Collective Rights', p. 195 
33 Johnston, 'Native Rights as Collective Rights', p. 198 
34 Article 6 of the Draft Declaration 
35 Articles 7 and 8 of the Draft Declaration 
36 Articles 12-14 of the Draft Declaration 
37 Article 15 of the Draft Declaration 
38 Stephen Roney, 'There are no Canadian 'aboriginals", The Report (2 March 2003) Vol. 30(3), 
[http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=90 19897 &db=buh] 3 February 2004, p. 30 
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cultural distinctiveness may be undermined by interaction, meaning that, ultimately, 
indigenous rights may become redundant. Indeed, the cultural distinctiveness 
argument has been used by the Brazilian government who maintain that once the 
indigenous population of Amazonia begins wearing what are considered 'Western' 
clothes and negotiating contracts with transnational corporations, their legitimacy as 
culturally distinct groups has been lost. 39 In this way, many indigenous peoples have 
forfeited their rights to a governmental policy which is bound up in the discourse of 
economic development, an intransigence which tallies with the Brazilian position on 
deforestation, as discussed in Chapter Three, arguably reinforcing the North/South 
divide. 
Recent, stinging attacks on indigenous rights have come courtesy of Professor Adam 
Kuper who in an article in Current Anthropology, confronted the indigenous peoples' 
movement, claiming it to be retrograde, anti-progressive and right-wing, charging that 
indigenous rights are privileges based entirely on the 'blood and soil' ideology of 
descent which echoes justifications given by Nazi Germany.40 Thus, aboriginal rights 
based entirely on an accident of birth are, thus, flag-bearers of inequality, of class 
rights and race discrimination. Although not true, as is discernible by arguments 
proposed in this chapter, Kuper's thought has cultural resonance and has been adopted 
by De Beers as justification for ignoring indigenous claims.41 However, even though 
aboriginal communities are political, not ethnic or racial, this is sometimes something 
of a thorny issue since some aboriginal groups have argued for racial criteria for 
membership, given limited resources and the need for control. Whether indigenous 
peoples should be able to enjoy collective rights, as well as those accorded to them as 
a result of being citizens, has been the subject of fierce debate, especially in Australia. 
This dispute is fuelled by assumptions from theorists such as Barry who asserts that 
the correlation between indigenous rights and liberal citizenship may threaten civil 
unity and broadly based social and economic programmes which aim for equality.42 
Furthermore, a critique of community rights comes from Noel Pearson, an Aboriginal 
activist, who claims that rights have deflected attention from deep-rooted social and 
39 See Michael Banton, 'International norms and Latin American states' policies on indigenous 
peoples', Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 2(1) (1996), pp. 89-103, for further details 
40 Adam Kuper, 'The return of the native', Current Anthropology, Vol. 44(3) (2003), pp. 389-402 
41 Kenrick and Lewis, 'Indigenous peoples' rights and the politics of the term 'indigenous", p. 5 
42 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, Polity 
Press, 200 I) 
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economic problems,43 that they are a mere placebo for indigenous peoples which 
results in sovereign states relinquishing responsibility for historical inequalities. 
Western philosophy and international relations theory has stressed the state and the 
individual, as is demonstrated by the lasting impact of Bodin, Hobbes and Locke. 
These figures leave no middle ground between humanity as individual organisms and 
the state. The legacy of this European tradition has led to assimilationist policies and 
tendencies which have dominated conceptualisations of sovereignty until the late 
twentieth century. John Stuart Mill's attitude to the colonised indigenous peoples can 
be viewed in his promotion of the incorporation into the national body politic of the 
indigenous person who would otherwise remain a 'half-savage relic' residing in his 
'own mental orbit without participation or interest in the general movement of the 
world. ' 44 Similarly, Rousseau, in the explication of the general will, argued that if, 
'the general will is to be truly expressed, it is essential that there be no subsidiary 
group within the state'45 and that a citizen ought to express 'his opinion and nothing 
but his own opinion. '46 
The liberal interpretation of human rights stresses that which communitarian logic is 
charged with forgetting, that human beings as inalienable moral units, have rights 
accorded to them merely by their being, for, as Clermont-Tonnerre in the French 
Legislative Assembly stated, 'One must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation, and 
give everything to the Jews as individuals. '47 Thus, to promote indigenous peoples is 
to counter the normal view of states being units wherein all are equal. Recent liberal 
political theory has viewed indigenous rights as cultural and, therefore, group rights 
and, consequently, they have been susceptible to at least three objections. Firstly, 
culture is not considered a primary good relevant to egalitarian justice. Secondly, that 
group rights are obstructions, blocking the path of moral individualism in liberal 
democratic societies. Thirdly, that pandering to group interests provides incentives for 
43 Duncan !vi son, 'The iogic of aboriginal rights', Ethnicities, Vol. 3(3 ), (2003), pp.321-324, p. 323 
44 John Stuart Mill quoted in Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 53 
45 Rousseau quoted in Vernon Van Dyke, 'The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in 
Political Theory', in Will Kymlicka (Ed.), The Rights of Minority Cultures (New York, OUP, 1999), 
pp. 31-56, p. 34 
46 Rousseau quoted in Van Dyke, 'The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political 
Theory', p. 34 
47 Clermont-Tonnerre quoted in Walzer, On Toleration, p. 39 
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abuse and undermines the conditions required for the promotion of egalitarian 
outcomes. 
The following passage enunciates what may be termed the 'liberal synthesis' of 
indigenous rights with regard to justice within the community, focusing on the 
challenges that such rights would construct for the Eurocentric concentration on the 
individual whilst retaining a liberal position. Following this is an examination of 
toleration and its limits, centring on the idea that justice within communities must be 
underpinned by a set of basic moral principles which are inalienable and that 
internationally acceptable codes of behaviour will not tolerate certain activities, no 
matter how culturally legitimated. 
The liberal defence of specialised community rights rests on the assertion that 
individual freedom is tied inexorably to membership in a national group and that 
group-specific rights can promote equality between the majority and the minority. 
Seemingly, this is communitarian justice but it is important to note that this rationale 
does not reject the liberal view about the importance of being able to realise one's 
own ends. Thus, liberals 'can and should endorse external protections where they 
promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit 
the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and 
practices, '48 an idea discussed in the section on toleration, below. In according 
cultural and social rights to indigenous peoples, the peoples would also accrue 
responsibilities. Thus, human rights may be universalised more effectively by 
admitting the Other to the community via the bestowment of rights, and imbuing them 
with the new sovereign responsibility to which other sovereign bodies are subject. 
Furthermore, to maintain credibility, the indigenous forum would have to include not 
only issues of cultural integrity, state interference and so forth but also potential 
human rights abuses perpetrated by the indigenous peoples themselves.49 Indeed, 
many indigenous nations have decided to abide by international human rights 
agreements and do so with greater gusto than the government of states who often 
jealously guard their sovereignty. 5° 
48 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 37. 
49 Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism, p. 117 
5
° Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 169 
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Toleration refers to the peaceful coexistence of groups of people with different 
histories, cultures and identities, which is especially important with regard to the 
nation-state, even the liberal nation-state, which traditionally allows less room for 
difference than do multinational empires or consociations,51 since it constitutes a kind 
of cultural corporation which claims a monopoly on arrangements within its borders. 52 
Consequently, diversity must be legally acknowledged as with the Canadian Charter 
of Rights which explicitly recognises 'aboriginal rights' which are cited in the Charter 
because they are in conflict with the state's dominant human rights culture.53 
However, if it becomes clear that the group can persist only through the denial of the 
human rights of its members, it may be argued that it has no claim to our respect.54 
Furthermore, if individuals with their rights in place choose to view themselves as 
part of the community, that choice must be guaranteed. 55 To this end, in the recent 
Manila Declaration, indigenous peoples accepted that the concept of justice is 
universal and that in 
[ r ]evalidating the traditions and institutions of our ancestors it is also 
necessary that we ourselves honestly deal with those ancient practices, which 
may have led to the oppression of indigenous women and children. However, 
the conference also stresses that the transformation of indigenous systems 
must be defined and controlled by indigenous peoples ... [as] part of the right 
to self-determination.56 
Thus, it may be seen that the process of normalising the indigenous populations is one 
which has to be driven by an internal mechanism, that the grip of the sovereign state 
is illegitimate when it imposes codes of behaviour from outside. To reconcile this 
demand, therefore, the exercise of sovereignty must be carefully constrained and must 
be open to the consideration of historical circumstances, inequalities and political 
arrangements. Article 4(2) of the Draft Declaration, for example, maintains that states 
51 Walzer, On Toleration, p. 27 
52 Walzer, On Toleration, p. 25 
53 Roney, 'There are no Canadian 'aboriginals", p. 30 
54 This notion is argued in Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, 
N.Y., Cornell UP, 1989) 
55 Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, p. 153 
56 The Manila Declaration quoted in Colchester, 'Indigenous rights and the collective conscious', p. 3 
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have to facilitate the employment of indigenous rights and practices except where 
they contravene national law and are contrary to international standards.57 The self-
fixing nature of indigenous cultures can be viewed in the emergence of organisations 
such as the Native Women's Association which is internally able to provide legitimate 
checks and balances on the excesses of tradition. The history of indigenous action 
within the United States has been one carried out, to the greater degree, from within 
the legal and political network developed by the European settlers58 and as such, 
indigenous peoples, under the Indian Civil Rights Act (1968) are required to respect 
most, but not all, of the rights contained within the Bill of Rights. 59 In international 
soft law, instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child call into 
question traditional punishments, whilst the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women aims to censure some traditional practices. 
Perhaps the most oft-discussed practice relating to indigenous peoples is female 
circumcision or female genital mutilation, as it is often referred to. Practiced in over 
forty countries, it is linked to higher rates of AIDS and infant mortality, and, as 
Catherine Annas maintains, 'When the effects of female genital mutilation are 
honestly faced, nothing can justify it. Not culture. Not tradition. Not parental rights. 
Nothing. ' 60 This invokes a challenge to indigenous populations and minority groups 
to desist in a practice which is viewed as being not only illiberal but also extremely 
dangerous. 
Indigenous peoples, though they may be awarded specific rights are, nonetheless, 
subject to national review. Canadian members of peoples can and do challenge in the 
Canadian Supreme Court decisions taken within the group itself owing to rights as 
documented in the Canadian Charter of Rights. Two cases from the 1990s, one 
involving fishing rights and access to land Sparrow v Regina (1990) and the other on 
indigenous initiations, where an individual was abducted by elders as part of a ritual, 
Thomas vs Norris (1 992) demonstrate the limit of indigenous rights and of sovereign 
toleration. The fact that under Sparrow fishing rights were upheld was used to argue 
that the unlawful abduction of a member of an indigenous community as part of a 
57 Article 4(2) of the Draft Declaration 
58 As argued in Taiaiake Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political 
Discourse', Indigenous Affairs, Vol. 3 (2001) via [www.iwgia.org], pp. 22-34, I July 2004 
59 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 38 
6
° Catherine Annas quoted in Niezen, The Origins of lndigenism, p. 113 
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ritual should, similarly, be recognised as an action which prioritised the collective 
over the individual. The court rejected this reasoning, arguing that there was 
absolutely no reason to assume that external protections and internal restrictions 
would or should stand or fall together. 
This section has attempted to construct a plausible rationale for according rights to 
indigenous peoples, based upon the notion that justice is only meaningful within the 
community and that, with regard to indigenous peoples, this sense of community is 
inextricably linked to the sense of self. In doing so, it has discussed and 
acknowledged the liberal viewpoint, understanding its moralistic case, in order to 
construct a coherent notion of justice which, whilst sensitive to the needs of the 
community, nevertheless remains a part of the liberal tradition of rights. Such a 
position challenges prevailing the conception of sovereignty which attempts to 
construct a sense of unity within its respective borders. This is almost impossible 
owing to the indigenous peoples' cultural and historical situatedness and their 
previous exercise of political autonomy which pre-dated the 'Western' notion of 
sovereignty, explored in detail in Chapter One and Section Four of this chapter. 
Culturally sensitive rights provide an effective alternative to the illiberal assimilation 
which still continues in contemporary Australia as evinced by Prime Minister John 
Howard's 1988 statement that 'Aboriginal people should be brought into the 
mainstream of Australian society.' 61 
Section Three: Indigenous Rights, Human Rights, and Legal Justice 
This section aims to show that complementing the community-based arguments and 
their ultimately liberal synthesis, there is a further set of arguments that legitimate 
indigenous rights and the reconceptualisation of sovereignty to encompass this. This 
line of reasoning is based upon human rights and aims to arrive at equality by 
understanding the historical and legal peculiarities which surround indigenous 
peoples. 
61 John Howard quoted in Australians for Native Title and Reconciliation, 'Why "practical 
reconciliation" is bad policy' 
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The first justification for special indigenous rights, and one used frequently in US and 
Canadian courtrooms, is based upon the notion that collective rights may be necessary 
in order to provide economic and political equality in cases where indigenous peoples 
are disadvantaged with respect to a particular resource, whether it be land or political 
representation. In these cases, group differentiated rights, such as the protection of 
languages, the reservation of certain areas for hunting and fishing, or mechanisms to 
ensure electoral representation, must be shown to rectify previously existing 
inequalities.62 The inequalities suggested in the criterion above have been formed 
largely by the histories of indigenous peoples63 who have been 'the victims of 
colonial discourses ofprogress' 64 and who have been described variously as children, 
slaves of natures, unenlightened and uncivilised. 
It is debatable whether the language of human rights, so favoured by many theorists 
of international relations, is actually beneficial to indigenous peoples, an issue which 
rests upon the foundation of rights themselves. Human rights are usually justified 
from a Kantian point of view, from the standpoint that all humans are equal, that all 
have inalienable and identical rights, a claim which can be prone to criticism on the 
grounds outlined in the previous section and also in Chapter One. Rights are not 
universally desired by indigenous peoples and persons, as can be viewed in Pearson's 
objections noted in the previous section and also in the New Zealand Maoris' decision 
to forego rights in favour of permanent representation in Parliament. 65 In this guise, 
the language and foundations of human rights serve as a barrier to indigenous rights 
but if they are viewed as being of instrumental value, rather than moral ends in 
themselves, they then become tenable and defensible once more. In viewing rights as 
a means to the goals of justice and equality, then indigenous rights are able to occupy 
a useful role within a morally-sensitive version of sovereignty which is able to act to 
guarantee a greater degree of justice whilst maintaining order. 
The rights accorded to indigenous peoples have, aside from securing the continued 
enjoyment of cultures, centred upon land and resource rights. The Draft Declaration 
62 Bowen, 'Should we have a universal concept of'indigenous peoples' rights?', p. 14 
63 Indigenous peoples' history is bound up in notions of self-determination, a factor and concept 
discussed in length in the following section. 
64 Thornberry, 'Minority and indigenous rights at 'the end of history", p. 528 
65 The 1865 decision of the Maori community as reported in Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in 
World Politics: Since Time Immemorial (Newbury Park, California, Sage, 1993), p. 14 
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asserts a number of important rights rangmg from development and control over 
lands, territories and resources,66 to recognition of the inviolability of intellectual and 
cultural property, as well as measures to develop and protect their sciences, 
technologies, and cultural manifestations. 67 Furthermore, under the terms of the 
Declaration, indigenous people would be able to affirm their right to restitution or 
compensation for lands, territories and resources which have been confiscated or used 
without consent, and to conserve the environment and productive capacity of lands.68 
Taiaiake Alfred argues that economic rights, such as fishing rights, do not indicate 
any significant normative shift since those rights pre-dated the modem state by 
hundreds of years, and, moreover, that rights like these seem to relegate the 
importance of indigenous peoples to the past since they do not embrace the 
indigenous cultures or utilise their traditions in the name ofmodemity.69 However, in 
offering recompense for past actions, sovereign states are admitting retroactive 
culpability and, as such, would be embracing a spatia-temporal justice not unlike the 
environmental variant discussed at length in the previous chapter. Economic factors, 
as with issues relating to the environment, often seem to act as tmmps and indigenous 
rights in domestic law often seem to be abrogated as with the Canadian government's 
authorisation of a multi-billion dollar nickel mine on the site of Innu burials, caribou 
migration trails and hunting ground and its brokering of a deal for the world's second 
largest dam, to be situated on the Lower Churchill River, in the heart of the Innu 
lands. 70 These actions clearly point to a discrepancy in terms of development, for 
whereas the government seems to favour economic and material development, 
indigenous peoples tend to stress spiritual and religious development, a sentiment 
expressed by a delegation from the Brazilian Y anomano people who travelled to the 
World Bank in the 1980s to argue this point. 71 Economic and environmental justice 
for indigenous peoples not only relate to their histories of dispossession and of 
governments reneging on treaty agreement, discussed below, but also on the 
substantive bond that exists between indigenous peoples and their land. Unlike 
traditional state sovereignty, this tie is not a dominion over territory but rather a 
66 Article 26 of the Draft Declaration 
67 Article 29 of the Draft Declaration 
68 Articles 27 and 28 of the Draft Declaration 
69 As argued in Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse' 
70 Discussions on the use of lnnu lands can be found in Kenrick and Lewis, 'Indigenous peoples' rights 
and the politics of the term 'indigenous", p. 5 
71 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, p. 37 
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sophisticated partnership with it.72 Accordingly, to strengthen their ties to the land 
further, Articles 22 to 24 of the Draft Declaration contend that indigenous peoples 
have the right to special measures for the improvement of their economic and social 
conditions and the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for 
exerctsmg their right to development, including programmes through their own 
institutions. 73 
Whereas the historical argument for granting rights rests on a subtle understanding of 
justice and culpability, the second approach, the legalistic approach, argues that the 
agreements negotiated between indigenous peoples and their invaders carry normative 
force, if not actual legal force. Tully, for example, contends that the common-law 
history of treaties and negotiation in North America does provide what may be 
termed, modifying the Rawlsian, an 'overlapping consensus' between the indigenous 
and Anglo-American legal conceptions of property and that this history of agreement, 
perhaps distinguished from specific historical settlements, provides a sound basis for 
returning land to indigenous groups. 74 
Indeed, colonial powers did sign treaties with 'nations' during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, mainly for land rights, and the vestiges of this jurisprudence, it is 
argued, lives on in the indigenous right and the doctrines of legal pluralism.75 In this 
way, sovereign alterations in contemporary society, although morally appealing in 
promoting equality, are nevertheless merely recognitions of concomitant 
sovereignties. However, it is notable that few, if any, of the major indigenous groups, 
are actually demanding secession as part of their right to self-determination and, 
hence, fears that justice may be placed too highly above order appear unfounded. 
Accordingly, the 'common law doctrine of aboriginal rights' in recent Canadian 
jurisprudence refers to the legal rights of indigenous peoples as originally recognised 
in the custom generated by relations between the indigenous peoples and the 
incoming French and English settlers from the seventeenth century onwards, 
72 Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse' 
73 Article 22 of the Draft Declaration 
74 The Rawlsian notion of the 'overlapping consensus' noted in Bowen, 'Should we have a universal 
concept of 'indigenous peoples' rights?, p. 14 
75 Colchester, 'Indigenous rights and the collective conscious', p. 2 
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particularly with regard to the treaty process between the peoples and the Crown.76 
As a basic constituent of Canadian common law, this doctrine regulates the interplay 
between Canadian systems of law and government and native land, rights, customary 
laws and political institutions. 77 In this manner, it aims to protect diversity and 
promote justice, thereby establishing a more normatively appealing version of 
sovereignty, since the Canadian government, under the Hobbesian conception, could 
feasibly dismiss indigenous claims. 
The native customary law discussed here has been recognised in varying degrees from 
the nineteenth century onwards but only in recent decades has it been fully accepted. 
The two landmark cases are the Calder decision (1971) in Canada and the Mabo 
decision (1992) in Australia, although Calder can be overridden by the rights 
explicated in Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms.78 The report compiled by the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada ( 1996) in line with common law 
and human rights justifications, advised that indigenous peoples receive land, fishing 
and linguistic rights but also noted that the evolution of cultures and rights would 
have to be carefully monitored.79 
Legalistic justifications are also subject to objections. Firstly, it may be argued that 
whatever rights were existent disappeared with the imposition of full sovereignty 
which made no special reservations for the indigenous populations. In short, there are 
and can be no inherent indigenous rights. Such a rationale was enunciated by the US 
State Department who, in responding to complaints made by a number of Indian 
nations, forcefully declared that 'conquest renders the tribes subject to the legislative 
power of the United States and in substance terminates the external powers of 
sovereignty of the tribe.' 80 
The exercise of historical sovereignty is, therefore, offered as a reason for moderating 
contemporary society but such an argument is rejected by Anaya, who contends that 
this is unlikely to be accepted by the international community and also because it 
76 I vi son, 'The logic of aboriginal rights', p. 325 
77 Brian Slattery reported in I vi son, 'The logic of aboriginal rights', p. 325 
78 I vi son, 'The logic of aboriginal rights', p. 326 
79 I vi son, 'The logic of aboriginal rights', p. 326 
80 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, p. 58 
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'ignores the multiple, overlapping spheres of community, authority and 
interdependency that actually exist in the human experience. ' 81 Also rejected by 
Anaya are cultural claims for placing the indigenous above the minority and instead it 
is argued that the crucial point is that indigenous rights are distinguishable by the fact 
that remedies are needed for past injustice, 82 a spatia-temporal notion which tallies 
with the environmental justice discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, the human 
rights rationale seems the most compelling in awarding rights to indigenous peoples 
and one which remains within the liberal tradition but, nevertheless, addresses the 
intellectual objections to which liberalism is prone. 
Section Four: Indigenous Rights, Sovereignty and Self-Determination 
This section addresses that which is commonly viewed as the most important of all 
the indigenous rights tabled in the Draft Declaration, namely self-determination. Tied 
to self-determination are images of nationhood, nationalism and legitimate authority 
and, hence, this section addresses these from a traditionally 'Westem' standpoint, 
since these contribute heavily to modem conceptions of sovereignty in contemporary 
intemational relations. However, it is to be noted that these images do not necessarily 
correlate with anything within the indigenous political vocabulary. Entangled in this 
discourse, is a discussion outlining the limits of Westphalian self-determination, 
which is then followed by a closer examination of indigenous self-determination as 
contained in the Draft Declaration. Also noted in this passage are state reactions to 
self-determination. 
Nationalism can be viewed as both a reaction against globalisation and also a product 
of it. 83 As global interconnections become more and more prominent, individual 
groups, nations, and states have become more willing to assert their cultural and 
national distinctiveness in the face of a grand homogenising trend. This is due, in 
part, to the fear of cultural imperialism which emerges from the 'systematic 
penetration and domination of the cultural life by the ruling classes of the West in 
81 S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (New York, OUP, 1996), p. 78 
82 A theme discussed throughout Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
83 Fred Halliday 'Nationalism' in John Baylis and Steve Smith (Eds.), The Globalization of World 
Politics (Oxford, OUP, 2001), pp. 440-5 
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order to reorder the values, behavior (sic), institutions and identity of the oppressed 
peoples to conform with the interests of the imperial classes. ' 84 
Nationalism is a normative concept, as it moulds how we do and, indeed, should live 
our lives whilst simultaneously informing us about the nature of legitimate authority. 
Beyond justifications in terms of traditional understandings of sovereignty in the 
Westphalian system, the state system can be seen to represent the interests of separate, 
individually legitimated nations. Nationalism contains, and perhaps creates, an 
indivisible sense of community even amongst those who have not even met. 85 As 
such, it is a powerful tool in the maintenance of the political life of a state. As a 
created sentiment, the 'image of a nation is largely the product of dominant elites 
whose definition of self and society, though virtual, acquires an air of solid reality. 
Indigenous peoples' claims for the right to self-determination challenges this image, 
making their request subversive and dangerous to the established order of things. '86 
Fears of subversion are perhaps exaggerated since, as noted above, few indigenous 
peoples are requesting statehood in the Westphalian sense, with calls for secession 
remaining the preserve of those groups, such as the Basque separatists, who operate 
within the mainstream international system. Moreover, it is clear that any attempt at 
the partial or total disruption of state sovereignty is fundamentally incompatible with 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, a fact supported by Erica-Irene Daes, a 
former chairperson of WGIP, who asserted that no state would be created until a 
state's political system became so exclusive and non-democratic that it no longer 
could be said to be representing the whole people. 87 The alien nature of Western 
political concepts is present in the statement of Matthew Coon-Come, grand chief of 
the Grand Council of the Crees, which asserts that ' [ w ]e Crees are not 'nationalists'. 
That concept does not exist in the Cree language. Our tie is not just political, it is also 
physical. We are part of our lands. ' 88 
84 James Petras, 'Cultural Imperialism in the Late 20th Century', Journal of Contemporary Asia, 23 
(1993),p~ 139-148,p. 140 
85 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London, Verso, 1983) 
86 D. Rosengren, 'On 'indigenous' identities: Reflections on a debate', Anthropology Today, Vol. 18(3) 
(2002), p. 25, p. 25 
87 Erica-Irene Daes' view as noted in Niezen, Recognizing lndigenism, p. 130 
88 Matthew Coon-Come quoted in Niezen, The Origins of lndigenism, p. 156 
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This sense of 'oneness' typifies the indigenous attitude to nationalism and self-
determination, in that the organization of the group is not placed at the top of the 
moral hierarchy since the land, the individual and the community are all part of the 
same indivisible whole. Indeed, such a notion may actually help to ease the type of 
environmental dilemma discussed in the previous chapter, for whereas the history of 
Western philosophy emphasises man above all else, the indigenous view is more 
acutely aware of the manner in which man is bound in his environment, rather than 
merely having an economically-based connection with it. The limitations inherent in 
Westphalian sovereignty with regard to indigenous rights exist because it regards 
identity, culture and tradition as valuable only if they help to strengthen national 
debates and provide a pool of loyal labour for defensive, military and economic 
purposes. ' 89 This suggests that sovereignty is constrained by capabilities and security 
issues, which, traditionally, for indigenous peoples, are not of paramount importance. 
The norms of indigenous self-determination are non-discrimination, cultural integrity, 
control over land and resources, social welfare and development. The most powerful 
call for these is found in Article 3 of the Draft Declaration which asserts that, 
'Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. '90 The text of this article is the same as is found in Article I of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and also the Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Political Rights but with 'all peoples' being replaced with 
'indigenous peoples.' 
The term 'peoples' is one fraught with controversy as can be viewed in the fact that 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Sweden and Turkey all voted against the two International Covenants based 
upon the ambiguity of the term which implicitly awards greater moral status to 
internal nations seeking to become a state. The problematic nature of 'peoples' can 
also be seen in the construction of the indigenous rights regime where discussions 
were marked by an obstinacy on the part of states and indigenous delegations as to 
89 Oliver P. Richmond, 'States of sovereignty, sovereign states, and ethnic claims for intemational 
status', Review of International Studies, Vol. 28 (2002), pp. 381-412, p. 389 
90 Article 3 of the Draft Declaration 
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whether to refer to the groups as 'peoples', 'populations' or 'persons' especially 
during the framing of the Draft Declaration. During these discussions, the UN went 
beyond its usual parameters for participation by opening its sessions to all interested 
parties, evoking a sense ofLinklater's dialogic community in order to promote greater 
levels of justice both outside of and within the traditional state community. By 
encouraging participation in the preparation of the Declaration, the UN also ensured 
that representation was more likely to be universal which, as with the NGOs at the 
Rome Conference, ensured a greater level of legitimacy. 
National reactions to the calls for self-determination, although generally enthusiastic, 
present a plethora of interpretations. The Canadian position, for example, is that self-
determination is now seen by many as a right which can continue to be enacted in a 
functioning democracy in which citizens participate in the political system and have 
the opportunity to have input in the political processes which affect them.91 A brief 
examination of this viewpoint seems to suggest that, far from the collective right of 
self-determination favoured by indigenous peoples, what is being offered is the 
standard account of political participation in a liberal democratic state. Norway, 
home to the Sami, was more forthcoming in its response stating that, 'the right to self-
determination includes the rights of indigenous peoples to participate at all levels of 
decision-making in legislative and administrative matters and the maintenance and 
development of their political and economic systems. '92 The US position was one 
which reinforced the importance of the state but its suggested text, which emphasised 
more fully the role of the state, was ultimately rejected.93 Similarly, Latin and South 
American states maintained the importance of the state over the community, enacting 
repressive policies in Brazil, Argentina and Peru which all deny self-determination to 
their peoples. The repressive nature of the South American attitude, however, may be 
symptomatic of their levels of development and the North/South divide in which 
economics is placed on a pedestal above justice.94 
91 The statement of Canada given to the UN Commission for Human Rights in 1999 as quoted in 
Caroline E. Foster, 'Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples', European Journal of International Law, Vol. 12( I) (2001), pp. 141-57, p. !51 
92 Quoted in Foster, 'Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration ... ', p. !51 
93 Foster, 'Articulating Self-determination in the Draft Declaration ... ', p. 148 
94 Banton, 'International norms and Latin American states' policies on indigenous peoples' 
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The normative challenge for sovereignty is to reconcile indigenous self-detetmination 
with the state's propensity to maximise its economic capacity and potential. The 
requests of indigenous peoples, if granted, would entail a rethinking of the ways in 
which economic activities are organized within states, which could, it is argued, pose 
a direct challenge to current understanding of the state.95 The overlapping loci of 
authority can be clearly seen in the potential discrepancy between Article 32 which 
asserts the right of the indigenous person to freely choose his or her own rights of 
citizenship without disbarring him or her from enjoying full citizenship rights of the 
nation96 and Article 35 which maintains that indigenous peoples, in particular those 
divided by national borders, 'have the right to maintain and develop contacts, 
relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political and 
social purposes '97 with other people across borders. This undermines traditional 
Westphalian sovereignty with its discrete, geographically-defined political units, and 
thus acceptance of these terms may ultimately help to weaken the state's primacy in 
international relations. It is, therefore, perhaps no surprise that, at the time of writing, 
the Draft Declaration is yet to be adopted, although the dialogue between NGOs, the 
UN and states continues in earnest with individual governments acting to preserve and 
promote indigenous justice. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the indigenous rights movement, and the ma1lller in which 
its normative rationale questions the moral legitimacy of the organising principle of 
the sovereign state and how sovereignty may be modified in order to embrace its 
demands. 
The first argument for indigenous rights rests upon communitarian justice, which 
maintains that the moral well-being of a community ranks higher in importance than 
do the interests of the individual within the society. Dominant conceptions of 
sovereignty note the indivisibility of the individual and the state as is evinced by the 
work of Hobbes, Locke and Bodin as discussed in Chapter One but, it is clear that 
95 David Maybury-Lewis's thought noted in Niezen, 'Recognizing lndigenism', p. 130 
96 Article 32 of the Draft Declaration 
97 Article 35 ofthe Draft Declaration 
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sub-state communities, including indigenous peoples, are moral units which bear 
attention, understanding and measures which are sensitive to the limitations on the 
grand, unifying logic of the sovereign state. Thus, culturally-sensitive justice for the 
community is a viable concept and goal for a morally-receptive form of sovereignty 
and so elements like cultural and linguistic rights are rightfully embedded in 
international conventions. Communitarianism tends to exclude those outside the 
community and dismisses the importance of the individual and so what may therefore 
be propounded is the liberal synthesis of the communitarian position which results in 
what may be termed 'justice for communities' which embraces diversity whilst 
simultaneously being underpinned by a basic moral foundation which regards the 
individual as being of paramount importance. This approach, which is far less 
homogenising than many expansive and austere cosmopolitan standpoints, is one 
which IS both practicable and morally appealing, providing the 'thin 
cosmopolitanism' which Linklater espouses. To this end, restrictions placed upon the 
state not to damage the community are reconciled by an acceptance that illiberal 
restrictions upon a community member are also intolerable. However, it may also be 
seen that the indigenous rights regime cannot stand on this reasoning alone and that 
the liberal human rights regime can provide a greater measure of justice for those who 
have historically been subjugated and dispossessed. 
The second, and more persuasive, of the arguments proposed is based upon a human 
rights rationale which centres around the notion that equality can only be achieved 
where amends are made for actions which have, in the past, led to the emergence of 
inequalities, dispossession and dominance by an outside power upon a previously-
existing community which had enjoyed political autonomy. The basis of human 
rights in this context owes a great deal to the instrumental appreciation of the topic, in 
which rights are viewed not as ends in themselves, but rather as mechanisms to 
guarantee particular moral requirements. As with environmental problems, the justice 
is spatio-temporal, where existing ruling elites and systems recognise that, at an 
earlier point in time, alien political cultures and domineering politics had been 
immorally, if not illegally, imposed. For sovereignty to recognise the moral force and 
validity of these arguments is to demonstrate the normative evolution of the concept. 
In a similar vein, historical agreements between the invaders and invaded also contain 
normative force as do the historical arguments of prior occupation though, as noted 
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above, this line of reasoning is susceptible to the charges made against it by, amongst 
others, Kuper. 
The working definition of an indigenous people given earlier in this chapter embraces 
the 'saltwater thesis', that is to say that only sea borne invasions can lead to post facto 
indigenous rights, rendering the problem one limited to European invasions of the 
'new world.' Discrepancies between the positions taken by the three most prominent 
states involved in indigenous rights, the United States, Canada, and Australia reveal 
disparities and concord on the subject with Canada remaining the most proactive in 
fulfilling the requests of its indigenous populations and Australia the least receptive. 
However, all three states have, unsurprisingly, been unwilling to accept the notion of 
self-determination, although acceptance of demands may soon be forthcoming if all 
recognise the limitations of the term in the vocabulary of the indigenous peoples 
themselves. Secession, for the vast majority of indigenous groups, is not a political 
aim, representing, as it does, a recognition of Western political notions of self and 
sovereignty which simply do not exist in indigenous cultures. Whereas demands for 
Westphalian sovereignty, including requests issued by those who favour the 
communitarian over cosmopolitan, stress dominion over and ownership of land, 
resources and so forth, the indigenous conception emphasises the manner in which 
people are merely part and parcel of the land itself. 
In conclusion, the acceptance of indigenous rights by the sovereign state rests upon 
dynamics of justice for the community built upon the foundations of a liberal bedrock 
of rights, a willingness on the part of 'new' states to promote a form of justice which 
is sensitive to past inequality, and lastly a clearer comprehension that indigenous 
peoples' rights are compatible with the current international system, if only by dint of 
the fact that the indigenous peoples themselves operate outside of that system. 
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Conclusion 
Sovereignty in contemporary international relations is facing a number of key 
challenges. Traditional conceptions have viewed it as a moral good, an important and 
immutable anchor of the international life, which, by its very existence, validates the 
actions and policies of each individual state. However, the Hobbesian state with 
unlimited internal jurisdiction and no right to question the policies of its neighbours is 
no longer tenable as normative challenges based on human rights, trans-border 
obligations and the need to recognise diversity within states borders begin to question 
sovereignty's moral worth. These three challenges are reiterated below, alongside an 
appreciation of the non-governmental activity which pervades all three. The notion of 
spatia-temporal justice, an important and new concept which has begun to guide 
contemporary conduct is also included. 
The traditional conception of sovereignty, the Westphalian in Krasner's examination, 
centres empirically on a fixed territory, population and government when combined 
with constitutional separateness. Its normative worth, according to Jackson who 
terms it the grundnorm, rests on its ability to provide a basis on which other values 
can be produced, most notably, order. However, this essay has sought to demonstrate 
that sovereignty as presently conceived is too narrow theoretically. We now 
recognise and must address conceptions of the good and of the moral worth of 
communities both outside of and within the state. The political imagination may be 
expanded so that sovereign states become increasingly aware of their responsibilities 
as well as their rights. 
Sovereignty, as a legitimate international concept, is becoming contingent. The 
legitimacy of a state in the eyes of the international community is absolutely 
fundamental to the international system as is demonstrated by the manner in which 
the Bantustans of Apartheid South Africa were rejected as potential states and also 
why states such as Haiti have to demonstrate their moral worth in order to remain 
valid. Sovereignty is becoming increasingly contingent upon human rights, the 
adoption of which is becoming the shared standard of civilization for full membership 
of the international community. Though moral judgements have played an important 
role since the end of the Second World War, they occupied a diminished role during 
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the course of the Cold War and only in the last fifteen years have they returned to the 
mainstream international political life, questioning the morality of the sovereign state. 
The cosmopolitan challenge of promoting individual responsibilities and rights 
constitutes an important evolution in the life of the sovereign state. The Kantian 
categorical imperative and the tide of Enlightenment philosophy which present the 
individual as a moral end have impacted massively upon international relations by 
way of the human rights regime whose crowning glory is the ICC. Human rights 
question, in Kant's terms, the majesty of the state as a constituent of an international 
system typified by lawless savages clinging to their freedom, unaware that the moral 
potential of mankind is being wasted, simply by dint of sovereign supremacy. 
Accordingly, sovereignty's ability to legitimise governments who treat citizens as 
they please is no longer defensible as evinced by the ICC's very existence and the 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which seem to indicate that some 
crimes transcend the individual and are directed, instead, against humanity. 
The ICC represents the recognition of the dignity of the individual, the limitations on 
the state's exercise of power and, according to Radley, the existence of a higher 
positive law. 1 In this way, sovereignty, pre-eminent in international relations, must 
evolve in order to mirror the normative requirements developed by the international 
community if it is to be regarded as, in any way, legitimate. Thus, the prospects for 
universal jurisdiction, which may lead to further developments in international 
criminal law, have increased markedly in recent years. Accompanying this is the 
hope that governments, NGOs and so forth will be able to modify sovereignty in order 
to explore its inherent normative possibilities in order that a cosmopolitan or to use 
Parekh's less politically contentious term, globally-oriented, outlook develops, 
superseding mere sovereign co-existence. Indeed, Teson's appreciation of the 
Kantian foedus pacificum seems to tally with the aspirations of the ICC and, 
potentially at least, this institution may lead to a positive moral modification of 
sovereignty as presently understood. Linklater's dialogic community, which avoids 
the pitfalls of Kantian transcendental universalism, favouring instead the Hegelian 
approach, also appears to present a promising methodology for extending moral 
1 Rodley in Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court, p. 42 
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concern, but only if the self-fulfilling prophecy of the Hobbesian war of all against all 
is re-appraised by policymakers. Linklater's hopes for a world in which sovereignty, 
citizenship and nationality are not welded together, thus, remains only a vision but, in 
this essay at least, there are signs that the cosmopolitan outlook is entrenching itself in 
the wider political consciousness. 
Further to the ICC's protection of the rights of the world community, the right to a 
clean and hospitable environment has also become a key issue in recent years and one 
which has been championed by a vast number ofNGOs. The Rawlsian-inspired right 
to a world in which the enjoyment of 'liberal' rights is possible has dominated and 
driven the epistemic community surrounding the climate change regime, and indeed, 
the lack of progress in tackling the problem may be seen to be directly related to 
disagreements as to what constitutes acceptable levels of greenhouse gases. 
Nevertheless, the right to a hospitable environment is one which may, in the near 
future, lead to limitations on a sovereign state's ability to industrialise and use its 
resources as it sees fit. 
A second cosmopolitan challenge emanates from the view that each sovereign state 
ought to be aware of its trans-border obligations, thereby disrupting the self/other 
dichotomy which currently characterises sovereignty. International relations, Pogge 
argues, operates as a balance of power and excludes outsiders. Thus, politicians are 
left with no true moral reason for taking neighbours and those on other continents into 
account. Pogge therefore suggests the construction of epistemic communities with the 
ability to transcend the state in order to provide for global well-being. The creation of 
international regimes, sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which expectations converge, are becoming increasingly 
important and offer a mode of alleviating the alienation and exclusion of outsiders 
which occurs under the anarchic precepts of the international system. Trans-border 
obligations and the recognition of interdependence have been particularly evident 
with regard to environmental dilemmas. The notion that the Earth is one but the 
world is not has become increasingly prominent, catalysed by events, news stories and 
reports which have forced leaders to explore possibilities which may limit their own 
power but which will offer a boon for those in other areas of the world. The 
limitation of the worth of the individual state in environmental matters has led to a 
122 
slight maturation m the way in which individuals problems are handled. 
Nevertheless, game theoretic, short-term financial considerations and lack of 
scientific certainty have, too often, prevailed, demonstrating the power of territorially 
limited notions of responsibility embedded in Westphalian sovereignty. 
Anthropocentrism, both strong and weak, has been the dominant position with regard 
to the environment and, consequently, instrumental and financial calculations have 
halted most attempts to deal with dilemmas at the international level. One of the 
greatest successes of an environmental regime, the Montreal Protocol on the use of 
CFCs, relied on the fact that hydrocarbons, CFCs' replacements, were not only less 
polluting but also significantly cheaper. Had this not been the case then the ozone 
regime, it may be argued, may not have been so successful. Financial considerations 
may also be noted in the early stages of the climate change regime when, at the Rio 
Summit in 1992, those who proffered ideas of limiting the use of fossil fuels were met 
by a wall of intransigence by oil exporters and importers, even to the extent that some 
states aimed to class petroleum as a non-polluting resource.2 This kind of attitude 
typifies the unwillingness of states to curb their economic power for the greater good 
and it may therefore be seen that any significant normative improvement in 
environmental matters is unlikely to occur whilst the Hobbesian war rages financially. 
Economic considerations also dent a state's willingness to accept diversity within its 
own borders as can be seen in the Canadian government's plan to build a nickel mine 
in an area which is sacred to the Innu people and which would have also disrupted 
their fishing and hunting activities. 
A further normative improvement may lie in sovereignty's ability to reconcile its 
totalising tendencies with the acknowledgment of diversity within cosmopolitanism. 
As has been argued, sub-state communities are worthy of moral consideration since 
ties and identities are formed within these communities rather than within a state as a 
single entity. For sovereignty to become more morally appealing it ought to recognise 
the role of diversity within its boundaries and abandon assimilationist tendencies 
which have led, in the case of indigenous peoples, to policies of subjugation and 
repressiOn. With regard to indigenous peoples, a number of logics have been 
2 Wapner, 'Reorienting State Sovereignty', p. 279-80 
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provided which each rationalize why specialised rights are justifiable but perhaps the 
most persuasive are the liberal, rather than communitarian, arguments. The liberal 
position contends that rights to self-determination, land and language are morally 
acceptable since they make amends for previous injustices. Thus, Kymlicka, for 
example, asserts that those who, in general, support the human rights regime, ought to 
accept diversity by endorsing external protections but, concurrently, should reject 
internal restrictions which limit the rights of group members to act as moral ends with 
their own aspiration and will, above and beyond the community. A more liberal and 
expansive sovereignty can, it is argued, allow groups such as indigenous peoples to 
hold rights as long as these are protections rather than internal restrictions. In this 
way, cultures, which are not considered a primary good, can be guarded, for, as 
Dworkin argues, we have a duty to protect the cultures in which we live and develop. 
Indigenous rights have been the most divisive of the three areas for normative 
improvement discussed in this essay. Those who support a robust set of human rights 
argue that, essentially, these rights are illiberal and are based purely upon descent and 
accidents of birth and that separate but equal is, echoing the US civil rights 
legislation, inherently unequal. However, the cosmopolitan may be able to argue that 
the community per se is not what is being protected but rather that, as mentioned 
above, such rights are enacted in order to secure equality where there previously 
existed relationships of dominance. Furthermore, these rights are underpinned by a 
cosmopolitan logic which provides a bedrock of fundamental rights which all people 
must enjoy, ruling out illiberal practices such as female genital mutilation, however 
culturally legitimated they may be. Thus, cosmopolitan sovereignty must be able to 
reconcile and understand the importance of culture rather than insisting on an austere 
and almost uncultured form of liberalism, for it has been argued that cosmopolitans, 
though enlightened, are moral drifters who move through life without significant 
attachments. 
Alfred notes that elements of indigenous rights are not normative improvements on 
any vast scale since they are simply the re-granting of previously existing rights. 3 
Nevertheless, a state's willingness to cede authority over important rights based upon 
3 A theme discussed in Alfred, 'From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political 
Discourse' 
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injustices which occurred centuries before does demonstrate that a new variant of 
sovereignty is emerging and that this new form is culturally-sensitive, even to the 
point of being willing to promote organisations which, were one a strict realist, 
undermine the nation state as previously drawn, bringing together groups of people 
scattered over various borders. 
Of the various types of justice documented in this essay perhaps the most impressive 
is spatio-temporal justice, a category which applies to the case studies of 
environmental problems and indigenous rights issues, though not, owing to the 
problems of retroactivity, to the human rights as relating to the ICC. In the case of 
indigenous peoples, the rights which have been accrued are, if one were only spatial, 
fundamentally illiberal. If these groups were stripped of their history and culture then 
liberal critics would have strong grounds for countering them. However, these rights 
are not only spatial but also temporal, recognising, as they do, what has happened in 
the past. Thus, rights which guarantee exclusive access to fishing and hunting 
grounds are granted on the basis of a history of subjugation and domination. These 
historical circumstances having produced inequalities and disparities are, therefore, 
justifiably redressed by a modern form of sovereignty sensitive to actions which 
occurred centuries previously, recognising the immorality, if not the illegality, of 
ancestors' actions. Spatio-temporal justice can also be seen with regard to 
environmental problems where, in the framing of the Kyoto Protocol, responsibilities 
are accrued as the result of industrial activities which have occurred in the past as well 
as the present, as can be seen in the 'common but differentiated' approach. 
Furthermore, spatio-temporal justice can also become an issue with regard to future 
generations for if Rawls' veil of ignorance is employed in such a way as to be devoid 
of temporality then the rights of future generations must be considered. 
In each of the case studies considered, the role of NGOs or epistemic communities 
has been considerable and important. NGOs, a constituent aspect of 'global civil 
society', are increasingly coming to prominence as bodies capable of creating agendas 
and maintaining legitimate pressure upon sovereign states over various issues in order 
to develop networks and construct norms. Linklater's dialogic community may be 
viewed in epistemic communities as bodies and networks which promote international 
and inter-governmental dialogue in order to widen circles of concern. In terms of the 
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Rome Conference, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) was able 
to direct delegates, offering legal objections and suggestions for consideration. 
Moreover, since NGOs from virtually every state attended, CICC acquired an air of 
legitimacy, representing humanity's interests, offering ways to improve sovereignty 
for the benefit of the global community. Similarly, the negotiations surrounding the 
UN's Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples included at every level 
various bodies, helping to constitute an indigenous peoples' epistemic community, 
which helped to validate the individual demands of each group. 
Epistemic communities are vitally important with regard to environmental problems 
as suppliers of research, costs, potential problems and also solutions, but are, perhaps, 
more fallible than their CICC counterparts owing to the problems of asserting, beyond 
doubt, scientific fact. Whereas CICC pricked the moral conscience of mankind, the 
epistemic community surrounding the climate change regime had to prove that 
damage was serious, lasting and anthropogenic and, as yet, has been unable to do so, 
meaning that governments have been relatively inactive. However, this is not to say 
that scientific epistemic communities are powerless, for if consensus was reached by a 
majority of legitimate bodies, then sovereign intransigence would become difficult, if 
not impossible. 
As discussed in the introduction, this essay aimed to address not only whether 
alterations to sovereignty were morally desirable but also whether they were likely to 
happen. Each of these case studies has demonstrated that states hold a range of views 
on a range of topics. The most visible and potentially most important in terms of 
practical politics is the Euro-Atlantic split, with theorists, such as Daadler and Kagan, 
arguing that the two are heading for divorce.4 Keohane argues that Europeans are 
fundamentally more cosmopolitan and that they are more prepared to indulge in 
compromise and negotiation whereas the United States is far more likely to be robust 
in its attitude, rejecting the international in favour of the domestic.5 This sentiment 
can be seen in the negotiations over the ICC and also over climate change where the 
US sought to maximise its voluntarism and its political supremacy. US attitudes are 
4 As in Daadler, 'Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?' and Keohane, 'Ironies of 
Sovereignty' 
5 As discussed in, for example, Marc Weller, 'Undoing the global constitution' 
126 
rooted in internationalism which views rules as being of use only if they guarantee 
order. The US attitude also encourages the primacy of power and facts in 
international relations, rather than their European counterparts who seem more intent 
on providing justice and adhering to normative agendas.6 To what extent this divide 
will grow is debatable, resting, arguably, on the economic performance of both. The 
North/South divide can also be seen with regard to environmental matters with many 
countries from the South viewing the Rio negotiations, for example, as an economic 
conference rather than an environmental one. Here, different priorities may clearly be 
viewed and it is wholly unsurprising that the developing world is focused more on 
continuing their development rather than maintaining an environmentally-sound status 
quo. 
In conclusion, sovereignty is a concept which has come under a great deal of scrutiny 
in recent decades. No longer can it claim to be an unconstrained moral good. The 
Hobbesian fiction by which a state could do as it pleased as long as it protected its 
citizens from invasion has been shown to be insufficient in contemporary 
international relations. This essay has investigated three challenges to sovereignty in 
order to demonstrate the manner and extent to which sovereignty is being eroded, if 
not actively relinquished, for a greater moral good. The cosmopolitan notion of 
individual responsibility has been endorsed and validated by all but a handful of 
states, indicating a willingness on the part of most to accept that sovereignty is not 
and cannot be a defence against the violation of fundamental rights. With regard to 
environmental matters, discussions have illustrated that states are willing to cede 
some authority for the good of others, but, currently, financial considerations 
dominate and there has been relative inaction on the part of all concerned. Indigenous 
rights have demonstrated that even where the sovereignty of a group is legally null 
and void, nevertheless moral culpability continues. 
Many theorists argue that sovereignty is an outmoded concept which will give way 
under the stress of globalisation but James and Jackson, for example, maintain that the 
normative modification of sovereignty in line with cosmopolitanism perhaps, will 
serve as a method for reenergising and reinvigorating the state in order that it remains 
6 
see Keohane in particular 
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an anchor for the international system. Sovereignty is reacting to new dilemmas and 
agendas in international relations, adapting its remit to provide greater levels of 
justice and accountability for individuals and groups within the global community. 
The breadth of the literature on the topic indicates that there exists a groundswell of 
opinion, both academic and otherwise, which is lobbying for an evolution of 
sovereignty in order that it is able to provide greater moral assurances to each member 
of the cosmopolis. Although the international system remains fundamentally tied to 
internationalism, which views its prime normative directive as being the maintenance 
of order, nevertheless, cosmopolitan moral improvements are clearly visible in all 
elements of international life and there is a significant amount of evidence to argue 
that this process will continue in the following few decades. 
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